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Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is a debilitating disorder that is heterogeneous in 
presentation and difficult to treat. Nearly half of treatment-seeking individuals do not benefit 
fully from therapy, and success rates have changed little over decades despite ongoing research 
into obsessions. These outcomes suggest that aspects of the OCD experience are being 
overlooked and not addressed in therapy, highlighting a need to revisit core assumptions the 
cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) model makes about the disorder. Indeed, there are 
significant gaps in the literature, revealing a lack of phenomenological grounding to support 
key assumptions made about obsessions and how they interact with compulsions in the model. 
In fact, there are scant existing studies of the true chronological nature between obsessions and 
compulsions (none interviewing individuals themselves), few studies of intrusive images 
despite their prominent place in diagnostic criteria, and woefully scattered investigations of 
doubt making it difficult to know how doubt should be defined in this ‘doubting disease.’ This 
dissertation thus aimed to address these lacunae by interviewing 65 individuals (44 diagnosed 
with OCD and 21 with subthreshold OCD symptoms) on these three domains using a 
structured interview developed for this study.  
Analyses of participant reports indicate that there is a significant need to revisit and 
possibly update the CBT model to highlight the interplay between obsessions and compulsions, 
and to underscore the complex relations between the ways in which obsessional content can 
appear (i.e., obsessional forms, such as verbal thoughts, mental images, or doubt, etc.). 
Specifically, obsessions were found to be more dynamic than we currently assume, typically 
appearing in three different forms at once and often taking place concurrently with and 
extending beyond compulsions. Moreover, the most distressing, noticeable, and powerful 
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forms in which obsessional content appeared were those not currently recognized: namely, 
doubt, an internal voice or narrative (which participants distinguished from general verbal 
thoughts), and sensory phenomena. For that matter, respondents defined obsessional doubt as 
capturing three categories of concerns: doubts about their safety status (‘Am I clean?’), how 
properly they completed behaviours (‘Did I clean well enough?), and their own senses or 
cognitive capability (‘Am I remembering correctly that I cleaned?).  Lastly, contrary to 
expectations, intrusive images were less prevalent, distressing, and personally significant than 
the few existing studies would suggest. These study findings have important implications for 
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Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) is a common and disabling disorder, afflicting 1-
2% of Canadians in their lifetime (Kessler et al., 2005) and estimated to be one of the leading 
causes of disability among individuals aged 15 to 44 (WHO, 2008). Characterised by recurrent, 
distressing intrusive thoughts (obsessions) and/or repetitive behaviours or mental acts the 
individual feels compelled to perform in response (compulsions), OCD can be extremely 
interfering and time consuming (APA, 2013). Over half of individuals with OCD report 
academic underachievement, 40% cannot sustain long-term employment, and many sufferers 
report impairment in social functioning and in their ability to perform day-to-day activities 
(Hollander et al., 1996). OCD symptoms tend to run a chronic course or wax and wane over time 
for most individuals; few cases get better without treatment, with most worsening over time and 
with age (Hollander, 1997; Kessler et al., 2005; McKay et al., 2015).  
There is significant heterogeneity in how OCD presents, ranging from the course of 
illness, to symptom presentation and content, to patterns of neurological activity (Ball, Baer, & 
Otto, 1996; Mataix-Cols, Marks, Greist, Kobak, & Baer, 2002). OCD assessment tools thus have 
the unique challenge of trying to tidily capture or quantify the essential elements of the disorder 
without neglecting its far-ranging corners. Structured interviews administered by trained 
clinicians are the gold-standard assessment tool, with some measures primarily intended to 
establish diagnoses and others to additionally identify symptom severity. Oft-used diagnostic 
tools include the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-5 (SCID-5; First et al., 2015) and the 
Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview for DSM-5 (M.I.N.I. 7.0; Sheehan, 2014), which 
focus on the absence or presence of DSM diagnostic criteria. The Yale-Brown Obsessive-
2 
 
Compulsive Scale (YBOCS; Goodman et al., 1989) is helpful in reflecting both the range of 
OCD symptoms, as it assesses obsession and compulsion content using a checklist of frequently 
reported domains, and in quantifying other disorder-relevant characteristics (e.g., insight, 
resistance, distress, etc.) among well-established norms. 
Captured by such assessment tools, typical OCD symptom domains include obsessions 
about being contaminated by dirt or germs; being responsible for possible harm due to one’s 
actions or inactions (e.g., not checking appliances well enough before leaving the house and 
burning it down); immoral or repugnant thoughts (e.g., aggressive, sexual, religious, or 
blasphemous themes); and/or a need for symmetry and exactness (e.g., papers or objects being 
properly aligned). These obsessions provoke compulsions to clean or wash, check repeatedly, 
complete superstitious rituals (e.g., touch a cross after every blasphemous thought), and order or 
arrange compulsively (Goodman et al., 1989; Pinto et al., 2007). 
OCD is well-documented as a disorder associated with poor quality of life (QOL) across 
several domains, such as a subjective sense of emotional well-being, ability to work and 
complete household duties, ability to enjoy recreational activities, and social functioning 
(Coluccia et al., 2016; Eisen et al., 2006). A recent meta-analysis of 13 studies assessing QOL 
outcomes in OCD, compared to healthy controls, determined that all QOL domains were 
negatively impacted, with emotional, work, and social domains most affected. Age and sex were 
significant moderators, with older and female patients indicating poorer QOL relative to controls. 
Bafflingly, OCD severity was positively correlated with global QOL in one study, such that less 
severe individuals had worse QOL (Coluccia et al., 2016), while more severe individuals 
reported greater functional impairment in other studies (e.g., Eisen et al., 2006). This discrepancy 
remains unresolved, though it has been posited that less severe patients may simply have greater 
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insight into their functional impairments and distress, or be better able to maintain social and 
work activities to some extent, compared to more severe individuals, who may avoid or escape to 
a significant degree (Coluccia et al., 2016). 
In a study of treatment-seeking individuals with OCD, Eisen and colleauges (2006) found 
that OCD severity was significantly correlated with all QOL domains. Moreover, associations 
were typically stronger between QOL ratings (overall QOL, subjective sense of wellbeing, 
ability to enjoy leisure activities) and obsessional severity than with compulsion severity, except 
for work functioning (which was more strongly correlated with compulsion severity; Eisen et al., 
2006). The inherent heterogeneity of the disorder has important consequences even for QOL, 
with specific subtypes differentially impacting domains of functioning. Contamination and 
symmetry-related symptoms predicted poorer satisfaction in social relationships after controlling 
for OCD and depression severity, while content related to contamination and overresponsibility 
for harm were associated with impairments in health-related QOL. Leisure-based QOL were by 
and large only impacted by contamination content. Symptom content domains appeared not to be 
significantly associated with work, school, or wellbeing QOL (Schwartzman et al., 2017). 
Significantly, poorer QOL has been found to predict poorer treatment outcomes across 
psychotherapy and pharmacotherapy (Maher et al., 2010), and impairment in the social 
functioning domain has been correlated with greater risk of drop out and relapse (Hollander et 
al., 2010). Fortunately, improvements in OCD symptom severity (whether via psychotherapy, 
pharmacotherapy, or placebo pill) do lead to subsequent changes in QOL over time. In fact, 
individuals with higher YBOCS scores showed greater improvements in QOL over time, perhaps 




Cognitive-Behavioural and Other Models of OCD 
The most widely accepted model of OCD is based on cognitive-behaviour theories that 
arose in the 1980s and 1990s (Rachman, 1997; Salkovskis, 1985) and have changed little since 
that time. This model identifies obsessions as normally-occurring intrusive cognitions 
(specifically, thoughts, images, or impulses) that cause distress in individuals and recur, because 
they are appraised as signifying potential harm or revealing unwanted, ego-dystonic aspects of 
self (Rachman, 1997; Purdon & Clark, 1999). Factor analyses of the Obsessive-Beliefs 
Questionnaire (OBQ; OCCWG, 2003) have yielded three types of appraisals that are 
characteristic of OCD:  
(1) inflated responsibility / threat estimation, which reflects an excessive sense of 
responsibility for negative events and concern about harm arising from acts of 
omission (failing to act and prevent harm one could have foreseen) or commission 
(behaving in a way that brings about harm);  
(2) perfectionism / certainty, which represents perfectionistic, rigid standards for task 
completion and intolerance of uncertainty; and, 
(3) importance / control of thoughts, which encapsulates implications of having the 
thoughts, such as thought-action fusion (the belief that having the distressing thought 
makes it more likely to become realised in life) and moral thought-action fusion (the 
concern that having the thought is the moral equivalent of having actually carried it 
out; OCCWG, 2003).  
According to the model, the obsessional distress that results from these interpretations 
drives compulsive behaviours meant to prevent the negative outcome or absolve the individual of 
responsibility and guilt should the feared event occur, thereby relieving distress. However, such 
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behaviours are typically perseverative in that they are repeated 
past the point where the behaviour would be functional or are 
not realistically capable of preventing the feared outcome. The 
temporary respite from distress negatively reinforces the 
compulsion, encouraging individuals to repeat such 
behaviours, and further entrenching obsessional beliefs, thus 
maintaining the maladaptive cycle (Rachman, 1997; 
Salkovskis, 1985). This cycle is portrayed in Figure 1. 
Cognitive-behaviour therapy (CBT), the most empirically-supported psychotherapy for 
OCD (Eddy, Dutra, Bradley, & Westen, 2004; Fisher & Wells, 2005; McKay et al., 2015), is 
based on the cognitive-behavioural model of OCD; thus, it focuses on challenging appraisals of 
the obsession as meaningful and important and conducting behavioural experiments to learn 
whether feared outcomes come true when compulsions are resisted. Exposure to obsessional 
fears while preventing compulsive responses (i.e., exposure with response prevention, ERP) is 
also frequently utilised to help individuals with OCD habituate to feared situations. However, 
treatment studies suggest that success rates are 50-60% when including those who drop out and 
refuse treatment (Fisher & Wells, 2005; McKay et al., 2015). This means that nearly half of 
treatment-seeking individuals with OCD do not benefit fully from therapy.  
Significantly, treatment success is not typically defined as a complete remission of 
symptoms. Instead, those with posttreatment YBOCS scores indicating a reduction of 35% or 
more from pre-treatment scores are considered treatment responders, while non-response is 
defined as 25% or less change (Pallanti et al., 2002; Pallanti & Quercioli, 2006). These treatment 
outcomes suggest that aspects of the experience of obsessions and compulsions are being 
Figure 1. CBT model of OCD 
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overlooked in therapies that are currently available (whether due to lack of awareness about these 
aspects, or lack of attention to them in spite of knowing), or are being targeted but are not 
responding to intervention. Consider that high scores on repugnant obsession dimensions (e.g., 
sexual or religious content) predicted poorer long-term treatment outcomes with 
pharmacotherapy, behaviour therapy (Alonso et al., 2001), and CBT (Mataix-Cols et al., 2002; 
McKay et al., 2015). By contrast, some studies have shown better outcomes for those with 
checking rituals (Drummond, 1993; Ball et al., 1996). It may be that certain pockets of the 
disorder are appropriately identified by the model and thus targeted and successfully treated in 
CBT, while others are incompletely understood and not effectively treated. As research over the 
past several decades has focused primarily on obsessions, with little change in treatment success, 
we may need to revisit core assumptions the model makes about obsessions in OCD.  
 Writers and researchers have attempted to offer alternative models of OCD or 
conceptualisations of obsessions and compulsions across time. Early German psychiatrists in the 
1950s conceptualised OCD in a more parsimonious way, labelling it "Zwangsvorstellung" 
(meaning a compelling presentation or fixed ideas) and using the German term "Zwang" to 
simultaneously denote both obsessions (Zwangsvorstellungen) and compulsions 
(Zwangshandlungen). This unitary approach highlighted the shared nature of both phenomena 
while de-emphasizing differentiating characteristics between intrusive thoughts and compulsive 
behaviours (Spitzer & Sigmund, 1997). However, according to Friedrich (2015), the word 
Zwangsvorstellung was translated as ‘obsession’ in the United Kingdom and ‘compulsion’ in the 
United States, and researchers settled on OCD as a mid-Atlantic compromise.  
At the extreme, Robbins, Gillan, Smith, de Wit, and Ersche (2012) have proposed that 
OCD may be better conceptualised as compulsive-obsessive disorder (i.e., COD), with the 
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obsession being subconsciously identified or unintentionally created after the felt urge to 
perform the compulsion. They argue that the obsession therefore exists only as a post hoc 
rationalisation of the compulsive urge, not as an initial phenomenon in and of itself. They further 
argue that inflated responsibility beliefs may simply be attempts to justify the compulsive urges. 
In support of this contention, Cougle and Lee (2014) have observed that people with OCD do not 
always score higher on measures of OC-related beliefs and appraisals than anxious controls and 
such post hoc justifications have been found with moral judgements (i.e., emotions, such as 
disgust and shame, and intuition often precede moral reasoning). They also note that distressing 
reactions to intrusive thoughts may be a normative response to the frequency or uncontrollability 
of obsessional intrusions rather than appraisals themselves, and appraisals may therefore be 
simply epiphenomena (Cougle & Lee, 2014). While recognising the extreme stance taken, 
Robbins and colleagues (2012) caution that exclusively conceptualising obsessions as 
misinterpretation-based reactions to intrusive thoughts may result in missed, important features 
of obsessions or factors implicating difficulty dismissing intrusions. In particular, they note we 
know little about the time course of relations between thoughts, control strategies, beliefs, 
distress, and frequency, so more light needs to be shed on these aspects (Robbins et al., 2012). 
Szechtman and Woody (2004) have also focused on the role of compulsions in OCD; 
they propose that OCD is fundamentally a disorder of stopping, wherein individuals are unable 
to achieve a satisfying internal sense that they have completed a task, although they are able to 
recognise rationally that the task appears complete, and therefore perseverate on tasks for 
abnormal lengths of time. Importantly, they argue that OCD results from the dysfunctional 
response of a natural Security Motivation System (SMS), which appraises potential danger and 
initiates an appropriate behavioural response to the danger. The SMS can typically be terminated 
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by performing corrective behaviours that help one achieve an internal, implicit, felt sense that 
one has completed a task to satisfaction, a sensation that Szechtman and Woody (2004) term 
“yedasentience” (also see Hinds et al., 2010). In OCD, the engagement in the elicited corrective 
or preventative behaviours fails to provide the normal, negative feedback that would terminate 
activation of the SMS (i.e., they are unable to achieve a ‘yedasentience’ signal), and thus the 
behavioural responses persist abnormally (Hinds, Woody, Schmidt, Van Ameringen, & 
Szechtman, 2015). Szechtman and Woody (2004) proposed that OCD is characterized by 
difficulty achieving yedasentience; thus, OCD is a problem of stopping.  
Lazarov, Dar, Liberman, and Oded (2012) have put forth a different theory regarding 
mechanisms in OCD, named Seeking Proxies for Internal States. In this model, they suggest that 
individuals with OCD have difficulty accessing internal, subjective states (e.g., memory, 
perception, emotions, and bodily sensations) and thus rely more on objective, external cues to 
guide behaviour. Indeed, they may compensate by developing and relying on external proxies or 
substitutes that are less ambiguous and more concretely discernable, such as rigid rituals and 
rules, which appear as compulsive behaviours. Yet, these external cues may ironically undermine 
confidence in internal states, compounding the core problem (Dar, Lazarov, & Liberman, 2016; 
Lazarov, Dar, Liberman, & Oded, 2012; Lazarov, Liberman, Hermesh, & Dar, 2014). Indeed, 
nonclinical individuals with more OC behaviours performed worse on a relaxation task, 
displaying greater fluctuations in stress and greater stress overall, than those with fewer OC 
tendencies. However, when given biofeedback information – external indicators of internal 
relaxation states – while completing the relaxation task, they performed better than those lower 
in OC tendencies. Thus, individuals with greater OC symptoms perform poorly when required to 
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rely on their own internal cues, but when given the opportunity, they successfully used external 
cues to guide their behaviour (Lazarov, Dar, Oded, & Liberman, 2010). 
In contrast, O’Connor (2002) has focused on the pre-compulsion experience, posing an 
inferential confusion hypothesis, which posits that intrusions are not just normal thoughts from 
one’s stream of consciousness. Rather, obsessions are primary inferences (e.g., “perhaps the door 
was not shut properly”) that develop after the individual registers an internal or external percept 
– an observation, feeling, or thought that arises from non-obsessional thinking (e.g., a current 
event or memory). The primary inference, often experienced as doubt, soon becomes a 
conditional premise (e.g., “if I left the door unlocked, bad things could happen”), leading to 
negative consequences which the individual feels compelled to prevent by way of rituals (e.g., “I 
better check the door, or else I will be responsible for damage and contamination inflicted by 
burglars”). While the internal or external percept is said to be the first event in the obsessional 
sequence – and the primary inference the problematic step – O’Connor argues that the negative 
consequences of not performing the ritual and the individual’s subjective distress are more 
readily accessible. Inferences and appraisals can be assessed by tracing the logic back to the 
original premise (O’Connor, 2002). Recent studies have demonstrated good success for 
treatment of OCD using this inference-based model (i.e., Inference Based Treatment; Aardema 
& O’Connor, 2012). 
 All told, these alternative models offer other ways of understanding OCD phenomena 
and, more importantly, highlight lacunae in the obsession literature. That is, although the CBT 
model is the most widely recognised and used in clinical and empirical explorations of OCD, 
these alternate models bring to light elements of the obsessive-compulsive (OC) experience that 
are poorly understood, overlooked, or are implicit, untested assumptions of the model. For 
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example, it is unclear what comprises the elements of the OC episode – are there in fact any 
experiences beyond obsessions and compulsions, and are both necessary? The timeline of the 
episode, i.e., the sequential structure, is also a relatively unexplored area as highlighted by 
Robbins and colleagues (2012). We do not know if there is possibly a more dynamic and fluid 
relation between obsessions and compulsions or how individuals determine the OC episode to 
have ended, as Szechtman and Woody (2004) clarify. For that matter, we lack clarity on the 
experience and types of obsessional forms in the OC episode (e.g., doubt, to which O’Connor 
calls attention).  
These issues represent important considerations, because successful treatment of the 
disorder requires a full understanding of key elements and processes involved in the 
development and persistence of the disorder. While the temporal structure of an episode, 
according to the CBT model, is not explicitly stated, it is implied, and treatment approaches for 
OCD are heavily dependent on this. An incomplete or inaccurate understanding is likely to result 
in moderate treatment success, at best, or improvements in specific symptom domains (e.g., 
extinction of specific compulsions) but the eventual discovery of OC concerns arising in new 
domains due to the incomplete treatment of underlying processes. One impediment to this 
comprehension is the dearth of rigorous phenomenological explorations of the OC experience 
(i.e., investigations of the direct, lived phenomena for individuals with OCD), especially into 
obsessions and their moment-to-moment structure in OC episodes.  
Phenomenological Studies of OCD 
 Most traditional phenomenological studies of OCD date back to the 1970s to 1990s and 
focus primarily on understanding key elements of the disorder in order to diagnostically define it. 
Earlier studies appeared to debate whether lack of insight was required in the characterisation of 
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OCD (see Berrios, 1989) before focusing heavily on content domains of obsessions and 
compulsions. In general, these existing phenomenological studies investigate very narrow 
aspects of the OC experience. 
Phenomenological explorations of obsessions. Early studies reported on in-depth 
investigations of obsessional content domains. Following interviews with OCD patients, Akhtar 
and colleagues (1975) identified six categories of intrusive thought content and their relative 
frequencies of endorsement: obsessions about dirt and contamination (42%); aggressive or harm-
related ideas (29%); counting, checking, and orderliness (titled ‘inanimate-impersonal,’ 27%); 
religious concerns (11%); sexual obsessions (10%), and miscellaneous other intrusions (e.g., 
musical obsessions, etc.). Dowson (1977) reported somewhat similar endorsement rates, albeit 
with numerous other available content domain distinctions: contamination-based thoughts (54-
56%, the most frequent types), thoughts about indirectly causing physical harm (24%), thoughts 
of violence or injury (32%), religious obsessions (5%), and sexual themes (12%). A uniquely 
identified domain was doubt about past events, endorsed by a whopping 49% (Dowson, 1977).  
It appears that these obsession content domains persist across the lifespan, with Swedo 
and colleagues (1989) noting fairly comparable content categories and frequencies through 
clinical interviews of 70 children and adolescents with OCD (dirt and germs being most 
frequently endorsed at 40%, 24% something terrible happening, 17% symmetry or exactness, 
13% scrupulosity or religiosity, and 4% sexual). Pitman (1987), in summarising Janet’s classic 
writings on obsessional states, summarised obsessional content as focusing not on “things 
outside of their control but rather about things within their (imagined) control” (p. 293). 
Phenomenological explorations of compulsions. Early studies also explored 
compulsions in various ways, focusing primarily on categorising compulsion focus or content. 
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Akhtar (1975) distinguished between two types of compulsive acts (rather than content), 
identifying yielding compulsions as those that give “expression to the underlying obsessive urge” 
(p. 344), contrasted with controlling compulsions, which tend “to divert the underlying obsession 
without giving expression to it" (p. 344). Of the study sample, 76% reported performing some 
type of compulsion, with the majority (61%) noting yielding compulsions alone rather than 
controlling compulsions alone (6%). Only 9% endorsed performing both types of compulsions 
(Akhtar et al., 1975).  
By contrast, Dowson (1977) found that all but 2 participants (95%) endorsed performing 
compulsions. When categorised by content domain, 54% focused on cleaning oneself and 37% 
compulsively cleaned things other than oneself. Additionally, 46% endorsed checking 
behaviours, 56% noted compulsive avoidance, and a further 54% reported some other content. 
Stern and Cobb (1978) highlighted 8 “behavioural forms” of obsessional-compulsive neurosis, 
which translate to compulsion foci, from 45 interviewed OCD patients. Most frequently endorsed 
were cleaning compulsions (51%) and avoidance behaviours (51%), followed by repeating acts 
(often related to numbers, 40%), and checking compulsions (38%). Another 11% of participants 
endorsed compulsions that focused on a need for completeness, 9% on symmetry / exactness, 
and 4% on “slowing” as if lost in thought. Although the vast majority of individuals reported 
recognising the excessiveness or absurdity of these compulsions, nearly half were reported to be 
resisted minimally or not at all (Stern & Cobb, 1978).  
Among children and adolescents (Swedo et al., 1989), compulsive rituals were noted to 
be of similar content and distribution. Specifically, washing rituals were most common (85%), 
with repeating (e.g., going in and out of the door) and checking rituals (doors, locks, appliances, 
etc.) next most frequent (51% and 46%, respectively). Rituals designed to remove contact with 
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contaminants (23%), counting behaviours (18%), ordering and arranging compulsions (17%), 
and acts intended to prevent harm (16%) were less frequently endorsed. These researchers 
maintained that the unifying factor across compulsion domains is that they reflect an underlying 
sense that the act (checking, counting, washing, arranging, etc.) did not quite feel right yet 
(Swedo et al., 1989). 
Phenomenology of the obsessive-compulsive link. Some studies investigated OCD 
phenomena by collapsing across obsessions and compulsions. According to Pitman (1987), Janet 
first wrote that obsessions and compulsions are unified in that they “often involve the thought or 
action that is most objectionable to the patient and causes him the most horror” (i.e., ‘association 
by contrast’; Pitman, 1987, p. 227). Swedo and colleagues (1989) observed that rituals were 
more frequently reported than obsessions among children and adolescents, and it was relatively 
rare to find individuals who reported obsessions but not compulsions (‘pure obsessives’) 
compared to those endorsing compulsions but not obsessions (‘pure ritualisers’). They distilled 
OCD content into two broad themes: “a preoccupation with and/or rituals for cleanliness, 
grooming, and averting danger, and a pervasive doubt or inability to ‘know’ that one is all right” 
(Swedo et al., 1989, p. 336).  
By contrast, principal components factor analyses completed by Leckman and colleagues 
(1997) on YBOCS responses yielded four factors capturing obsessive-compulsive content. These 
four factors encompass: (1) aggressive, sexual, religious, and somatic obsessions with checking 
behaviours; (2) symmetry obsessions and ordering/arranging, counting, and repeating rituals; (3) 
contamination concerns with cleaning and washing compulsions; and, (4) hoarding and 
collecting symptoms. Significantly, they advised clinicians to differentiate between these 
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symptom dimensions when producing clinical severity ratings, instead of obscuring changes 
within one aggregated total severity score (Leckman et al., 1997).  
Pinto and colleagues (2007) found a similar content distribution, albeit across five 
factors, following an exploratory factor analysis of YBOCS responses by adults with OCD. This 
five-factor solution included three factors from the Leckman four-factor solution, namely 
Symmetry/Ordering, Hoarding, and Contamination/Cleaning. However, the remaining factor 
(aggressive/sexual/religious/somatic) was further differentiated into a Doubt/Checking factor 
(involving pathological doubt, somatic obsessions, and checking compulsions) and a novel 
Taboo Thoughts factor (aggressive, sexual, and religious obsessions; Pinto et al., 2007). 
Other early phenomenological researchers reported on descriptive statistics characterising 
the frequency of OCD phenomena and other characteristics (e.g., interference, resistance, 
conviction, etc.) rather than content domains. OCD was noted to have poor treatment outcomes 
(Roy, 1979) with purportedly moderately implausible symptom content (Jakes & Hemsley, 
1996). Stern and Cobb (1978) noted that individuals with OCD can recognise the absurdity of 
their obsessions and compulsions, but vary considerably in their ability to resist carrying out 
rituals. The obsessive-compulsive experience was rated nearly unanimously (i.e., by over 90% of 
55 OCD patients) as highly interfering, difficult to dismiss, preoccupying (thought about all the 
time), pervasive (inability to think about other things at all when thinking about it), and worry- 
and unhappiness-provoking (Jakes & Hemsley, 1996). Reassurance seeking did not generally 
reduce rituals (reportedly moderate to no effects on these behaviours), perhaps due to the 
transient nature of the discomfort reduction (Stern & Cobb, 1978). 
Significantly, Jakes and Hemsley (1996) were among the first to highlight the 
heterogeneity in the OCD experience. They argued that obsessions and compulsions, much like 
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delusions, are multidimensional experiences, in that it is not always possible to speak of such 
phenomena as being more or less severe than others using one feature (e.g., an obsession can be 
highly preoccupying but not at all interfering in the person’s behaviours, or vice versa). 
However, it is straightforward instead to conceptualize obsessions and compulsions in terms of 
being more or less in various dimensions (e.g., insight, pervasiveness, resistance, etc.). In factor 
analyses of 55 OCD patients on several dimensions, they found that while uniformly upsetting 
and prominent, there is considerable variability in characteristics of obsessions and compulsions, 
and to a considerable extent they varied independently of one another. Obsessions and 
compulsions are thus arguably best conceptualised as multidimensional phenomena (Jakes & 
Hemsley, 1996). 
However, these broad phenomenologies are now markedly outdated. They often 
conceptualise OCD as a “neurosis,” betraying rudimentary understandings of what symptoms 
comprise the disorder. Indeed, the vast majority of these studies hail from early editions of the 
DSM, spanning the second to the fourth edition (prior to the text revision). While these studies 
are helpful in very openly exploring and describing OCD phenomena, they utilise different 
criteria for the disorder or focus almost exclusively on a few aspects of the lived obsessional-
compulsive experience. Moreover, these studies typically involve interviewing individuals with 
OCD and asking them retrospectively to characterise their symptoms across various dimensions 
(e.g., preoccupation, interference, and resistance) and/or completing factor analyses of various 
symptom checklists to determine symptom clusters or domains of obsessional content (e.g., 
Jakes & Hemsley, 1996; Leckman et al., 1997; Pinto et al., 2007).  
Other studies still investigate the difference between ‘normal’ and OCD obsessions by 
comparing characteristics, appraisals, and control strategies of intrusive thoughts experienced by 
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OCD and control groups (Purdon & Clark, 1993), with a scant few studies reporting on the 
history of the disorder and subjective thoughts on conceptualisations that collapse obsessions and 
compulsions (Burgy, 2005). While informative, existing phenomenological studies do not quite 
capture a complete view of the lived obsessive-compulsive experience. For example, there are 
significant gaps in our understanding of the obsessional state (e.g., in what forms do they appear, 
what do the thoughts sound like, what is the timeline, etc.) and how the intrusive elements 
interplay with compulsions. Fuller representations have typically been offered in subjective 
clinical anecdotes, case studies, and book chapters (e.g., Rachman & Hodgson, 1980).  
 More recent studies that focus on phenomenology offer slightly more nuanced 
explorations of obsessions and compulsions and offer more finesse in their focus. They appear to 
look beyond content domains and have begun to assess appraisals and related underlying 
processes, overlooked aspects of the obsessive-compulsive experience, and even other ways to 
conceptualise phenomena. For example, in factor analyses of intrusive thought content in an 
analog sample, Lee and Kwon (2003) found two categories of obsessions, each associated with 
specific appraisals and control strategies. They distinguish between autogenous obsessions (ego-
dystonic intrusions of sexual, aggressive, and/or immoral content, typically without identifiable 
triggers) and reactive obsessions (relatively realistic intrusions about contamination, harm, 
asymmetry, etc., often evoked by identifiable stimuli). They reported that appraisals associated 
with autogenous obsessions relate to high control over thoughts and the importance of thoughts, 
resulting in avoidant control strategies (e.g., thought stopping, avoiding triggers, etc.). However, 
reactive obsessions are reportedly appraised in terms of inflated sense of responsibility and thus 
drive more confrontational control behaviours (e.g., washing, checking, reassurance seeking, 
etc.). These researchers argue that such a distinction is significant as it has treatment 
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implications; namely, CBT may work better with autogenous obsessions than traditional 
exposure with response prevention, as it challenges one’s belief structure (Lee & Kwon, 2003).  
A qualitative interview study by Van Schalkwyk and colleagues of 20 participants with 
OCD (2016) further highlighted often unmentioned experiences within the obsessive-compulsive 
episode. Individuals with OCD reported a variety of sensory phenomena preceding compulsions 
(e.g., panic, muscle tension, the sense that acts are incomplete, a sense of impending doom, etc.) 
and a wide spectrum of relief typically following compulsive acts (from none to partial to full 
relief). The obsessional experience is also reportedly associated with affective experiences – 
while some reported anxiety during obsessions, others reported a sense of incompleteness. Some 
individuals further described repeating acts compulsively due to a sense that they had failed to 
maintain good attention during tasks (e.g., cleaning). Although these participants reported feeling 
that they would not need to restart the compulsion so many times if they could only focus well 
enough the first time, the researchers noted that this appeared to extend beyond poor confidence 
in their memory. It may be that this lack of focus reflects ambivalent attention toward feared 
stimuli (e.g., both a desire to look toward threat and a wish to avoid it) rather than objective 
attentional deficits (Van Schalkwyk et al., 2016). Curiously, these experiences are not often 
mentioned in the CBT cycle, let alone the literature. 
Shavitt and colleagues (2014) interviewed 1001 individuals with OCD for diagnostic 
revision of OCD criteria. They found that it is rare for respondents to endorse obsessions without 
compulsions (.5%), and 99% of participants experienced both obsessions and compulsions. This 
high endorsement rate is likely due to the inclusion of mental compulsions (56.7%), which are 
easily overlooked by clinicians and participants, and more common for symmetry / ordering / 
arranging obsessions and sexual / religious content (often missed in assessment or self-report) 
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than other domains, such as contamination. Of the .5% reporting compulsions without 
obsessions, all endorsed feeling sensory phenomena (e.g., physical sensations or not-just-right 
experiences) before the compulsion. They thus argue that the definition of obsessions should be 
broadened to include sensory phenomena and compulsions to include mental compulsions 
(Shavitt et al., 2014). 
Even existing elements in the diagnostic criteria for OCD, such as obsessional images, 
have been to some extent neglected in the research literature and thus in models of the disorder 
and treatment protocols alike. Interview-based studies of images in OCD have highlighted the 
fact that they are prevalent, distressing, and difficult to resist (Lipton, Brewin, & Halperin, 2010) 
and may warrant targeted treatment, such as with imagery rescripting (Veale, Page, Woodward, 
& Salkovskis, 2015). Obsessional images are further discussed in Section III, below. 
These more recent phenomenological studies highlight that our current understanding of 
the obsessive-compulsive experience is rather incomplete. Specifically, there are gaps in our 
conceptualisation of the disorder, ranging from nuances (e.g., different categorisation schemes 
for obsessional content) to core phenomena (e.g., the need to revisit the definition of obsessions 
to include prevalent experiences, such as sensory phenomena) and the model itself (e.g., if some 
individuals do not experience relief after compulsions, how do they know to stop?). Indeed, one 
limitation of the OCD literature is that few studies have sought to carefully revisit the lived 
experience of obsessions and compulsions. Given the poor response to treatment and the well-
recognised heterogeneity of OCD, there is a significant need for a thorough understanding of the 
phenomenology of OCD and especial attention to overlooked aspects of the experience that may 
maintain the disorder in the face of targeted treatment. It is therefore the broad aim of this study 
to investigate the phenomenological experience of individuals with OCD in order to clarify 
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overlooked aspects of obsessive-compulsive episodes that may inform our theoretical 
understanding and clinical treatment of the disorder. 
Recently, technological advances have allowed researchers to more completely explore 
the phenomenology of compulsions (e.g., Bucarelli & Purdon, 2015; Zor et al., 2009). Indeed, 
behavioural parsing studies have found that OCD rituals are significantly longer than those acts 
performed by matched control individuals, due in part to the performance of a greater repertoire 
of acts and a greater number of unique acts, i.e., those not shared with control individuals. In 
fact, control individuals spent only 20% of the time in unique acts, whereas unique behaviours in 
OCD individuals comprised 60% of their rituals. Sequential order was determined by parsing 
behaviours into linear chains of shared and unique acts, with control individuals displaying long 
chains of shared acts and OCD individuals shared acts interspersed among long chains of unique 
acts (Zor et al., 2009). Thus, treatment efforts that challenge compulsions can be targeted toward 
limiting (and understanding the function of) unique acts in daily behaviours while 
simultaneously mimicking only those short chains of shared acts. 
In addition, a recent study within our own lab has revealed that compulsive episodes are 
time-consuming, lasting 34 minutes on average and through six repetitions. Episodes which 
failed to yield a sense that things were “right” or certain resulted in greater repetitions, poorer 
confidence in memory and sensory processes, a higher evidentiary threshold for termination of 
compulsions, and less reported relief. By contrast, those episodes which resulted in a sense of 
certainty or the “right” feeling – making up over half of the compulsive episodes – offered the 
subjective sense that the compulsion “worked” and the episode could be terminated, reinforcing 
the compulsive behaviour (Bucarelli & Purdon, 2015). As poorer memory confidence is 
associated with as few as five repetitions (e.g., Coles, Radomsky, & Horng, 2006), and the 
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subjective feel of compulsions distinguished between subsequent compulsive experiences, it may 
be that “not just right” or uncertainty feelings are particularly important in understanding 
perseveration and the subjective determination that OC episodes have concluded. However, it is 
unclear how these feelings arise and whether they are better conceptualised as obsessional, 
compulsive, or other phenomena. 
Unfortunately, our inability to parse internal cognitive experiences in this manner (i.e., by 
breaking down in stepwise fashion actual observable footage) has made it difficult to study 
obsessional experiences in a similar manner, and to the best of our knowledge few studies have 
tried to do this careful work. At the same time, these recent phenomenologies highlight that there 
are significant gaps in OC episodes that are not only not fully understood but in fact so unknown 
that researchers might not know to investigate it. Of note, there are scattered explorations of 
experiences that are significant temporally within the sequence of events in an OC episode (e.g., 
those immediately preceding and following compulsions) but few investigations of the 
chronology itself. The first aim of this study is therefore to clarify the sequential structure of 
the obsessive-compulsive (OC) experience. In order to better understand the chronological 
structure of OC episodes, we intend to: 
(1) parse the obsessional experience into its basic elements of building blocks (i.e., 
determine the forms in which obsessional content might appear), and  
(2) elucidate the timeline of these obsessional elements and how the obsessional forms 
interact temporally with compulsions.  
I. On the Chronological Structure of Obsessive-Compulsive Episodes 
Obsessional forms. Indeed, few studies have investigated the forms in which obsessions 
arise. The most recent DSM identifies three main forms in which obsessions may occur: 
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thoughts, images, and impulses (APA, 2013). This categorisation dates back to the 3rd edition of 
the DSM, but it is unclear from where this distinction originates or even how such a (verbal) 
thought might appear. Several decades ago, studies into obsessional forms by Akhtar and 
colleagues (1975), as well as Reed (1985) identified several other obsessional modes that have 
since been overlooked or gone unrecognised with no further exploration.  
Notably, Akhtar and colleagues (1975) found that the current forms recognised by the 
DSM (thoughts, images, and impulses or urges) were only endorsed by 34%, 7%, and 17% of 
their 82 OCD participants, respectively. Significantly, they helpfully defined an obsessional 
thought as “a seemingly endless thought chain, usually one pertaining to future events” (p. 343). 
By contrast, a whopping 75% of participants reported obsessional doubt (i.e., a tendency to not 
believe a task had been completed satisfactorily), an additional 26% reported broad obsessive 
fears (e.g., fear of losing self-control and inadvertently committing an embarrassing act), and 2% 
noted miscellaneous forms (e.g., musical obsessions, when tunes get stuck in mind). The marked 
prevalence of other formats for obsessional content points to the need to explore obsessional 
forms beyond those in the DSM-5, such as a possible doubt form (Akhtar et al., 1975).  
Similarly, Reed reported that 4% of their 50 OCD participants endorsed discrete thoughts 
(40% were categorised as ruminations, i.e., interferingly preoccupying trains of thought that are 
inherently circular and unproductive), 2% visual images, and 35% urges and impulses. Doubts 
(defined as pervasive indecisiveness) were also common at 38%, fears at 65% (e.g., diffuse fears 
of having harmed people, being contaminated, etc.), and obsessional affects at 4% (strange 
feelings, e.g., as if just informed that someone died; Reed, 1985). Significantly, just as with the 




In addition, a growing literature indicates that people with OCD frequently experience 
sensory phenomena (SP) that precede or accompany compulsions. These potentially obsessional 
experiences, previously couched within impulses, extend beyond urges to include not-just-right-
experiences, feelings of incompleteness, and other sensory experiences that are uncomfortable 
and distressing. In a study of 1001 OCD individuals administered the University of Sao Paulo 
Sensory Phenomena Scale (USP-SPS), a semi-structured interview to assess different forms of 
sensory phenomena (SP), 65% of individuals reported at least one type of SP, with 52% of those 
reporting “just right” perceptions, 37% describing physical sensations in their body, 14% noting 
“energy release” sensations, and 24% identifying urges only. Most individuals reported that their 
SP were less severe than their obsessions, although 15% endorsed similar severity, and 16% 
described their SP as more severe than their obsessions. SP often co-occurred with symmetry / 
ordering / arranging and contamination / washing symptom dimensions (Ferrao et al., 2012). 
The idea that SP are important obsessional phenomena is further corroborated by other 
studies, which have found that intrusive thoughts are more perceptual than assumed. In one 
study, 73% of OCD individuals endorsed at least one mild perceptual feature accompanying their 
obsessive thoughts (most commonly in a somatic or visual sensory modality). The presence of 
these perceptual properties has been associated with lower insight into the excessive or 
unrealistic quality of obsessions and compulsions (Moritz, Claussen, Hauschildt, & Kellner, 
2014) and previously with poorer outcome in CBT for OCD (Steketee et al., 2011). Thus, SP – 
or, obsessional thoughts with perceptual properties – may be common but overlooked in OCD 
and may be interfering with treatment success. 
Meanwhile, a couple of studies exploring obsessional experiences from other approaches 
(e.g., qualitative case study, dialogical rather than cognitive conceptualisation) have highlighted 
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obsessional content via an internal OCD voice. In analysing one woman’s account of OCD, 
O’Neill (1999) described three different ‘voices’ she used: a factual ‘narrative’ voice (largely 
used for first-person descriptive purposes), an ‘interpretative’ voice (much like one’s conscience, 
reacting to external social rules), and finally a ‘controlling,’ dominant voice to characterise OCD. 
This OCD voice was described as appearing privileged with knowledge that others do not have 
and thus holds a position of authority, power, and/or control over the individual. In fact, the 
narrator described the OCD voice as “imperative,” “almost a threat” (p. 80) and argued or 
conversed with her own rational voice all the time. The presence of the OCD voice made it so 
that she had to negotiate a morally defensible position for herself both from within (given access 
to her own thoughts) and from outside (from those who would view her actions; O’Neill, 1999). 
In discussing their dialogical approach to understanding obsessions (and ensuing 
dialogical therapy), Hallam and O’Connor (2002) also describe how narrative voices as 
obsessions can be inferred from the internal interactions shared by individuals with OCD. Of 
note, they describe these interactions with obsessional content “as though” they were voices, 
quoting from several participants who described voices (e.g., as “judging” in tone, like the voice 
of her mother, etc.). Should obsessions be experienced as persuasive and engaging dialogues, 
there are important clinical implications, as compensatory or neutralising behaviours would 
perhaps be proportional to the power of the narrative rather than the appraisal itself. Indeed, 
these authors posit that dialogical therapy would be appropriate; this therapy would be aimed at 
exposing the obsessional narratives and then empowering the individual to modify these 




In the eating disorder world, a critical-internal voice or dialogue has been documented as 
a prevalent and clinically important aspect of the anorexic experience. Reported by over 90% of 
individuals suffering from an eating disorder (Noordenbos, Aliakbari, & Campbell, 2014), recent 
studies indicate the necessity of learning to defend against this anorexic voice during the 
recovery process, as it has been implicated in relapses for enticing individuals back to their 
eating disorder (Pugh, 2016; Pugh & Waller, 2016). This voice is experienced as a second- or 
third-person commentary often ‘heard’ by the individual, in a way distinct from typical 
cognitions, to be remarking on body shape, weight, food, and consequences for self-worth. 
Significantly, this voice is understood to first emerge as a benign and positive guiding force (e.g., 
praising weight loss and protecting against distressing emotions), later evolving into a hostile and 
abusive presence, encouraging harmful behaviours and attacking one’s self-esteem in dominant, 
critical fashion. Indeed, weight loss and other aspects of eating pathology may arise as a defense 
against internal attacks from the anorexic voice (Pugh, 2016; Pugh & Waller, 2016) or other 
interpersonal events such as shame. Higher self-criticism has been associated with elevated 
eating disorder pathology through shame (Kelly & Carter, 2013). These findings have important 
implications for treatment, and researchers have been supporting the use of self-compassion 
therapy to combat this critical internal voice. 
Additional attempts to categorise characteristics of the anorexic voice have clarified 
associations between the voice and ED symptomatology. Specifically, lower BMI (i.e., more 
severe ED pathology) was associated with greater desire to fight the anorexic voice but 
heightened perceived inability to do so (entrapment by the voice). Benevolent voices (i.e., those 
perceived as being on one’s side) were associated with more pathological eating beliefs while 
voices perceived as omnipotent were related to longer disorder duration. Stronger (more 
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powerful) anorexic voices were found in those with greater ED cognitive pathology, worse 
compensatory behaviours (i.e., laxative use and purging, etc.), and longer disorder duration 
(Pugh & Waller, 2016).  
It is thus conceivable that in OCD an internal-critical voice also fuels symptoms such as 
obsessions and perseveration with compulsions. However, no research beyond those few 
reviewed has specifically explored whether individuals with OCD experience such an internal 
voice or, if present, what its perceived nature or aspects of its voice might be (e.g., as with 
psychotic experiences, what is its perceived power, benevolence vs malevolence, etc.). We thus 
hope to determine whether individuals with OCD report obsessions that appear in the form of an 
internal voice or narrative, and if so, what characteristics the voice or narrative might carry. Is it 
dominant and hostile? Can it be neutral and/or warm? 
Even among forms already identified in the DSM, relatively little research has explored 
non-verbal forms, such as images. Only recently have researchers begun to explore intrusive 
images, with preliminary studies identifying prevalence rates of intrusive OCD images at 95% 
and 81% and purporting that images are more common, frequent (appearing on average 5 to 10 
times per week), and distressing than expected (Lipton et al., 2010; Speckens et al., 2007). Given 
the noteworthy presence of these intrusive images, researchers have begun to explore the 
possibility and success of rescripting OCD images (originally developed for anxiety and 
depressive disorders) in treatment (e.g., Rusch, Grunert, Mendelsohn, & Smucker, 2000). 
It is thus evident that current assessment and treatment approaches are based on an 
incomplete understanding of the various forms that obsessions take in OC episodes. Perhaps an 
inherent difficulty in the study of obsessional forms is the heterogeneity of the disorder both 
within and across individuals. Reed (1985) noted that the various forms, however carefully 
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defined, will tend to overlap. Additionally, most individuals experience multiple forms, even if 
one form tends to be their predominant obsessional experience. He also qualitatively observed 
that the longer his participants were studied, the more they disclosed, and the more complicated 
the obsessional picture became; rather than one discrete obsession, the obsessional experience 
could be an interconnected web of various obsessional forms and rituals (Reed, 1985). Yet, this 
has not been replicated or acknowledged in current models and treatments. 
Indeed, there is a need for a more systematic study of the common forms of obsessions 
endorsed by individuals with OCD in recent OC episodes. Despite support for additional forms, 
only three remain recognised by the DSM, and there is increasing pressure to investigate 
obsessional forms. At the time of publication, Akhtar and colleagues (1975) cautioned that 
fellow psychiatrists typically use terms like obsessive doubts, fear, and impulses facilely, in the 
absence of appropriate operational definitions of such terms, and doing so prompts such 
interchangeable use that the distinctions lose significance. Currently, almost all existing OCD 
research focuses on verbally-mediated thoughts, disregarding images and impulses. However, it 
is unclear even what an obsessional thought entails – interpretation is largely at the discretion of 
the researcher and can encompass discrete, word-based cognitions to broad ideas. 
Attempts made by researchers conducting phenomenological interviews of specific 
obsessional forms have shed some light on aspects of the obsessional experience. From these, we 
can glean that there is evidence for the existence of obsessions in other forms – such as sensory 
phenomena, doubts, and narratives or voices – and the need to understand more about 
obsessional images. However, these attempts are often limited in scope, focusing on a narrow 
aspect of the fuller OC experience without an understanding of how it fits within the broader 
context of the full episode (e.g., how do images arise within the episode? How should we 
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understand obsessional doubts?). Moreover, there is a lack of clarity about whether some 
elements should be subsumed under others, or whether and how they should be identified 
separately, as researchers have suggested. For example, doubt simply indicates a lack of 
confidence or uncertainty, and it is unclear whether doubts and the internal narrative should be 
conceptualised under the general ‘verbally-mediated thoughts,’ or exist independently as noted 
(e.g., Akhtar et al., 1975; O’Neill, 1999).  
In understanding the first part of our first research question, this study asks specifically: 
do obsessions only occur in the forms suggested by the DSM (i.e., verbally-mediated thoughts, 
images, and urges), or do individuals with OCD identify other obsessional forms – such as 
sensory phenomena, doubt, and internal narratives – as significant components in their episodes 
that warrant clinical attention? Between these forms, are some consistently more distressing and 
thus impactful than others, or does one type tend to initiate an episode? Moreover, within any 
given episode, does one form persist alone, or is the obsessional experience dynamic, with 
multiple forms interwoven? Are internal voices or narratives prevalent among individuals with 
OCD, and what do they sound like? Clarifying the obsessional elements or forms that cut across 
episodes render one well-positioned to understand the chronological timeline (and interactional 
nature) of these elements with compulsions, i.e., the second part of our first research aim, 
creating a cognitive parsing system that approximates as best we can the behavioural parsing 
compulsion studies described above.  
OC episode timeline. Implicit in the model (and diagnostic criteria) is the notion that 
obsessions and compulsions are discrete entities that occur chronologically and linearly, with 
obsessions always preceding compulsions and the experience of obsessions terminating upon 
performance of the compulsion. However, recent literature has called to question four possible 
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distinct models of OCD, each of which places obsessions and compulsions in slightly different 
longitudinal temporal arrangements: no coupling, goal directed, habit-driven, and reciprocal 
(e.g., Laposa, Hawley, Grimm, Katz, & Rector, 2019). At one extreme, the ‘no coupling’ model 
represents obsessions and compulsions as being rather independent phenomena, changing 
independently over time without relations between the two. This is arguably represented in both 
the diagnostic criteria for the disorder, which allow for obsessions without compulsions and vice 
versa (APA, 2013), as well as mentions in the literature of the ‘pure obsessional’ form (e.g., 
Baer, 1994), though researchers criticize this latter notion for overlooking specific types of 
compulsive behaviours, such as avoidance and mental rituals (Leonard & Riemann, 2012; 
Williams et al., 2011). In the ‘goal directed model,’ obsessions are followed temporally by 
compulsions and thus lead to changes in compulsions; the goal directed model is represented 
most prominently by the CBT model, previously described in detail (Rachman & Hodgson, 
1980; Salkovskis, 1985).  
The ‘habit-driven’ hypothesis or model posits that OCD is a disorder of habit, namely 
that compulsions arise out of deficits in goal-directed action systems and a persistent 
overreliance on the habitual system (i.e., through stimulus-response, automatic habit formation; 
Gillan et al., 2011). Compulsions constitute habitual behaviours that are not typically or cannot 
be explained, and so obsessions would follow temporally as post-hoc rationalizations; the 
conceptualization of OCD as compulsive-obsessive disorder (Robbins et al., 2012), previously 
discussed in detail, represents this habit-driven model. Proponents of this view note that 
individuals with OCD performed worse on ‘slips-of-action’ tasks (in which they completed a 
task to artificially develop a habitual response and then the same task with the outcomes 
reversed, so that their new goal required that they override the habit system), and performance 
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was correlated with symptom severity (Gillan et al., 2011). They also point to a stimulus-
response study in which individuals with OCD were trained to respond habitually to avoid 
shocks, but continued to respond avoidantly out of habit even when informed they would no 
longer be receiving such shocks (Gillan et al., 2015). Taken together, they note that individuals 
with OCD erroneously conclude that “if they felt driven to perform an act of (habitual) 
avoidance, they must have had something to fear” (Gillan & Sahakian, 2015, p.248). 
However, Kalanthroff, Abramovitch, Steinman, Abramowitz, and Simpson (2016) offer a 
critique of this model across many levels. They highlight that several processes and mechanisms 
would typically be involved in such a goal-directed system, and the literature demonstrating 
deficits in OCD is inconsistent at best for specific mechanisms (and typically marked by small to 
moderate effect sizes or clinically insignificant presentation). These researchers furthermore note 
that some OCD rituals are so complex and deliberate that they cannot possibly be construed as 
automatic habits; similarly, OCD beliefs can be so severe and complex that they could not 
feasibly be post-hoc explanations or rationalisations for ‘slips of action.’ Moreover, even if it is 
true that those with OCD rely more heavily on habitual systems than goal directed, the direction 
of the causal pathway would be unclear (i.e., is the habit formation a consequence or cause of 
OCD; Kalanthroff et al., 2016).  
Significantly, the last model – the reciprocal model – combines both the goal directed and 
habit-driven models (Laposa et al., 2019). This representation would putatively reflect 
bidirectional relations between obsessions and compulsions, such that obsessions influence 
compulsions and vice versa. As highlighted by Laposa and colleagues (2019), findings that 
bidirectional relations exist between changes in OCD beliefs and behaviours might support this 
model (Rhéaume & Ladouceur, 2000).  
30 
 
Most recently, treatment-based studies have attempted to examine the time sequencing of 
obsessions and compulsions over the course of treatment, i.e., determine whether obsessional 
symptom levels predict compulsion levels at end of treatment, or whether compulsions affect 
obsession scores across treatment. Laposa and colleagues (2019) used latent difference score 
analysis to determine which of these models might best capture the temporal relations of 
obsessions and compulsions in a 12-week CBT group for OCD. By their analyses, the goal 
directed model was the best fit, as they found that obsession scores, measured by the Y-BOCS, 
led to subsequent changes in the compulsions scores, but not the reverse (Laposa et al., 2019).  
However, Falkenstein and colleagues (2020) found slightly different results in a study of 
individuals undergoing intensive residential treatment (consisting of 6-to 8-week-long individual 
and group therapy, including 4 hours of exposure with response prevention daily). When 
including obsessive beliefs and state and trait characteristics in their random intercepts cross-
lagged panel models, findings supported the reciprocal model, in that both the goal directed and 
habit-driven models were evidenced in their data. Specifically, greater intensity of obsessive 
beliefs led to greater obsession severity, which then led to greater compulsions during treatment 
(supporting the goal directed model). Yet, compulsions led to more obsessive beliefs – 
specifically, greater responsibility and threat beliefs – which then led to greater levels of 
obsessions (supporting the habit-driven hypothesis). The researchers note that resisting 
compulsions thus results in decreased obsessions via this belief-driven pathway (Falkenstein et 
al., 2020); of note, this is the exact mechanism by which behavioural experiments are proposed 
to have therapeutic effect (Salkovskis, 1999). In further support of the habit-driven side of the 
reciprocal model, individuals who performed higher levels of compulsions midway through 
treatment (week 4) had higher levels of obsessions at discharge (Falkenstein et al., 2020).  
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While these studies offer some insight into the sequential relationships of obsessions and 
compulsions in the OC cycle, the results support different temporal models. The recent treatment 
studies provide compelling support for the goal directed model and possibly the reciprocal 
model, but they are limited in that they offer information about how OCD symptoms unfold 
specifically during treatment. In so doing, these researchers are extrapolating from symptom 
change across treatment (i.e., treatment mechanisms in treatment studies) how the disorder might 
present itself in and be experienced by individuals themselves. Such results cannot definitively 
clarify whether these patterns would be seen in a non-treatment seeking sample, that is, most 
significantly, in the general phenomenology and/or natural course of OCD. Moreover, these 
models investigate in broad strokes the direction(s) in which OCD symptoms exert influence in 
an attempt to understand the longitudinal temporal relationship between obsessions and 
compulsions. They do not directly inquire whether obsessions and compulsions exist non-
sequentially (i.e., concurrently) and/or if they may be ordered differently than obsessions 
occurring only before compulsions. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, there have been no 
such careful phenomenological explorations of the episode timeline. 
Additional studies have not quite explicitly highlighted the episode timeline but elements 
around compulsive phenomena. For example, Berrios (1989) wrote about how Ball first noted 
that an operational criterion for OCD should be the experience of a tension release following 
completion of the compulsion. Van Schalkwyk and colleagues (2016) reported that participants 
tended to report a variety of experiential qualities prior to compulsions (physiological signs of 
anxiety, felt senses of incompleteness or doom, etc.) and anywhere from full to no relief 
following the acts. Significantly, they noted that some individuals with OCD reported repeating 
aspects of their compulsion after one or more iterations due to an internal sense (e.g., they had 
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not focused well enough on the task). However, it is unclear from their description whether the 
experience that prompted a repetition of the compulsion is in fact a resurgence or emergence of 
an obsessional experience after the compulsive act (Van Schalkwyk et al., 2016).  
Indeed, anecdotal evidence from our own clients supports not only the co-occurrence of 
obsessions and compulsion but the existence of obsessional phenomena beyond the end of 
compulsive acts. As no studies have empirically demonstrated this, this study seeks to determine 
whether individuals with OCD report that aspects of the obsessional experience: (a) persist 
through the performance of the compulsive behaviour and (b) beyond the completion of the 
compulsion, leading to repetitions of the compulsive act and/or performance of different types of 
compulsions.  
Another key aspect of understanding the episode timeline involves understanding how 
individuals perceive that they have done enough for the OC episode to terminate. While the CBT 
model posits that the relief from distress obtained after neutralising the obsession (i.e., by 
completing the compulsion) maintains the cycle via reinforcement of obsessional appraisals and 
the performance of the compulsion, it does not clearly specify how the episode terminates. Few 
efforts have also been spent in establishing empirically how individuals know that the OC 
episode is over (and/or they can stop perseverating).  
As Szechtman and Woody’s (2004) model posits OCD as a disorder of stopping, it offers 
one of the few explanations for episode termination. Specifically, they suggest that individuals 
with OCD fail to achieve yedasentience, an “internally generated feeling of knowing [that] 
provides not only a phenomenological sign of goal-attainment but is also the physiological 
mechanism that actually shuts down security motivation” (Szechtman & Woody, 2004, p.115). 
Yedasentience is reportedly an internally felt sense – a feeling of knowing – much like how one 
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knows to stop drinking water once one has quenched one’s thirst (i.e., the feeling of satiation), 
and is thus unrelated to one’s rationalisations or cognitively-explained appraisals. Rather, 
yedasentience captures a “subjective conviction [that is] functionally separate from knowledge of 
objective reality” (Szechtman & Woody, 2004, p. 115). This feeling is reportedly the stop signal 
that is emotionally distinct from the obsessional distress itself (anxiety is a go signal), just as the 
feeling of satiation is different from that of the thirst. Indeed, they found that experimentally 
blocking this feeling through hypnotism induced compulsive-like checking in nonclinical 
individuals (Woody et al., 2005). 
Some initial research suggests that individuals with OCD require more information when 
making decisions about terminating compulsive behaviours. In a study exploring how individuals 
decide when to stop typical OCD compulsive behaviours (e.g., washing, checking), Wahl and 
colleagues (2008) found that individuals with OCD who wash compulsively use arbitrary stop 
rules (i.e., subjective criteria) more frequently – and consider them more important – in 
determining when to stop washing than non-washing individuals with OCD and healthy controls. 
Additionally, regardless of their typically performed type of compulsion, individuals with OCD 
used more criteria than control participants before terminating washes, increasing the length of 
hand washing. This suggests that elevated evidence requirements may be involved in general 
decision-making strategies in OCD and that the use of subjective criteria may typically impede 
stopping ability (Wahl, Salkovskis, & Cotter, 2008). The reliance on subjective criteria may 
further complicate stopping abilities, given the Seeking Proxies for Internal States model 
findings that those higher in OCD symptom severity doubt internal cues and rely instead on 
external cues to guide behaviour (Lazarov et al., 2010). To the extent that such external cues are 
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maladaptive attempts to achieve that same satisfactory decision, this may explain differences in 
evidence requirements. 
Moreover, investigations of compulsion sequences implicate a just-right feeling in the 
termination of compulsive episodes. Bucarelli and Purdon (2015) determined that among 
individuals with OCD, episodes which failed to yield a sense that things were “right” or certain 
resulted in greater repetitions of the compulsive act, a higher evidentiary threshold for 
termination of compulsions, and less reported relief. These episodes were also associated with 
poorer rated confidence in their memories and sensory processes. By contrast, episodes which 
resulted in a sense of certainty or the “right” feeling – making up over half of the compulsive 
episodes – offered individuals the subjective sense that the compulsion “worked” and the episode 
could be terminated, reinforcing the compulsive behaviour (Bucarelli & Purdon, 2015). 
In understanding the second component of our first research question, this study aims to 
clarify aspects of the episode chronology implied in current models but not phenomenologically 
investigated, namely whether obsessions precede, overlap with (i.e., appear concurrently), and/or 
extend beyond compulsions. Our study furthermore asks: what obsessional form tends to appear 
first in the episode and which forms tend to dominate the experience or persist the longest? What 
criteria do individuals with OCD use to terminate episodes? Are they unable to end compulsions 
based on the subjective sense that they have done enough (i.e., failure to achieve yedasentience), 
as Szechtman and Woody (2004) suggest?  
All in all, current thinking identifies obsessions and compulsions as distinct phenomena, 
occurring in sequential fashion. Researchers have not inquired directly of individuals with OCD 
whether there might be a potential dynamic relation between the two, though a recent modelling 
study of change across treatment indicates the relationship may be reciprocal (Falkenstein et al., 
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2020). However, findings from both components of our first research question will allow us to 
appreciate a fuller picture of the OC episode. Specifically, by putting such findings together, we 
can understand the basic elements of the episode (i.e., the various forms obsessions typically 
take) and the way in which they are arranged chronologically. This clarification allows us to 
investigate those elements that might initiate and/or dominate the experience (i.e., obsessional 
forms that wield the most power through distress and persistence), as well as the manner in 
which these two phenomena interact, whether mutually exclusively in sequence or dynamically 
interwoven and overlapping. Importantly, such results can help us understand how individuals 
determine that their episode is over, which may be influential both from a theoretical and an 
intervention standpoint (e.g., how to facilitate their efforts to achieve that conclusion). 
The determination of the true sequential order of obsessive-compulsive (OC) phenomena 
has important clinical implications beyond the theoretical. Should Robbins’ theory (i.e., the 
habit-driven model) prove to be accurate, therapeutic focus would shift to exclusively 
overcoming compulsive urges, as there would be no obsession without a compulsion or its 
compulsive urge. On the other hand, if obsessions occur first but continue to be experienced 
through (and beyond) the onset of the compulsive behaviour (including being influenced by 
compulsions, i.e., reciprocal model), it will be important to understand the impacts of this 
dynamic relationship (i.e., how the continued obsessional experience may be informing the 
compulsion and the reverse) and address this in treatment through both cognitive and 
behavioural strategies. As it is not clear whether these timelines may in fact vary depending on 
the actual form of the obsessions (e.g., images may terminate easily upon performance of 
compulsions but doubt tends to persist beyond) this first research question provides the 
overarching framework to guide our findings from our latter two research questions. Specifically, 
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research questions two and three focus, as discussed below, on more fine-grained details about 
two obsessional forms in particular – obsessional doubt and obsessional images – due to the vast 
lacunae in OCD literature but their anticipated clinical significance, discussed in the following 
two sections.  
II. On Obsessional Doubt 
Doubt in OCD presents a curious case; it has long been noted in clinical accounts of the 
disorder, but our empirical understanding of doubt is woefully scattered. The doubt research 
landscape in OCD is peppered by incomplete or unclear definitions and by researchers’ highly 
varied ideas, rather than being unified by the perspectives of disorder sufferers themselves. Early 
OCD literature is sprinkled with numerous clinical accounts and descriptions of doubt. First 
touted as the ‘doubting disease,’ or folie du doute, in writings by 19th century French 
psychiatrists like Esquirol and du Saulle, OCD was posited to begin with spontaneous and 
irresistible thoughts that were accompanied by feelings of doubt or brooding, ultimately leading 
to the establishment of rituals. Ribot further described OCD as “hesitation over futile issues and 
incapacity to make decisions” (Berrios, 1989, p. 290). 
Janet expanded on the presence of doubt in his descriptions of OCD in 1903, noting that 
“everything is doubted” in the disorder. These feelings of incompleteness reportedly may 
manifest across behaviours, feelings, perceptions, and cognitions. Significantly, individuals “may 
feel that an action wasn’t done well or completely, that it lacked something, or that it didn’t 
produce the sought-for satisfaction ... although to an observer all may appear perfectly well 
done” (Pitman, 1987, p. 226). Reed (1985) conceptualised OCD as simple indecisiveness to the 
point that their doubts are all-pervasive, robbing an individual of volitional resources and 
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rendering them unable to act even if they were to resolve their doubt. This OCD doubt is posited 
to be around content such as a specific occurrence, memory, or their self-concept (Reed, 1985). 
Of note, pathological doubt was investigated as a possible severity rating item in the 
development of the YBOCS, alongside items such as pathological slowness, pathological 
responsibility, and indecisiveness. The pathological doubt item of the YBOCS asks whether 
individuals with OCD (1) doubt whether they performed an activity correctly after completing it; 
(2) doubt whether they completed the activity at all; or (3) feel that they don’t trust their senses 
(what they see, hear, or touch) when carrying out routine activities. The item is rated on a 5-point 
Likert scale, from not at all to extreme uncertainty about perceptions that are constantly present 
and substantial interference in almost all activities (Goodman et al., 1989).  
Unfortunately, the items under investigation for pathological doubt were not retained in 
the final YBOCS severity rating score – which includes items rating the amount of time occupied 
by symptoms, interference, resistance, and distress – due to insufficient evidence of their core 
relevance to OCD (Goodman et al., 1989). These items and this conceptualisation of doubt also 
do not appear much in the literature, doubt-centric or not. It is also unclear whether this 
formulation of doubt is data-driven, i.e., as told by participants themselves, or if it is researcher-
asserted. Nevertheless, this single item captures many different ways in which pathological doubt 
can present in OCD. Indeed, the extant literature reveals that investigations of doubt in OCD 
vary widely, as doubt is conceptualised in very specific ways by individual researchers, existing 
in silo-like fashion from the way doubt is being investigated by other researchers. 
Doubt as an obsessional or compulsive form (taken across content domains). The 
first mentions of doubt were as forms in OCD, both across the compulsive or behavioural 
domain (Stern & Cobb, 1978) and the obsessional (Akhtar et al., 1975). Stern and Cobb (1978) 
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described a domain of compulsive behaviour termed ‘striving for completeness,’ characterizing 
11% of their 45 participant OCD sample, that captures their rendition of OCD doubt. These 
‘striving for completeness’ behaviours encompass spending inordinate amounts of time 
completing a behaviour due to “doubt whether he had completed [the] activity correctly” (thus 
trying to prove that it was done properly) or repetition of simple actions due to being “plagued 
by the thought that the ritual might not have been carried through according to prescription” 
(Stern & Cobb, 1978, p. 229).  
By contrast, Akhtar (1975) identified doubt as a form that obsessional content can take 
(much like a verbal thought or an image), consisting of “an inclination not to believe that a 
completed task has been accomplished satisfactorily” (e.g., Did I turn off the stove? Am I sure?) 
even in the face of a “a clear and accurate remembrance of having done so” (Akhtar, 1975, 
p. 343). He argued that doubts, reportedly endorsed by 75% of his OCD sample, are the most 
prominent feature of obsessional neurosis and wrote of his agreement with earlier representations 
of the disorder as ‘manie du doute.’ Indeed, researchers have written of doubt appearing across a 
range of OCD symptoms but appearing in its purest form in checking rituals (e.g., Tolin et al., 
2001). Yet, even these reports of doubt as an obsessional form are limited in scope.  
 Doubt as an obsessional content domain or topic. Obsessional doubt has also often 
been conceptualised as a content domain (i.e., the focus of an obsession, much like 
contamination fears or repugnant sexual and blasphemous thoughts). As previously discussed, 
Swedo and colleagues (1989) first identified doubt, or uncertainty about whether one is safe, as a 
broad content domain for obsessions and compulsions. Doubt as a content domain appears very 
briefly in the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-5 as an OCD item about excessive 
doubting of locks, appliances, and other tasks having been completed accurately (Brown & 
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Barlow, 2014). Doubt is again captured in the symptom checklist of the YBOCS in two items 
capturing content about fears one unknowingly and carelessly caused harm to others (e.g., a hit-
and-run automobile accident) or one was responsible for something terrible happening (e.g., a 
fire from not having checked the house properly before departure), both within the cluster of 
aggressive obsessions (Goodman et al., 1989). 
In fact, Pinto and colleagues (2007) identified Doubt/Checking as one of five factors 
extracted in factor analyses of content categories; it was comprised of the two aforementioned 
doubt items (grouped into a “pathological doubt” category), somatic obsessions (e.g., excessive 
concern with illness or disease), and checking compulsions (e.g., stoves, locks, no harm to 
others, no mistake took place, or nothing terrible will happen). Significantly, this distinction 
appears to indicate that Doubt/Checking content occurs somewhat independently from the other 
aggressive obsessions, which have historically been considered with sexual and religious 
obsessions in the Taboo Thoughts factor. This is of clinical utility, as these domains have 
reportedly been associated with different treatment response (Pinto et al., 2007). 
An international study was also completed by Radomsky and colleagues (2013) to assess 
the prevalence of intrusive thought content domains across 13 countries and 6 continents using 
the standardised International Intrusive Thoughts Interview Schedule. In this study, they found 
that doubting intrusions were the most commonly endorsed content area, while sexual / religious 
/ immoral obsessions were least common (compared to obsessional domains such as 
contamination, harm / injury / aggression, etc.). This pattern was again repeated when 
participants were asked to report on the most distressing content domain. Given this unexpected 
prevalence of doubt-content intrusions compared to all other domain types – and moreover 
consistently found at nearly every study location – the researchers highlight the need to explore 
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more the role of doubt in OCD, especially in relation to the intolerance of uncertainty construct 
(Radomsky, Dugas, Alcolado, & Lavoie, 2014). 
Obsessional doubt as pervasive indecisiveness. Consistent with this idea, investigations 
of doubt as a cognitive process at work (or failing to work) have also been conducted by 
different researchers, yielding various results. Within this conceptualisation, doubt is typically 
defined as difficulty making or feeling confident in one’s decisions. Indeed, OCD has been 
referred to as a disorder of decision-making (Sachdev & Malhi, 2005) and a state of pathological 
indecisiveness (Beech, 1974), that is, “the experience of decision problems…resulting in overt 
choice-related behaviours” such as delays and post-decision rumination (Rassin, 2007, p. 2). 
While not always explicitly stated to be an investigation into doubt in OCD, several other 
studies have explored indecisiveness among individuals with OCD. Indecisiveness is readily 
apparent in clinical accounts of OCD (e.g., repetitive checking due to difficulty determining if 
the door is locked) and existing research offers an empirical link between OCD and 
indecisiveness, both among nonclinical and clinical individuals. Scores on self-report 
indecisiveness scales have been shown to be correlated with OCD checking and doubting 
symptom scales in nonclinical individuals, but not with other OCD symptom scales, such as 
washing scores (Frost & Shows, 1993; Gayton, Clavin, Clavin, & Broida, 1994). Associations 
between indecisiveness and total OCD symptom severity are inconsistent, with one study finding 
a significant relation (Gayton et al., 1994) and one failing to reach statistical significance (Frost 
& Shows, 1993).  
Several experimental studies of decision-making in clinical OCD populations have 
yielded evidence of group differences in objective markers of indecisiveness, namely, latency for 
decisions and evidence requirements for decisions (i.e., amount of information required to make 
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a decision). Individuals with OCD seem to be slower to make decisions in some contexts, taking 
longer to complete tasks with many solutions (Goodwin & Sher, 1992) and spending more time 
deliberating about low-risk and OCD-relevant hypothetical scenarios (Foa et al., 2003) than 
control participants. Additionally, OCD groups performed more slowly than healthy controls on 
probability-based gambling tasks when presented under negative, threat-based frames (e.g., 
possible losses as opposed to gains; Sip, Muratore & Stern 2016). However, another study found 
that individuals with OCD did not differ from control participants in total response time or 
decision latency for scenarios when deliberating about hypothetical, explicitly moral dilemmas 
(Franklin, McNally, & Riemann, 2009).  
As well, as previously highlighted, individuals with OCD have a higher threshold for 
evidence requirements in decision-making. Compared to control participants, individuals with 
OCD required more information before making decisions about hypothetical scenarios (Foa et 
al., 2003) and requested more repetition of trials on a signal detection task despite no difference 
in performance (Milner, Beech, & Walker, 1971). Additionally, Banca and colleagues (2015) 
found that under high uncertainty those with OCD needed more evidence before making 
determinations about the direction of moving dots; however, they were able to lower thresholds 
to control levels (normalise reaction times and evidence requirements) under low uncertainty 
contexts when monetary incentives were provided for speed. Thus, those with OCD might not 
have true decision-making deficits per se; rather, they may simply accumulate evidence from 
data inefficiently (Banca et al., 2015) or rely on subjective thresholds that can be adjusted under 
specific conditions, when certain concerns are appeased.  
Nestadt and colleagues (2016) defined this orientation more explicitly in a theoretical 
paper elucidating the hypothesized core deficit in OCD, stating that: 
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“Doubt can be defined as lack of certitude or confidence in one’s memory, 
attention, intuition, and perceptions, such that it is difficult to trust one’s internal 
experiences; hence retarding satisfactory responses to cues or possibly to 
information in general. This appears to occur at a reflexive level and often leads to 
indecision or even a sense of incompleteness or a ‘not-just-right’ feeling” (p. 2).  
Significantly, these authors hypothesized that doubt, uncertainty, or lack of confidence could be 
used interchangeably to describe the deficit in the decision-making process, which is the core 
impairment in OCD. They note that this difficulty is distinct from impairments in other aspects 
of the decision-making process, such as error detection or making choices with conflicting 
alternatives. In this case, it is at the stage of information accumulation, a process that necessarily 
proceeds until the decision threshold is exceeded (i.e., the individual perceives that enough 
information has been collected to a point that they can make a decision and begin to respond), 
that doubt exerts its influence, affecting the time taken to make a decision. These researchers 
posit that OCD symptoms develop when an individual with a tendency to doubt encounters an 
experience wherein perceptual information available at that time and the individual’s internal 
knowledge prevent the individual from smoothly engaging in and completing a decision-making 
process. This may transpire at a largely unconscious level (Nestadt et al., 2016). 
 Marton and colleagues (2019) put this hypothesis to the test with the development of a 
Doubt Questionnaire which clinically assessed doubt defined in this manner. The items were 
devised to capture the experience of doubt in several domains, including memory, decisions, task 
accuracy and completion, visual perception, and auditory perception (e.g., “I second-guess my 
decisions,” “I feel that I might have missed something because I didn’t look carefully enough,” 
and “I don’t trust my memory of simple, everyday things”). As predicted, participants with OCD 
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scored significantly higher on doubt than control participants. Significantly, these OCD vs 
control group findings appear to parallel the high vs low doubt results, and in conjunction with 
the Doubt Questionnaire results, the researchers suggest that high levels of doubt may affect 
decision-making processes in individuals with OCD (Marton et al., 2019).  
Yet, overall, these studies indicate that while individuals with OCD may sometimes 
appear to struggle with indecisiveness, it is not due to a true inability to make decisions, but 
rather that there are factors that impede their ability to feel certain in the decisions they have 
made. In fact, these studies point to the evolution of doubt investigations into explorations of 
broader distrust in one’s internal senses. 
Obsessional doubt as a distrust of reality (result of inferential confusion). The 
inference-based approach outlined by O’Connor et al. (2005) focuses more narrowly on doubt as 
a core distrust of internally-derived (sensory) information in OCD. In this model, they posit that 
individuals with OCD rely too heavily on hypothetical possibilities that may in fact negate reality 
or persist in the face of no sensory-based evidence. Due to this inferential confusion, individuals 
are plagued by inferences drawn subjectively through inductive reasoning (i.e., obsessions) and 
perseverate with compulsions despite no evidence in support of the obsessional content. Within 
this framework, obsessional doubt is inferential doubt, i.e., doubt in the conclusions one draws 
about the world (e.g., the door has been locked) due to a distrust of reality and one’s senses in 
favour of hypothetical dangers (Aardema, O’Connor, Pelissier, & Lavoie, 2009; Nikodijevic et 
al., 2015; O’Connor et al., 2005). In this approach, doubt has been experimentally tested using 
two tasks – the Reasoning with Inductive Arguments Task (O’Connor et al., 2005) and the 
Inference Process Task (Aardema et al., 2009) – and thus quantified in slightly different ways.  
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In the Reasoning with Inductive Arguments Task (RIAT), participants are measured on 
how much their belief in an initial conclusion, drawn from two premise statements, could be 
undermined (i.e., doubt introduced) by externally provided alternative conclusions as opposed to 
internally generated alternatives. Individuals with OCD, while not inherently higher in baseline 
doubt than anxious and healthy controls, did doubt significantly more (i.e., reported a greater 
change in the strength of belief in the original conclusion) when provided with an alternative that 
was provided by an external source rather than produced by themselves. This was interpreted to 
indicate similar reasoning abilities but a different inductive reasoning strategy, one which relies 
too heavily on externally-provided rules, reassurance, or inferences (Pelissier, O’Connor, & 
Dupuis, 2009).  
A later study found that when provided with alternative possibilities that contradicted the 
original conclusion on the RIAT, doubt was generated in both the OCD and healthy control 
groups; however, doubt increases were greater in the OCD group than healthy control for neutral 
but not OCD-relevant items. Yet, when the alternatives supported the initial conclusion, healthy 
controls benefited (i.e., reported greater increases in confidence), while the OCD group remained 
unaffected (O’Connor, Wilson, Taillon, Pelissier, & Audet, 2018). Thus, it appears that people 
with OCD do rely more on external than internal sources of information to draw inferences about 
the world, but perhaps in biased ways, such that it tends to be doubt-generating rather than 
doubt-inhibiting. 
Studies using the Inference Process Task (IPT) found similar support for this inferential 
confusion hypothesis. In this task, participants are provided with vignettes and pieces of 
information that alternate in terms of whether they are ‘reality-based’ (i.e., factual) or 
‘possibility-based’ in a bid to measure how much individuals are impacted by the different types 
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of information. Aardema et al. (2009) found that, as expected, people with OCD are more 
impacted by possibility-based information (i.e., subjective sources) than nonclinical controls. 
This increased reliance on uncertainty-based information comes at the expense of reality-based 
information and thus leads to higher levels of doubt in OCD (Aardema et al., 2009). When 
completed by nonclinical participants, those with higher levels of OCD and feared self beliefs 
(i.e., the extent to which they identify undesirable aspects of themselves) showed greater 
fluctuations in doubt, indicating greater vulnerability to possibility-based information, especially 
for OCD-relevant scenarios (contamination and checking content). Moreover, it appears that it 
may be feared self beliefs that make individuals susceptible to doubt in relation to OCD 
symptomatology (Nikodijevic et al., 2016). 
Yet, some studies have failed to replicate findings supporting the doubt-provoking role of 
inferential confusion. Gangemi and colleagues (2015) found that it was the threatening nature of 
the information provided (i.e., does it communicate safety or danger?) that actually impacted the 
levels of doubt evoked. Specifically, when probability-based information indicated safety in a 
hypothetical scenario and reality-based information confirmed danger, individuals with OCD 
were swayed by the danger-oriented factual information. The researchers thus posit that 
individuals with OCD actually enact a ‘prudential reasoning strategy’ (i.e., a “better safe than 
sorry” policy) wherein doubt and the ensuing preoccupation is provoked by any information that 
might indicate danger, regardless of whether it is framed as reality- or probability-based 
(Gangemi et al., 2015).  
Moreover, a therapy designed specifically to target inferential confusion, inference-based 
therapy (IBT), while improving 44% of the OCD group’s ability to achieve non-clinical levels of 
doubt on the IPT, did not resolve this inferential confusion or doubt for 35%. Additionally, while 
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IPT performance improved for these individuals after treatment and they reported lower levels of 
obsessionality and negative mood states, this improvement was not associated with 
improvements in the YBOCS clinician scores (Aardema & O’Connor, 2012). Thus, even this 
conceptualisation of doubt requires further clarification for a more thorough understanding. 
Obsessional doubt as uncertainty about one’s behaviour due to poor memory 
confidence.  Several studies, in discussing doubt in OCD, have also made reference to extant 
metamemory literature, especially the role of poor confidence in one’s memory on checking 
behaviours. While the early metamemory OCD studies sometimes make no reference to doubt 
(Radomsky, Gilchrist, & Dussault, 2006; Tolin et al., 2001; van den Hout & Kindt, 2003) or 
expound little on it (Nedeljkovic, Moulding, Kyrios, & Doron, 2009; Radomsky & Alcolado, 
2010), they provide context and understanding for the later studies that directly explored it. Of 
note, these metamemory researchers appear to focus exclusively on doubt in having completed 
checking behaviours. 
Early metamemory studies found that individuals with OCD appear to demonstrate 
selectively low confidence in their memory but not worse memory accuracy for objects that are 
deemed unsafe (in memory tasks); in OCD, there is even a progressive worsening of their 
memory confidence in repeated trials of object presentation (Tolin et al., 2001). In a 
questionnaire-based study assessing metamemory and metacognition in OCD, researchers found 
that the confidence in memory scale (but not confidence in decision-making or concentration 
ability, or perfectionistic expectations of memory) uniquely predicted OCD severity measured on 
the Y-BOCS, over and above anxiety and depressive symptomatology and other OCD-relevant 
beliefs (Nedeljkovic et al., 2009). 
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Moreover, manipulating beliefs about one’s memory can produce OCD-like checking 
behaviours. In a nonclinical student population, those offered false feedback suggesting below 
average performance on memory tasks, and advised not to trust their sense of how well they did, 
demonstrated greater doubt in their memory and urge to check (e.g., higher urges to check the 
memory task, start over on the memory task, and even check whether a light – unrelated to the 
task at hand – had been turned off; Alcolado & Radomsky, 2011). The reverse – that repeated 
checking inherently creates memory distrust in individuals – has been repeatedly demonstrated 
across various objects, such as stoves (e.g., van den Hout & Kindt, 2003; Radomsky et al., 2006) 
and faucets (Radomsky et al., 2014), including both physical and mental checks (Radomsky & 
Alcolado, 2010). Of note, it appears that the reductions in memory confidence are specific to the 
modality of the checks themselves, such that repeated physical checking only erodes confidence 
in memory of the physical check, not mental, and vice versa (Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010). 
The mechanism behind doubting one’s memory (of a check) was posited to relate to 
reduced vividness and a shift from perceptual, detailed remembering to semantic or conceptual 
memory with repeated checking (i.e., from ‘remembering’ the check to ‘knowing’ that it had 
been done; van den Hout & Kindt, 2003), as people use perceptual aspects of memories to 
differentiate real from imagined autobiographical events (Johnson et al., 1988). Indeed, later 
studies demonstrated that when non-OCD individuals were asked to check a stove repeatedly, 
they reported not only poorer memory confidence but reduced vividness and detail in the 
memory compared to ratings after one check and compared to those who repeatedly checked a 
faucet instead of a stove (Radomsky et al., 2006). As memory accuracy has been only slightly 
affected by repeated checking in some studies (Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010) or trended toward 
it (Radomsky et al., 2006) but not in others (e.g., van den Hout & Kindt, 2003), its links to 
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repetitive behaviours need to be further explored. Of note, it is not possible at this time to 
disentangle the possible effects of doubt on accuracy results; that is, it is unclear whether doubt  
arising from repeated checking makes one alter an otherwise accurate answer (i.e., the memory is 
intact but not trusted and therefore reported on incorrectly).  
Altogether then, individuals with OCD are believed to suffer from a “self-perpetuating 
checking/doubting mechanism” in which repeated checking paradoxically increases doubt, which 
then increases checking (Radomsky et al., 2014, p.30). In particular, checking behaviours in 
OCD are understood to arise out of obsessional concern, consistent with Rachman’s model 
(1997), but exert detrimental effects on memory confidence, producing conditions that promote 
doubt, which perpetuates checking behaviour, and so on (Radomsky et al., 2014). Significantly, 
an fMRI study of individuals tested on recall of objects seen while virtually ‘walking’ through 
four rooms found differences in activated brain regions between the OCD and health control 
groups. Specifically, in spite of no difference in memory accuracy, the OCD group activated 
areas associated with greater pathological doubt in memory tasks (posterior cingulate cortex and 
premotor / dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; Olson et al., 2016). These doubt investigations are thus 
couched entirely within the context of metamemory and checking behaviours. 
Obsessional doubt as reduced access to internal states (sensory, affective, cognitive, 
etc.). As previously described, the Seeking Proxies for Internal States model captures obsessive-
compulsive doubt and uncertainty as not content-bound but concerning any internal, subjective 
state that cannot be fully accessed by external observers or measures. These internal states 
include but are not limited to: cognitive states such as perception and memory, affective states 
such as emotions and attraction, and bodily states such as tension and proprioception. This 
attenuated or reduced access to their internal signals may result in pervasive doubts and a 
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compensatory reliance on external proxies (e.g., compulsive rituals). These external proxies may 
however erode confidence in internal states, then ironically justifying their doubts, further 
reinforcing reliance on external criteria and the idea that their internal states should not be 
focused on or trusted (Dar et al., 2016; Lazarov et al., 2012; Lazarov et al., 2014). 
When asked to complete a muscle tensing task, individuals with OCD were less accurate 
than anxious controls and healthy controls at producing muscle tension levels in a specific 
muscle without external feedback (i.e., internally determining the level of the internal tension 
state required to produce certain magnitudes). However, when offered biofeedback monitoring 
information of muscle tension levels as an objective, external proxy, the OCD group’s 
performance improved to the point of equalling the other groups. OCD individuals were also 
more likely to request biofeedback proxy information when offered the opportunity; and, when 
given false feedback on the biofeedback monitor about the tension levels they were producing, 
the OCD group relied more on that external information than their internal sense (i.e., 
misguidedly adjusted muscle tension significantly more) than anxious and healthy controls 
(Lazarov et al., 2014). This pattern of findings has also been demonstrated in a student 
population comparing individuals with high vs low OCD symptomatology, measured by self-
report questionnaire (Lazarov et al., 2012). 
When the Seeking Proxies for Internal States model hypothesis was tested for emotional 
states, using emotion intelligence (EI) measured on the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional 
Intelligence Test, similar results were observed. Specifically, participants scoring high in OCD 
symptomatology performed worse than those low in OCD symptoms on scales measuring their 
ability to perceive and use emotions or affective states (experiential EI, a more internally-based 
cue) but equivalently on scales measuring their ability to understand and manage emotions 
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(strategic EI, argued to be a more external indicator). When used continuously, OCD symptom 
severity was also negatively correlated with experiential (internal) EI but not strategic (external) 
EI. Moreover, in an unselected group of participants, individuals who received an ‘undermined 
confidence’ induction for doubt (informed that some people can feel confident in identifying 
emotions but are actually inaccurate) performed more poorly than the control group in 
experiential but not strategic EI, mimicking the high OC group results. Thus, the model findings 
appear to extend to the emotional domain, with experimental induction of doubt in one’s 
emotions producing performance like that of individuals with high OC symptoms without any 
induction, namely deficiencies in perception and use of internal emotional states (Dar et al., 
2016).   
Unfortunately, a more recent study failed to substantially replicate these Seeking Proxies 
for Internal States model findings on a task measuring grip strength, which researchers noted 
might be more familiar, under greater individual control, and therefore more resistant to doubt 
than the rather unknown flexor carpi ulnaris muscle (Wong, Williams, & Grisham, 2017). 
Indeed, these researchers found that OCD symptomatology in a student population was not 
significantly associated with poorer accuracy in grip strength when feedback was unavailable (as 
predicted). Rather, previous findings may have reflected the ability to perceive internal states but 
the inability to physically produce the necessary performance for muscle tension (lack of 
practice, physical limitations). The predictions outlined by this model failed to withstand testing 
in another sensory domain (distance perception, which is a familiar form of visual estimation that 
may be ecologically valid for the OCD population. The opposite pattern of results was found, 
with higher OCD symptomatology associated with better distance perception prior to feedback; 
additionally, feedback as an external proxy was more influential in the high than low OC group, 
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as the Seeking Proxies for Internal States model would expect, but it did not reliably improve 
performance, instead worsening it so that the groups were equivalent. This feedback was posited 
to instead introduce doubt in their performance. Rather than reducing access to internal states (or 
any actual deficit in ability to ascertain internal states), individuals with OCD were argued to 
generally be vulnerable to doubting or distrusting their senses or cognitive performance, much 
like the inferential confusion hypothesis and cognitive appraisal models (Wong et al., 2017). 
Obsessional doubt as uncertainty due to poor confidence in internal senses.  Wong 
and colleagues (2017) thus agreed with and extended previous schools of thought regarding the 
broad scope of doubt, namely: doubt in OCD encompasses one’s memory, decision-making and 
concentration abilities, sensory perception, etc. in the absence of any concrete deficits. In fact, 
their study findings highlight that OCD individuals might show enhanced performance when 
internal states are involved. Yoris and colleagues (2017) similarly found such a pattern of results 
when they asked participants with OCD, panic disorder, and no diagnosis (healthy control) to 
follow their own heartbeats through mental or motor tracking (heart beat detection task). Those 
with OCD performed better than anxious and healthy controls when asked to synchronise motor 
responses to their internal heartbeats but reported lower confidence in their performance. 
Significantly, it may be that individuals with OCD simply have a tendency to overmonitor 
internal sensations, such as one’s heartbeat, given that they exhibited an enhanced heart evoked 
potential on electroencephalography, a sign of greater attention allocation to changes in heart 
rate, regardless of their accuracy on the task (Yoris et al., 2017). This study thus supports the 
view that there are no decrements in (and perhaps enhancements in performance due to increased 
attention to) internal state monitoring but rather poor confidence in one’s ability to do so. 
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Phenomenological investigation of OCD doubt. Yet, of all the studies of doubt in 
OCD, only one to our knowledge comes close to directly asking individuals about their 
experience and defining it accordingly from their perspective. Samuels et al. (2017) define doubt 
as “lack of subjective certainty about, and confidence in, one’s perceptions and internal states” 
(p. 117) and allude to the many OCD studies investigating a lack of confidence in one’s own 
memory, attention, and perception, not to mention indecisiveness and intolerance of uncertainty. 
They thus investigated OCD doubt by asking individuals diagnosed with OCD an item from an 
earlier version of the YBOCS: 
“After you complete an activity, do you doubt whether you performed it 
correctly? Do you doubt whether you did it at all? When carrying out routine 
activities, did you feel you didn't trust your senses (i.e., what you see, hear, or 
touch)?” (Samuels et al., p. 119) 
The researchers found that many individuals with OCD rate themselves as being severely (19%) 
or extremely (10%) burdened with such doubt, although a sizeable proportion endorsed no (29%) 
or mild (15%) doubt; the remaining 27% endorsed moderate doubt. Doubt appears to speak to 
disorder severity, as doubt severity was correlated with OCD severity and impacted global scores 
of impairment (44% in the no doubt group vs 81% in the extreme doubt group endorsed ‘marked 
or extreme impairment’) with odds of impairment significantly increasing from severe (odds 
ratio of 2.6) to extreme doubt (odds ratio of 5.5), relative to no doubt. Significantly, doubt 
severity seems to be a prognostic indicator, with the proportion reporting a good response to 
CBT declining precipitously with increased severity (58% of those with no doubt to 35% with 
extreme doubt). Results were similar for pharmacotherapy response (serotonin reuptake 
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inhibitors). Alarmingly, the odds of a good response to CBT were very low (0.40) for those with 
extreme doubt, relative to no doubt (Samuels et al., 2017).  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this OCD doubt endorsement was related to contamination or 
cleaning and hoarding dimensions but strongest for checking symptoms. These findings are 
important in that they suggest doubt may not be a core OCD feature spanning all cases; rather it 
may be a frequent and impactful or prognostic symptom when it does occur. Yet, in spite of a 
comparatively broader investigative purview (relative to the experimental studies mentioning 
OCD doubt), this study’s exploration of OCD doubt is limited in scope, having assessed only 
those doubts about performing activities and trusting one senses (Samuels et al., 2017).  
OCD doubt as a scattered landscape. Altogether, therefore, OCD researchers have 
variously conceptualised doubt as an obsessional or compulsive form (e.g., Akhtar et al., 1975), 
an obsessional content domain (e.g., Pinto et al., 2007; Radomsky et al., 2013), pervasive 
indecisiveness in decision-making (e.g., Nestadt et al., 2016), or a distrust of reality (inferential 
confusion; Aardema et al., 2009; Nikodijevic et al., 2016). Doubt has also been defined 
specifically as uncertainty about checking behaviour due to poor memory confidence (e.g., 
Radomsky et al., 2014), a broad deficit in one’s ability to access internal states (sensory, 
affective, or cognitive; e.g., Lazarov et al., 2012, 2014), or the converse – individuals with intact 
or enhanced ability to access internal states but poor confidence in it (e.g., Wong et al., 2017). 
One of the few studies asking individuals with OCD to reflect on their own doubt experience still 
couched it within a combination of uncertainty about whether they performed an activity 
correctly or at all and a distrust of one’s senses (Samuels et al., 2017).   
These various operationalisations of doubt have created a scattered landscape, wherein 
doubt is consistently observed and acknowledged, but is variably defined and thus discrepantly 
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measured and assessed. These definitions encompass invisible cognitive processes, subjective 
feelings accessed by the individual, (conversely) a lack of or difficulty accessing subjective 
feelings, and observable behaviours (as in poor decision-making). Some conceptualisations are 
in direct opposition to others, with some researchers arguing that it is a core process in OCD 
applying to all, while others posit that it is limited in scope and experienced only by some. 
Additionally, some of these understandings defy thought experiments testing the construct; for 
example, if doubt is a content domain like contamination, it ought theoretically to be manifested 
across the existing forms (e.g., verbal thoughts of doubt content, images of doubt, urges of doubt, 
etc.), but it is difficult to conceive of examples for the latter two. It is unclear whether doubt is 
even a disorder-wide construct, obsession-specific, or compulsion-specific.  
It is therefore difficult to make any conclusions about obsessional doubt in OCD (other 
than that it is highly prevalent in some manner), because findings are entirely dependent on how 
each researcher has conceptualized doubt. Perhaps one of the main challenges in doubt 
investigations is the nebulous, highly conceptual nature of doubt, which is made more difficult 
by our lack of understanding of the construct at a phenomenological level. Importantly, to our 
knowledge, all studies of doubt in OCD (but one) have approached doubt in an experimental 
fashion and failed to capture the lived experience of doubt among individuals with OCD. A basic 
understanding of obsessional doubt is lacking, as it is unclear at this point whether individuals 
are referring to a physiological sensation, an affective state, a verbal dialogue that consistently 
undermines an internal conviction, an underlying cognitive mechanism, or any other experience.  
A strong case can be made for doubt as an obsessional form, although it can be applied to 
compulsions as well. Consider the table below, which outlines various ways in which doubt, 
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alongside other obsessional forms, may appear across various content domains and may take 
place with respect to the accuracy, success, or relevancy of one’s compulsive behaviours.  
Table 1.  





















object? What if a 
dirty or sick 
person touched 
that surface? 
Did I wash my 
hands well or 
thoroughly 
enough?  
Harm to self or 
others 
It’s possible I 
could push my 
friend, with 
whom I am 
walking, into 
traffic and kill her 
(though I do not 
want to) 
Intrusive image 
of me shoving 
friend into traffic 
Did I hit someone 
with my car 
without realising? 
I can't remember 
if I turned off my 
hair straightener 
(in which case I 
will burn down 
my house and my 
pets in it). 
Can I trust my 
eyes when I look 
back to check? 
Did I properly 
turn off that hair 
straightener? 
Sexual  I am a sexual 
deviant 
Intrusive image 
of sexual activity 
Am I a 
homosexual and 









don’t know it? 
What if I am a 
pedophile and a 
danger to society? 
job of avoiding 
areas where 
children gather? 
What if did not 
control my 
thoughts carefully 
enough when I 













Am I possibly the 
Devil incarnate? 






These objects are 
off. These things 
are not quite right 
Image as 
somatosensory 
buzzing or “not 
just right” feeling 
I’m not sure that 
object is 
positioned quite 
right. Is that 
exactly so?  
Has this been 
arranged quite 
right by me? 
Have I done 
enough to ensure 
this is exactly 
appropriate? 
 
If doubt can manifest across symptom clusters, just as other obsessional forms, it should 
also be characterisable in ways that are similar to image- or thought-based intrusions (e.g., 
prevalence, distress, interference, etc.) and likewise provoke compulsions in an attempt to get rid 
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of the form. However, we lack key information about the experiential qualities of obsessional 
doubt that would not only help us characterise doubt appropriately (is it a form, a cognitive 
process, or metacognitive state?) but also allow us to understand its role in the development 
and/or maintenance of OCD and inform treatments accordingly. Indeed, it may be that the mixed 
findings across the studies are the equivalent of uncovering specific aspects of the broad 
obsessional doubt experience (i.e., small slices of the pie that while sometimes inconsistent with 
other slices hold together in totality to comprise the overall construct). 
Further research is thus needed to clarify several aspects of obsessional doubt. Given the 
lack of phenomenological understanding, we seek to explore these elements in our interview. 
The second aim of this study is therefore to understand how doubt is experienced, 
appraised, and neutralised by individuals with OCD. In understanding this second aim, this 
study asks: when individuals endorse doubt, what are they doubting (i.e., doubt content domains) 
and how do they know it (is it a verbal stream of thoughts, a felt sense, or other experience)? 
How convinced are individuals that their doubt is true, and how distressing and interfering is it? 
For that matter, how prevalent is obsessional doubt, and is it associated with OCD symptom 
severity? Moreover, at what point does obsessional doubt terminate, and to what extent do 
individuals perform specific compulsions to prevent doubt or in response? In fact, how is 
obsessional doubt appraised – does it have special meaning or significance to them?  
Results of this exploration into obsessional doubt will have significant impacts both 
theoretically and clinically. Consider that, presently, many individuals at post-treatment may 
either never have discussed obsessional doubt or it may not have been addressed fully in  
treatment, given the lack of empirical clarity. Indeed, some cases of treatment non-response may 
be explained by significant doubt that continues to fuel obsessional concerns. From a theoretical 
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perspective, conclusions from this investigation will address key lacuna in the OCD literature 
and clarify current models. 
III. On Obsessional Images 
There exists a considerably larger pocket of literature on obsessional or intrusive images 
in the context of OCD. Despite early debate about whether images are encoded as verbal mental 
descriptions or as distinct cognitions with spatial and sensory properties, decades of research 
have established that mental images are distinct and impactful cognitions that play a significant 
role in daily functioning and in psychopathology alike (see Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001; 
Pearson, Naselaris, Holmes, & Kosslyn, 2015). Mental images have been defined in various 
ways by different researchers, including: 
- “contents of consciousness that possess sensory qualities as opposed to those that are 
purely verbal or abstract” (Hackman, 1998, p. 301); 
- “neural representations constructed from…elemental sensory information” (Holmes 
& Mathews, 2010, p. 350); and, 
- “representations and the accompanying experience of sensory information without a 
direct external stimulus” (Pearson et al., 2015, p. 590). 
These definitions highlight that mental images are internal, cognitive representations that involve 
a notable sensory experience. Kosslyn et al. (2001) likened visual and auditory imagery to 
“seeing with the mind’s eye” or “hearing with the mind’s ear.” 
Images and emotion.  Images in psychological disorders have recently garnered more 
attention due to their vast impacts on one’s emotional experience. Holmes and Mathews (2010) 
describe their significance as arising from three different paths through which images – over any 
other type of cognition, such as verbal thoughts – have special links to emotions. First, mental 
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images are able to directly influence emotional systems in the brain that are inherently 
responsive to specific sensory signals, such as those inherent in images. In particular, such 
sensory cues are able to bypass higher-level processing by routing through the amygdala, an 
evolutionary by-product of a rapid signalling system to facilitate responses to danger or reward 
cues (Holmes & Mathews, 2010).  
Support for this pathway comes from studies noting amygdala activation in response to 
emotional stimuli (e.g., pictures of angry faces) that are presented outside of one’s attention and 
when masked to prevent participant awareness of the stimuli. It is not that higher-level 
processing is completely removed, as instructions to consider the stimuli in a different way (via 
top-down conscious control) can reduce, if not eliminate, amygdala activation (Mathews, Yiend, 
& Lawrence, 2004). Rather, mental images, by nature of their intrinsically sensory inputs, may 
activate brain systems that underlie emotions more directly than symbolic representations such as 
verbal material that do not contain sensory codes. In fact, verbal processing may actually 
undermine one’s affective experience, perhaps by routing through one’s semantic memory and 
potentially accessing conflicting information. Indeed, consider that Borkovec and colleagues 
(Borkovec, Alcaine & Behar, 2004; Sibrava & Borkovec, 2006) proposed that verbal worry in 
generalised anxiety disorder serves a cognitive avoidance function in response to threatening and 
distressing information, potentially buffering against emotional engagement and intensity.   
 Second, mental images may evoke emotion through a more indirect pathway, namely 
that emotion-arousing images may actually feel as if they are being perceived in real life, 
eliciting an emotional response due to the perceptual processes involved (Holmes & Mathews, 
2010). Lang (1979) first expounded on this in his bio-informational theory of emotional imagery, 
in which he noted that a mental image of an emotion-provoking stimulus (e.g., a spider) will 
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activate an associative network of stored information that overlaps with networks activated by 
the stimulus in real life (e.g., an encounter with a live spider). This associative network of 
information contains various types of information about the stimulus, ranging from perceptual 
(colour, shape, texture, etc.) to semantic (what it means), somatovisceral (what it feels like to 
encounter the stimulus), and behavioural (preparatory motor responses evoked by encounter). 
Given this overlap in perceptual information between imagined and real stimuli, images can 
operate as “as-if real” templates of real interactions with the stimulus, evoking the corresponding 
emotional and behavioural responses (Lang, 1979).  
A wealth of research from activation studies supports Lang’s notion that images provoke 
emotional and physiological reactions consistent with “as-if real” templates. Functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) results indicate amygdala activation when participants are given 
emotional script-driven imagery, regardless of positive or negative content, compared to neutral 
imagery (Costa, Lang, Sabatinelli, Versace, & Bradley, 2010). Additionally, visual mental 
imagery has been observed to activate areas in the visual cortex, as if one is seeing the content of 
the image in real life (Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003). Moreover, mental imagery of high vs. low 
arousal scenarios did in fact provoke greater corresponding physiological activity reflecting 
emotional response, such as greater heart rate acceleration (Vrana, 1995; Vrana, Cuthbert, & 
Lang, 1986), skin conductance response levels (Lang, Levin, Miller, & Kozak, 1983), and 
respiratory responses (Van Diest et al., 2001). Repeatedly imagining a finger movement 
sequence not only improves performance behaviourally but activates corresponding activity 
changes in one’s motor cortex (Sirigu & Duhamel, 2001). 
This is significant in that individuals who feel as if their imagery was real (e.g., through 
concrete physical reactions) – in spite of knowledge that it is not – may still find their behavior 
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influenced or impacted by the images. Indeed, repeatedly imagining a future event increases the 
perceived likelihood that it will occur for the individual (Szpunar & Schacter, 2013). Dubbed the 
simulation heuristic, it has been shown to provoke mood-consistent emotions, increasing anxiety 
levels in participants who imagined anxiety-provoking future events (Raune, MacLeod, & 
Holmes, 2005). Further, imagining an event as having taken place in the past (even if it did not) 
inflated individuals’ confidence that the event actually did take place (Garry, Manning, Loftus, & 
Sherman, 1996), likely lending further feelings of realness to visual mental imagery. 
Studies finding evidence of selective interference (i.e., competition for shared cognitive 
resources in mental imagery tasks with same-modality perceptual demands) highlight the 
overlapping neural activation patterns between imagery and perceptual processes, consistent with 
an “as-if real” emotional pathway. Indeed, task interference has been noted for individuals 
completing tasks involving mental imagery and perceptual processes that share the same sensory 
modality across auditory and visual stimuli (Holmes & Matthews, 2010). Researchers have 
found that holding a visual image in mind selectively interferes with detection of a faint signal of 
the same modality (i.e., a visual signal), just as auditory images interfere with detection of 
auditory stimuli (Segal & Fusella, 1969). Additionally, vividness of visual imagery is selectively 
reduced by the concurrent completion of visuo-spatial tasks, just as auditory image vividness is 
reduced by counting aloud (Baddeley & Andrade, 2000). Disruption of emotional mental 
imagery via perceptual engagement also reduces emotional impacts: when tapping spatial 
patterns with one’s finger or engaging in lateral eye movements while generating visual imagery 
from emotionally negative cues, participants report reduced imagery vividness and 
corresponding declines in intensity of emotional responding compared to neutral cues (Andrade, 
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Kavanagh, & Baddeley, 1997). Thus, images may indeed have a pathway to emotions via “as-if 
real” templates. 
Third, researchers have noted that generation of images can draw on autobiographical 
memories; mental images that derive source material from emotional memories of lived events 
may then reactivate the feeling states related to the incident. (Holmes & Mathews, 2010). 
Consider that most forms of remembering involve images (Brewer, 1996), making it sensible 
that autobiographical recall and image construction are intricately interlinked. Indeed, Schacter, 
Addis, and Buckner (2007) noted that neuroimaging studies reveal that memory-based processes 
responsible for the assembly of autobiographical memories (by using memory fragments stored 
within the individual’s database of general knowledge) are the very same processes involved in 
generating new mental images, as they rely upon fragments that are reproduced from memories 
of past events (Schacter et al., 2007).  
In further support of this overlap, studies have found that amnesic individuals 
(subsequent to occipital lobe injury) who struggle to produce personal visual images were also 
unable to retrieve mental images of personal events that had transpired prior to the injury, unless 
they were in a different modality (i.e., non-visual such as listening to music; Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000). Moreover, it appears that there are top-down effects, with emotional processing 
style affecting one’s experience of constructed images and recalled memories. D’Argembeau and 
Van der Linden (2006) report that individuals who report greater habitual avoidance of 
emotional expression endorse less imagery vividness (fewer sensory details) when remembering 
autobiographical events and generating images of imagined future events. 
Researchers speculate that this type of overlapping reconstruction process (in which 
generation of new images relies upon autobiographical memory recall processes and fragments) 
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may be advantageous in that it allows for information from one’s memory to be used in mental 
simulation of future events (Schacter et al., 2007). A natural consequence of this system would 
be that constructed mental images would also reinstate emotions experienced in the past events 
accessed (to the extent that these memories include feelings). Emotional responses to images 
involving memories may thus come about by virtue of (1) recapitulated feelings originally 
associated with that event in one’s memory, and (2) feelings generated anew by the experience of 
perceiving the constructed image itself. 
Yet, not all images have an equal impact on emotion: images seen from a field (i.e., first-
person) perspective are associated with greater emotional intensity and more detailed memory of 
emotional reactions and sensations than images seen in the observer perspective (Holmes & 
Mathews, 2010). Individuals may then deliberately apply an observer perspective to intrusive 
imagery as an attempt to reduce associated distress. Indeed, the adoption of an observer 
perspective is common in other psychological disorders, such as social anxiety disorder (Wells, 
Clark, & Ahmad, 1995) and depression (Williams & Moulds, 2007); however, this observer 
perspective imagery is not associated with improved long-term outcomes. Holmes, Mathews, 
Mackintosh, & Dalgleish (2008) have hypothesised that the observer perspective may maintain 
some disorders by focusing the individual’s attention on a negative and distorted self-image 
instead of broader and more positive sources of information. It may thus be necessary for the 
images to be switched to a field perspective to encourage positive emotions (e.g., in depression; 
Holmes et al., 2008). 
Images and behaviour.  Images are also uniquely linked to behavioural patterns. They 
allow us to mentally simulate actions (Moulton & Kosslyn, 2009) and organise our behaviour to 
achieve goals (Conway, Meares, & Standart, 2004), priming us to act. Significantly, images also 
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help us to generate predictions about outcomes based on past experiences (Moulton & Kosslyn, 
2009). Extant research has found that the simulation heuristic, in which imagining a future event 
increases the perceived subjective likelihood that the event will occur, is moderated by the ease 
with which this event can be imagined, with participants who imagined themselves falling ill 
with more easily imagined symptoms reporting greater likelihood of contracting the disease 
(Sherman, Cialdini, Schwartzman, & Reynolds, 1985). This prepares us to act accordingly. 
Imagery also has implications for performance of behaviours, with evidence that 
imagined rehearsal of actions increasing the likelihood that the action be completed (e.g., in 
voting behaviour; Libby et al., 2007). It is possible that this is due to activation of the 
corresponding areas of the motor cortex (Holmes & Mathews, 2010) that enhances the 
individual’s readiness to act in an appropriate manner (Conway et al., 2004). In fact, mental 
imagery has been argued to be a key aspect of the ‘prospective brain,’ as it enables individuals to 
simulate hypothetical future outcomes using their memories and past experiences as a fount of 
knowledge. In so doing, individuals can effectively ‘try out’ different futures to facilitate 
predictions and inform plans (Moulton & Kosslyn, 2009; Schacter et al., 2007). Significantly, 
given the emotional access afforded by imagery, individuals are also able to try out emotional 
consequences of various courses of action, a phenomenon termed ‘mental emulation’ (Moulton 
& Kosslyn, 2009).  
Images in OCD. More recently, OCD, along with other anxiety disorders, has benefited 
from a surge of interest in imagery. Within the context of OCD, intrusive images have been 
defined as “mental pictures that interrupt ongoing mentation” and, much like intrusive verbal 
thoughts, “are unselected, unexpected, uninvited, [and] often unwelcome” (Rachman, 2007, p. 
404). Intrusive images have been listed as a diagnostic criterion for OCD since the third version 
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of the DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 1980), yet research over the last several decades 
has focused almost exclusively on verbal intrusions, with a few studies recently explicitly and 
directly exploring images in OCD (e.g., Lipton et al., 2010; Speckenset al., 2007).  
De Silva first wrote an exploratory paper on the matter, reporting that images can occur 
in the context of OCD as obsessional or compulsive images (1986). If obsessional, images are 
unwanted, intrusive pictures (e.g., mutilated or rotting bodies, scenes of sexual or violent acts, 
etc.) or videos (e.g., hitting a child with one’s fist, violently attacking an elderly parent) of 
typical OCD content. If compulsive, the image may be corrective to reduce urge-driven 
discomfort (i.e., corrects or neutralises the original image, such as imagining the mutilated 
bodies as healthy, intact people standing or walking around) or independently produced to reduce 
distress (e.g., picturing photographs of loved ones after intrusive thoughts of harm). He described 
further categorisations of images into disaster images, representing the feared sequelae of 
obsessions or failure to complete compulsions, and disruptive images, which invalidate 
compulsions while they are being complete (De Silva, 1986). However, De Silva’s writings on 
images have largely been overlooked, with recent studies on obsessional images focusing on 
properties of the images themselves. 
Pearson, Deeprose, Wallace-Hadrill, Heyes, and Holmes (2015) point out that mental 
images can be created directly from perceptual information immediately available in the short-
term (e.g., creating a mental image while looking at a picture of a cat) or crafted from previously 
stored information in one’s long-term memory (Pearson et al., 2015). Given that obsessional 
imagery in OCD takes place in the absence of actual, concrete sensory stimuli, intrusive OCD 
images can be understood to correspond with the latter type. Such images generated from long-
term memory are typically less accurate in sensory information than those of short-term origin 
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and differ in the associative network they provoke (emotional, behavioural information, etc.). It 
is thus vital to explore the lived experience of OCD images to better understand how this may 
manifest in the disorder. 
Speckens and colleagues (2007) offered the first systematic study of mental imagery in 
OCD, conducting a phenomenological interview of 37 individuals with OCD, followed soon 
after by Lipton and colleagues (2010), who interviewed 21 OCD and 22 anxious control 
participants. Prevalence rates in both studies are high, ranging from 81% (Speckens et al., 2007) 
to 95% (Lipton et al., 2010). Reports across both studies also converge in the highly visual 
nature of OCD images as well as their tendency to be seen as if from out of one’s eyes (i.e., field 
perspective), estimated at 68% in the earlier and 85% in the later study (Speckens et al., 2007), 
compared to an estimated 45% of Lipton and colleagues’ (2010) anxious control group.  
Intrusive images are also frequently recurring experiences in OCD, with the median 
frequency reported to be 10 times a week in one study (Speckens et al., 2007), echoed in 79% 
endorsement of more than 5 occurrences per week in the other OCD group in contrast to 35% of 
the anxious control group (Lipton et al., 2010). Both studies also reported that images were 
sometimes drawn directly from actual memories of autobiographical events (34% in the former 
study and 15% in the latter study) and more commonly simply associated with an earlier event 
but not of the memory itself (68% and 55%, respectively). In fact, Lipton et al. (2010) found that 
there were much higher associations between actual memories and intrusive images in those with 
a diagnosed anxiety disorder than those with OCD.  
Each of the two studies also investigated unique aspects of imagery not explored by the 
other. Speckens and colleagues (2007) reported that the vast majority of OCD images appeared 
either as a snapshot (46% endorsement) or film (43%), with a limited proportion (11%) 
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describing the image as a series of unconnected pictures. Vividness was rated highly and distress 
even more so, alongside provoked feelings of anxiety, helplessness, sadness, guilt, and shame 
(Speckens et al., 2007). OCD images appeared to primarily center around unacceptable ideas of 
harm (often violent or sexual in nature) to self or others by acts of commission or omission 
(75%), with only 10% noting image content about contamination and somatic complaints. In 
contrast, images in anxious control participants encompassed several other topics (e.g., 15% 
endorsed unacceptable ideas of harm in their images, 35% contamination and somatic 
complaints, 35% social rejection, and 15% miscellaneous; Lipton et al., 2010). Roughly 75% of 
individuals reported performing some sort of ritual when experiencing the image (e.g., 
avoidance, distraction, pushing the image out of mind, seeking reassurance, etc.). Those who 
experienced more intrusive images also endorsed higher severity of anxiety and OCD symptoms, 
especially in obsessive perseveration and neutralising. Curiously, individuals who experienced 
images reported more responsibility beliefs than those without (Speckens et al., 2007); however, 
no other appraisals have been investigated within the context of intrusive images.  
To the best of our knowledge, these two studies are the only empirical phenomenological 
studies of intrusive OCD images. Rachman (2007) offered further commentary in a non-
experimental paper, noting distinctive properties of intrusive images over other obsessional 
content. He described images as appearing primarily as visual pictures, fully formed (rather than 
in disconnected splashes or patches), and brief (under one minute in duration). Rachman noted 
that these mental pictures are stable from occasion to occasion, as if preserved in its complete 
form, leading individuals to dread their reappearance and even resist them. Identified neutralising 
compulsions might involve modifying the image (e.g., reshaping it or forming a corrective 
image), using counterthoughts, or superimposing a more acceptable image over the distressing 
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one. Significantly, repugnant images may be particularly toxic because of the damage done to the 
person’s self-concept, especially in the moral domain.  
Indeed, Rachman (2007) noted that the CBT-based appraisal model could be applied to 
understand the maintenance of intrusive images in OCD. Specifically, he described how an 
intrusive image may persistently recur in individuals with OCD due to interpretations of the 
image in personally significant ways. The catastrophic misinterpretation (e.g., “it means I am 
losing my mind”) leads to distress that drives avoidance or neutralising behaviours (e.g., attempts 
to block or suppress the image); this in turn fuels the significance of the images, contributing to 
their distressing recurrence. Rachman thus posited that the cycle could be disrupted by 
appropriately negating or modifying the maladaptive interpretations of images to more benign 
alternatives, circumventing any need to block or suppress OCD images (Rachman, 2007).  
Rachman (2007) went on to note that it may sometimes be necessary to directly 
manipulate OCD images should they not respond to typical therapeutic methods. Other 
intervention points suggested include replacing the image with an innocuous one, reshaping or 
shrinking down the image, or even rescripting the image (Rachman, 2007). Indeed, current gold 
standard OCD treatments have been developed to intervene with primarily verbal material. 
However, if intrusive images are functionally and significantly phenomenologically different 
from intrusive verbal thoughts, it may be necessary to target OCD images directly with image-
specific interventions. This begs the question: is there a need to focus specifically on OCD 
images, apart from verbal thoughts? 
The literature on mental images in psychological disorders, neuropsychological research, 
and the limited existing studies on images in OCD reviewed above converge to suggest that 
images are distinct from verbal thoughts, structurally and functionally, in important ways. 
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Indeed, consider thinking, “I am about to be hit by a falling brick,” compared to visualising a 
brick falling onto oneself. Significantly, Keen, Brown, and Wheatley (2008) noted that 
individuals with OCD were better able to mentally simulate (that is, imagine) scenarios relevant 
to their core OCD fear (i.e., personally relevant scenarios) than other OCD and non-OCD fears. 
Moreover, better simulation of feared scenarios was associated with more worrying behaviour 
about the feared outcome, and this relationship was not moderated by the perceived likelihood of 
the outcome (Keen et al., 2008). These findings together present a loaded picture for individuals 
with OCD, as they may thus more readily create imaginary narratives for feared scenes; mentally 
emulate the scenarios, evoking enhanced negative emotions; in consequence feel that such 
outcomes are more likely; and be better motivated, organised, and primed to react compulsively. 
These systems together may powerfully fuel OCD symptoms. 
Interventions for intrusive images. Given the potential uniqueness of the intrusive 
image experience, it has been hypothesized that intrusive images may require direct and image-
specific intervention, outside of current verbally-based treatments, due to the understanding that 
their encoding and storage mechanisms differ considerably from verbally encoded information. 
Intrusive images are not exclusive to OCD; they have been reported in numerous disorders, 
including social anxiety disorder, panic disorder, depression, and posttraumatic stress disorder 
(Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010; Moscovitch, Gavric, Merrifield, Bielak, & 
Moscovitch, 2011). Imagery rescripting for distressing, unwanted images has been added to 
treatments for social anxiety disorder, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder, with studies 
into its efficacy supporting its use in treatment (Stopa, 2011). 
Broadly speaking, imagery rescripting techniques used in CBT are those that aim to 
modify negative interpretations of distressing autobiographical memories in an attempt to update 
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meanings and see them in context (Stopa, 2011). These strategies include: (1) taking an existing 
negative mental image and transforming it into a more benign or positive image (e.g., bringing 
an adult self into the memory to stop the abuse), or (2) construct a new and positive image that 
captures more adaptive interpretations or meanings to counteract negative schemas or beliefs 
associated with the original image (e.g., creating positive future-self imagery; Holmes, Arntz, & 
Smucker, 2007). In Arntz’s three-stage technique, early traumatic childhood memories are 
modified by first reliving the event as a child, incorporating an adult self into the memory, and 
then reviewing the full image as a child once more (Arntz & Weeterman, 1999). 
Only a couple studies have actually studied the use of imagery rescripting for OCD to 
determine if it might be an effective intervention. Veale and colleagues (2015) found that 
following a single session of Arntz’s imagery rescripting procedure, there were clinically 
significant changes (i.e., 10-point reduction in YBOCS scores) in 42% of participants (5 of 12). 
Gains continued to be made over time, with 58% reporting clinically significant change at 3-
month follow-up, and 2 of those individuals achieving asymptomatic status (i.e., score of 7 or 
less on the YBOCS). Significantly, the researchers highlight that none of the participants were 
treatment naïve, with all participants having completed at least one trial of CBT more than one 
year before this intervention (Veale et al., 2015). It is thus difficult to determine whether these 
effects are the result of imagery rescripting alone or the compounded effects of imagery 
rescripting and previous treatment.  
In a broader test of image-neutralisation, Marks and colleagues (2000) demonstrated that 
individuals with OCD were able to significantly reduce discomfort provoked by an OCD image 
by imagining a cancelling image, although the discomfort did not come down to the baseline 
level of the neutral image. It appears exposure and response prevention (ERP) treatment may 
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also successfully improve image-related distress from OCD images specifically but not other 
types of anxiety-related images, as indicated by pre- and post-treatment discomfort ratings. 
However, once again, discomfort did not fall to the low levels of neutral images, indicating that 
ERP offers some but not full benefits even in this domain, in keeping with the treatment response 
literature (Marks et al., 2000).  
Curiously, there has been little evidence of investigations into applications of existing 
therapies (i.e., exposure-only based interventions) to OCD images. Ferris, Mills, and Hanstock 
(2012) did detail a case study of exposure and response prevention for repugnant images, in 
which the patient completed imaginal exposures to her hierarchy of distressing images (e.g., her 
father dying, children getting hurt, hurting her own children). While the latter two image 
categories were treated in an exposure-based way so as not to facilitate avoidance, descriptions 
of the first category seem to indicate rescripting (e.g., feeling empowered after changing the 
image and story). No quantitative measures were reported, though the authors note the patient 
reported improvements in functioning, and treatment ended prematurely due to her attainment of 
full-time employment (Ferris et al., 2012).  
Need for further research into OCD images.  Indeed, De Silva (1986) lamented over 
thirty years ago that in spite of numerous clinical accounts of images in OCD, “the literature is 
almost totally bereft of any detailed examination of obsessive-compulsive imagery as a specific 
phenomenon in its own right” (p. 334). Since that time, there have been scattered attempts to 
understand images in OCD and strategies to treat them. The few existing studies on OCD images 
suggest that they are prevalent, distressing, distinct from verbal thoughts, and may benefit from 
specific intervention, such as imagery rescripting. However, such studies are limited in scope, 
possibly coloured by self-selection bias (individuals without images opting not to participate), 
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and it is therefore difficult to understand how intrusive images fit within the general OC episode 
or obsessional landscape. 
The targeted study of image-based obsessions in OCD is therefore warranted; yet, few 
studies have explicitly and directly investigated intrusive images in OCD. This study thus also 
seeks to determine if existing findings can be replicated, to explore novel aspects of the 
phenomenology, and to clarify the model in which we can understand OCD images. The third 
aim of this study is therefore to elucidate how intrusive images are experienced and 
appraised in OCD, and what compensatory strategies are performed in relation to images. 
More specifically, this study asks what the true prevalence of intrusive images might be in the 
overall obsessive-compulsive experience, as well as their typical content and other characteristics 
(vividness, difficulty with which they are dismissed or resisted, manner in which they are 
experienced, etc.). Moreover, how do these images terminate? Is it a spontaneous conclusion, or 
do they rely on preventative compulsions or those performed after the image appears? How do 
individuals appraise and make sense of the images, and is their presence associated with 
increased OCD severity? 
In couching this exploration within a broader phenomenological study, we can obtain a 
more accurate estimate of the prevalence of intrusive images in OCD. The existing studies of 
OCD images, advertised as in-lab interviews about images, may be vulnerable to inflated 
prevalence statistics, as individuals who do not experience obsessional images may simply 
decline to participate in a study about which they know themselves to have no information. 
Further clarifying image-specific obsessions also has significant implications. Currently, 
assessment of obsessional imagery has not yet become a standard part of clinical work and may 
thus be underreported if neither the client nor clinician know to distinguish between thoughts, 
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impulses, and images. Assuming that images are distressing and disorder-maintaining clinical 
phenomena in OCD, failing to address or target images in an appropriate manner may contribute 
to treatment nonresponse in OCD. This exploration will also allow us to determine whether the 
CBT model plausibly applies to obsessions that appear in image form. Of note, if the CBT model 
does not actually apply well to the imagery experience of individuals with OCD, then CBT with 
ERP strategies may doubly fail to treat OCD. That is, verbally-based CBT with ERP may neglect 
to reach image-related distress and impairment, unless clinicians specifically attend to the OCD 
images, and will not detoxify this form if the mechanism of their maintenance is not verbal. 
Appraisals in OCD: How to Understand Doubt and Imagery 
A fundamental component of the CBT model, on which our most empirically supported 
treatment currently depends, is that it is the manner in which intrusive cognitions are interpreted 
or appraised (e.g., uncontrollable, harmful, or dangerous) that drives the obsessional distress and 
maintains OCD as a disorder. The significance of the OCD appraisal is highlighted in the CBT 
model by reflections that 99% of the population, most of whom do not develop OCD, report 
having experienced at least one intrusive image, impulse, or thought at some point (Purdon & 
Clark, 1993; Rachman & da Silva, 1978).  
Appraisals about the meaning and importance of obsessions and compulsions may arise 
from or reflect schema that individuals have about themselves, the world, others, or the future 
and that specifically threaten their self-view. As reported above, beliefs are typically assessed 
using the OBQ-44 and based on factor analyses are believed to fall under the following 
categories: inflated responsibility and threat overestimation, perfectionism and intolerance of 
uncertainty, and importance and overcontrol of thoughts (OCCWG, 2001). These appraisals echo 
statements made in Pitman’s (1987) summary of Janet’s writing, in which he reflected that 
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obsessional content reflects things within the individual’s imagined control, rather than those 
outside of their sphere of influence. Moreover, OCD symptoms are thought to reflect content that 
is most objectionable or most horrific to the individual, which he coined ‘association by contrast’ 
(Pitman, 1987). 
Curiously, recent studies have found that some individuals with OCD do not endorse any 
obsessive-compulsive (OC) beliefs or score very low on belief measures, which contradicts one 
of the central tenets of the theory. These low-belief individuals tend to report “not just right 
experiences” that researchers argue represent a purely sensory-affective symptom, without any 
cognitive component (Taylor et al., 2006). Moreover, Cougle and Lee (2014) suggest that such 
obsessive beliefs and the focus on catastrophic misinterpretations are epiphenomena or of 
secondary importance. Specifically, they note that these dysfunctional beliefs traditionally 
associated with OCD are not specific to OCD, and success rates of cognitively-focused 
interventions targeting these beliefs are inferior to behavioural approaches (Cougle & Lee, 
2014). However, instead, it may be that this finding represents an assessment problem, in which 
appraisals for other obsessional forms (e.g., doubt) have not been identified and therefore are not 
measured in these scales. Alternatively, it is possible that the appraisals these individuals make 
are simply broader in nature, tapping into schemas they have for themselves, in particular their 
sense of self, and are not captured by OBQ items. Or, it may only take one or two beliefs, 
strongly held, to lead to clinically significant difficulties. 
Indeed, Rachman (1997) first noted that obsessions are distressing because the individual 
‘catastrophically misinterprets’ the personal significance of the intrusive thought in a way that 
endangers his/her view of self. Purdon and Clark (1999) further elaborated on this, proposing 
that the obsessional thought persists specifically because it is appraised negatively due to its ego-
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dystonic nature (that is, its inconsistency with the individual’s sense of self, beliefs, or values, 
including the types of thoughts one might expect to have). Rowa and Purdon (2003), moreover, 
found that participants’ upsetting intrusive thoughts were characterised by more negative 
appraisals and greater reported contradiction of valued aspects of the self than their least 
upsetting thoughts.  
Self-related appraisals in OCD. Ferrier and Brewin (2005) extended both Rachman’s 
(1997) and Rowa and Purdon’s (2003) reflections on self-representations. They found that OCD 
individuals drew more negative inferences about themselves due to their intrusions than anxious 
controls (AC), who in turn drew more negative inferences than non-anxious controls. 
Significantly, content analysis of the negative traits these groups reported concern about 
becoming (i.e., feared self) yielded four -themes, namely: 
(1) a dangerous self that is bad, dangerous, immoral, or will harm others or be out of control; 
(2) a flawed self, involving negative traits that are undesirable but not inherently dangerous 
or harmful to others (e.g., weak); 
(3) a rejected self, involving self-views of oneself as alone or unloved; and, 
(4) a depressed or anxious self, wherein one’s self-perceptions are symptom-related (e.g., 
fearful or hopeless). 
The feared self in the OCD group was more likely to involve bad and immoral traits, leading to 
significantly more endorsements of the ‘dangerous self’ category in the OCD group than either 
of the control groups. The non-anxious control group reported significantly more ‘flawed self’ 
traits than the other two groups, and the anxious control group tended toward endorsing more 
‘anxious/depressed self’ traits than any other group (Ferrier & Brewin, 2005).  
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The groups were also asked to identify the extent of the discrepancy between how they 
perceive their actual self to be against who they ought ideally to be (i.e., actual-ideal 
discrepancy) and against the negative self they feared becoming (i.e., actual-feared discrepancy). 
Ferrier and Brewin found that OCD individuals reported similar levels of actual-ideal and actual-
feared discrepancies as anxious control individuals, but both groups reported significantly greater 
discrepancies than the non-anxious control group (Ferrier & Brewin, 2005).  
Gentes and Ruscio (2015) experimentally manipulated undergraduate students’ appraisals 
of three different types of negative cognitions by providing negative feedback (i.e., that their 
upsetting thoughts are more uncontrollable, rare, and frequently occurring than most people), 
normalising feedback (i.e., that their thoughts are perfectly average in those aspects), and no 
feedback at all. However, they found that neither feedback condition (i.e., manipulated thought 
appraisal) nor thought type reported (ruminative thoughts about the past, worry thoughts about 
the future, or obsessional intrusive thoughts) affected their negative emotionality at the time. 
Instead, in the Negative Feedback condition, it was their pre-existing beliefs about cognitions – 
specifically, how much they believed that thoughts can be dangerous, uncontrollable, or harmful 
– that influenced their experience of negative affect after reporting any kind of upsetting thought. 
Those in the Normalizing Feedback condition demonstrated that their emotions were not 
influenced by the feedback nor by pre-existing beliefs. This study demonstrated that an 
individual’s appraisal of their cognitions, specifically their beliefs about their thoughts, can 
sometimes be more influential in the emotional outcome than the type of thought itself (Gentes 
& Ruscio, 2015). 
Appraisals of obsessional doubt. Why might doubt be particularly toxic for individuals 
with OCD? Currently, floated models about obsessional doubt do not rest on the CBT model but 
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rather explore alternatives (e.g., inference-based models). Research suggests that individuals 
with OCD do not doubt globally or have broadly impaired decision-making abilities; rather, 
doubt is limited to OCD-specific content or ambiguous situations (Kim et al., 2015). Indeed, as 
Moritz and colleagues demonstrated in a directed forgetting paradigm (2011), which asked 
participants to remember one list of words and forget another list of words, OCD individuals are 
not more doubtful on responses for neutral and OCD-relevant words, suggesting that they do not 
have a ‘cold impairment’ that would manifest in neutral situations. Instead, decreased confidence 
among OCD individuals may only be triggered by maladaptive beliefs in OCD scenarios and 
situations (Moritz et al., 2011). While appraisals in doubt-relevant situations have not been 
directly studied, we can generalise from existing literature that suggests doubt-related obsessions 
are particularly upsetting because of the ways they are appraised. 
Inference- and appraisal-based models are purported not to be mutually exclusive; 
whereas appraisal models are mostly concerned with interpretations of an intrusion after the 
event, inferential confusion relates to the perceived likelihood of the feared event at the time of 
the intrusion (Clark & O’Connor, 2005). In one inference-based model study, nonclinical 
participants were investigated for the role that feared self-beliefs might play in levels of doubt 
and their preference for possibility- vs reality-based information. Nikodijevic and colleagues 
(2015) found that individuals who reported greater levels of feared self (i.e., the belief there are 
hidden and negative aspects to one’s personality) endorsed higher levels of baseline doubt and 
were more heavily influenced by the doubt-provoking information (i.e., possibility-based 
statements), demonstrating greater variations in doubt in response to the doubt-provoking 
statements. In fact, they maintain that these results are the first to suggest that feared self-beliefs 
might in part underlie obsessional doubt, via the influence of possibility-based information 
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(Nikodijevic et al., 2015). Yet, this is a significant lacuna in the literature, extending from the 
dearth of obsessional doubt research, and there is a need to further explore appraisals of doubt. 
Appraisals of intrusive images. There have been slightly more explorations into the 
manner in which intrusive images are appraised. Lipton and colleagues (2010) directly explored 
inferences about the self using the categories first created by Ferrier and Brewin (2005) for 
intrusions at large. When the researchers asked what self-beliefs individuals inferred from 
intrusive images, they found that the majority of the OCD group reported the theme of a 
dangerous self (55%), which was largely absent from the anxious control group (5%). In fact, a 
chi-square test indicated significantly greater frequency of ‘dangerous self’ endorsement in the 
OCD group than all other themes combined. The next most frequently endorsed appraisal type 
was depressed/anxious self (30%), followed by flawed self (15%; Lipton et al., 2010).  
Cili and Stopa (2015) further expounded on how intrusive images might help maintain 
different types of disorders through their influence on individuals’ sense of self. They highlight 
how image-related OCD literature investigates links between images and memories as well as 
associated emotions but has not investigated one’s broader sense of self in understanding these 
links and what mechanisms might be set in motion when intrusive self-images are activated. 
Specifically, they link images and one’s sense of self via one’s memories through the self-
memory system model. Consider one’s most significant memories, especially those considered to 
be self-defining, which can powerfully evoke images that confirm one’s beliefs about oneself or 
highlight moments that transformed their sense of self (e.g., ‘I am an embarrassment’ in social 
anxiety disorder). These researchers invoke the concept of the working self, that is, the version or 
representation of one’s sense of self that is active at any given time; this working self allows an 
individual to adapt flexibly to the circumstances at hand while still keeping a stable and coherent 
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sense of self over time. They propose that when in situations that resemble adverse events 
experienced by the individual, they experience not only activation of related images but 
activation of the entire working self (self-beliefs, goals, images, etc.). As such, the intrusive 
images are actually part of the working self linked to the memory, and their purpose (as well as 
that of associated compulsions) is to distance the individual from the possible failure or threat 
represented by the image (Cili & Stopa, 2015).  
Self-concept in OCD. It may not make intuitive sense why ideas about the self one fears 
to be might play such a significant role in OCD. Self-concept has been studied in depression, 
social anxiety disorder, and personality disorders, but curiously not much in OCD. In 
continuation with the appraisal findings detailed above, consider that OCD content, including 
doubt-related content, may be particularly potent for the individual with OCD, as OC 
participants have been shown to be ambivalent about themselves, holding conflicting and 
dichotomous views in domains they deem important (e.g., I am a good and bad person). Indeed, 
Bhar and Kyrios (2007) created a Self-Ambivalence Measure (SAM) specifically to study self-
ambivalence in OCD, specifically ambivalence about one’s morality and self-worth.  
Additionally, discrepancies between low perceived competence and high ascribed 
importance – that is, self-sensitivity – in self-domains such as morality has been associated with 
higher levels of OCD symptoms and beliefs when compared to other anxiety disorders and when 
controlling for overall self-worth  (Doron, Moulding, Kyrios, & Nedeljkovic, 2008). This 
suggests that individuals with OCD may be particularly vulnerable to situations that might reflect 
their moral worth, as they feel incompetent but deem it important (Doron et al., 2008). Indeed, 
studies have indicated that among individuals who are high in self-ambivalence, activation of a 
self-sensitive domain results in more OC cognitions (Abramovitch, Doron, Sar-El, & 
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Altenburger, 2013), greater compulsive urges (Doron, Sar-El, & Mikulincer, 2012), and longer 
deliberation on moral dilemmas (Perera-Delcourt, Nash, & Thorpe, 2014).  
Altogether, according to Doron and colleagues (2008) it may be that the individual with 
OCD holds highly ambivalent notions about valued aspects of self, reflected in dichotomous and 
conflicting beliefs about oneself. These valued domains also represent aspects of self in which 
the individual feels uncertain about his/her worth or standing but to which s/he attributes great 
importance. Consequently, the individual with OCD attends closely to any information that may 
reflect negative personal characteristics in these domains, attributes great importance to any 
evidence of these unwanted traits, and goes to great efforts to prove that s/he instead falls on the 
positive and moral side of these self-domains. With respect to self-concept, then, there are three 
key aspects – importance of domain, perceived competence in that domain, and felt uncertainty 
(or ambivalence) in the self-domain – and it is the discrepancy between high importance and low 
competence (self-sensitivity), couched in a broad self-uncertainty, that is of greatest import in 
OCD. Obsessions are therefore excessive preoccupations about these ruptures in their ideal self-
image, and compulsions and other neutralisation strategies are attempted solutions to resolve 
their self-ambivalence and reinstate their ideal self (Doron et al., 2008). 
Indeed, Ahern and colleagues (2015) found that when participants with OCD repeatedly 
listened to an idiosyncratic, unwanted intrusion and then implemented a neutralising strategy in 
an experimental paradigm designed by Salkovskis and colleagues’ (2003), they reported 
significant increases in self-worth, a temporary decrease in distress, and then a rebound effect of 
increased distress and urge to neutralise, compared to when they implemented a control strategy. 
Thus, it appears that neutralisation strategies may in fact be used to boost self-worth after 
experiencing a distressing intrusion. Limitations to interpretations of these findings include the 
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fact that researchers used just one global measure of self-worth, which did not reflect worth in 
specific domains (e.g., morality), and their study did not explore self-uncertainty (self-worth 
captures ways in which the self has value whereas self-ambivalence taps into a slightly different 
construct, namely lack of certainty in these important self-domains; Ahern et al., 2015).  
 All in all, we thus have a rather incomplete picture of the manner in which intrusions 
might be appraised in OCD. This occurs first at the level of broad self-concept. More 
specifically, what does the individual think the obsession and its content reveals or says about 
him/herself? This occurs at another level in terms of explicit investigation of appraisals occurring 
for specific obsessional forms (currently identified or hypothesized), such as obsessional images 
and doubt). For example, how is the content of the intrusive image or obsessional doubt 
personally threatening? How significant would this be to the individual, and is it deemed to be 
likely? These are identified as subcomponents within our existing research questions for Sections 
II (doubt) and III (images) and will not only potentially inform our theoretical models of the 
disorder – updating the longstanding CBT model – but also offer treatment targets in therapy. 
Obsessional Phenomena: Continuous, Dimensional Experiences?  
 A natural follow-up question to investigations of self-concept in OCD is the following: if 
a faulty appraisal of the self may be at the crux of clinically significant obsessions and the 
maintenance of OCD, what of the average individual with intrusive cognitions that do not 
become distressing and/or time consuming obsessions for which they perform life impairing 
compulsions? Do they simply not make these maladaptive self-appraisals, or are the 
interpretations less potent or less believable? For that matter, are there other differences in the 
obsessional experiences between individuals with clinical vs subclinical levels of OCD, 
especially among those that will not have received much investigation (e.g., obsessional doubt 
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and images)? These are questions that could fundamentally change our understanding of the 
OCD model (factors involved in its development and maintenance) and are necessary to resolve. 
A longstanding debate in OCD has been whether obsessive-compulsive phenomena, like 
other psychopathology (e.g., anxiety and depression symptoms) exist on a continuum or a 
dimension ranging from nonpathological to pathological levels (an incremental phenomenon), 
instead of qualitatively different states or entities at the different levels. Given the high 
proportion of individuals in community who endorse low-level OC symptoms without significant 
interference, the general consensus is that this view has merit. Indeed, “various definitions of 
subclinical OCD…share the assumption that subclinical OCD is a weaker manifestation of the 
full-blown disorder” (Gibbs, 1996, p. 735), though prevalence estimates are difficult to obtain 
due to variability in how it is defined (i.e., how many symptoms must be endorsed). This 
dimensional view has long justified the use of nonclinical populations in researching OCD. 
In fact, in perhaps the most comprehensive study to date, unwanted intrusive thoughts 
were investigated in 777 university students across 15 sites in 13 countries across the world. 
Radomsky and colleagues (2014) concluded that 94.3% of the sample reported at least one kind 
of intrusive thought in the months prior, with doubting most commonly reported and sexual / 
religious / immoral intrusions least commonly reported. Significantly, these individuals reported 
that the intrusions were moderately distressing and described OCD-like appraisals (from the 
OBQ-44) and attempts to control the intrusions much like those observed in OCD (e.g., thought 
stopping, distraction, reassurance seeking, etc.). In sum, the researchers note that their findings 
support the investigation of obsessions on a continuum (normal to abnormal thoughts; Radomsky 
et al., 2014). This is further supported by a few existing studies that suggest that clinical and 
subclinical obsessional content are comparable, and there is no evidence of a subtype of 
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obsessions that might characterize abnormal or clinical content (Garcia-Soriano, Belloch, 
Morillo, & Clark, 2011; Gibbs, 1996).  
A comprehensive review completed by Gibbs (1996) suggests that, in general, subclinical 
and clinical OCD individuals suffer similar types of symptomatology (content, comorbidity, 
etc.), simply enduring a lower severity of these symptoms. In particular, individuals with 
clinically significant OCD are more likely to endorse multiple obsessions and compulsions, 
whereas subclinical individuals tend to exhibit an obsession or compulsion alone. Rather, they 
posit that the primary distinguishing difference from subclinical to clinical status may be the 
manner in which the obsessions are interpreted, as well as the type and effectiveness of coping 
strategies enacted in response to symptoms. Specifically, it was observed that there is a large 
percentage of subclinical individuals who did nothing in response to obsessions (0% of clinical) 
and a greater tendency for clinical individuals to use distraction. Those with diagnostic levels of 
OCD also reported significantly more strategies and that strategies were on average less effective 
(Gibbs, 1996).  
Yet, direct comparisons between clinical OCD and those with obsessive-compulsive 
symptomatology below diagnostic levels (i.e., subclinical or subthreshold OCD) are very 
infrequently made; instead, the vast majority of comparisons made against individuals with OCD 
consist of either anxious controls (i.e., those without OCD) or healthy controls (those without 
OCD or any other anxiety disorder diagnosis). Gibbs (1996) posited that unwanted intrusive 
cognitions can be considered precursors to clinical obsessions, with maladaptive appraisals 
serving as the process by which clinical levels are met. Yet, appraisals between subclinical and 
clinical OCD individuals have not been directly compared, nor has there been a careful 
comparison between phenomenological elements of the obsessive-compulsive experience. We 
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seek to address this in our study by examining these features in both participants with clinically 
significant OCD and those individuals with some identified OC symptoms but not sufficiently 
interfering to meet diagnostic threshold. These two groups – clinical and subclinical – will allow 
us to more accurately compare experiences and more deeply understand how to conceptualise the 
clinical syndrome and its development.  
Altogether, these highlighted lacunae in the OCD literature shed light into the incomplete 
understanding that researchers and clinicians alike possess of the disorder. Specifically, we lack 
the phenomenological grounding to understand models of OCD, especially regarding the 
timeline and the components that would make up the obsessional elements or forms as defined in 
the DSM, such as images. We also fail to comprehend obsessional doubt in spite of various 
attempts to understand the doubting disease, with present research reflecting only researcher-
driven ideas rather than open-ended reflections by the individuals themselves. Considering the 
middling treatment response results for gold standard psychotherapy, it may be that we are 
overlooking phenomenological aspects of the OC experience important in the maintenance of the 
disorder that lead to treatment nonresponse in certain individuals. As such, this study aims to 





RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
RQ1. The first aim of the proposed studies was to clarify the sequential structure of the 
obsessive-compulsive (OC) experience. Specifically, our first research question asks: what is the 
chronological structure of obsessions and compulsions in OC episodes? In order to clarify 
this sequential structure, we sought to understand: 
a) the basic elements or building blocks that comprise the obsessional experience, namely 
the quantity and quality of forms in which obsessional content might appear, and 
b) the timeline of these elements in OC episodes, that is, the manner in which such 
obsessional forms are arranged chronologically alongside compulsive acts. 
In an attempt to ascertain what obsessional elements may be present in the OC experience 
(RQ1a), we aimed to explore: the number of forms endorsed in an OC episode and the 
prevalence of each; whether participants experience obsessions in the form of an internal voice 
or narrative, and if so, the associated tone; and which forms might be the most distressing and 
therefore impactful to individuals. In light of extant literature and clinical experiences, we 
advanced the following hypotheses about the quantity and quality of obsessional forms:   
 1.1 Frequency and number of endorsed forms. We anticipate that participants will report 
that the obsessional aspect of their OC experience is marked by the presence of more than one 
type of obsessional form (e.g., doubt and images). Additionally, we hypothesise that images, 
doubt, and the internal narrative or voice will be among the most frequently endorsed forms.  
 1.2 Understanding the internal voice(s) form. Moreover, in spite of limited research, we 
predict that intrusive thoughts will be frequently endorsed in the form of an internal voice, 
narrative, conversation, or dialogue. Specifically, we anticipate that the tone of this internal voice 
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or narrative will be primarily described as hostile and dominant. Such a format would likely not 
be well captured by or within the ambiguously broad “verbal thoughts” umbrella and will be 
endorsed by participants as a separate phenomenon (and thus measured separately).  
1.3 Relative rankings of distress among endorsed forms. We predict that certain 
obsessional forms will be more distressing than others, with obsessional doubt and intrusive 
images proving to be the most distressing forms in which obsessional content can appear.  
In order to clarify the manner in which obsessional and compulsive elements are 
temporally arranged (RQ1b), we further aimed to understand what form tends to appear first in 
the episode and which forms tend to dominate the experience or persist the longest. Most 
significantly, we hoped to clarify aspects of the episode chronology implied in current models, 
namely whether obsessions overlap with compulsions (i.e., appear concurrently), if obsessions 
extend beyond the termination of compulsions in episodes, and how individuals determine that 
their episodes are over. We made additional predictions about our exploration into the timeline 
of obsessional and compulsive elements in OC episodes: 
1.4 First obsessional form experienced. As there is no existing literature to guide 
hypotheses on which obsessional form might appear first in individuals’ awareness, we have no 
formal hypotheses. 
1.5 Duration of each form and most predominant form experienced. As this inquiry is 
similarly lacking in literature, we have no formal predictions about which forms might persist for 
longer in the episode or have such intensity that it tends to dominate the experience. 
1.6 Do obsessions co-occur or overlap with compulsions in the episode chronology? We 
anticipate the relationship between obsessional and compulsions is not linear (i.e., purely 
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sequentially) but dynamic, with both phenomena co-occurring or intermittently appearing for the 
majority of the OC experience.  
1.7 Do obsessions extend beyond compulsions in the episode chronology? We predict 
that obsessions do not terminate upon performance of the compulsion but rather persist beyond 
or onset again after completion of the compulsion. 
1.8 Episode termination criteria. Much like Szechtman and Woody (2004), we predict 
that individuals will report experiences other than completion of compulsions as how they know 
their OC episode has ended. Specifically, we posit that they will report an internal subjective 
feeling and/or the experience of subsiding obsessional forms that allows them to determine that 
the OC episode is over. 
RQ2. The second aim of the interview was to better understand the nature of obsessional 
doubt in OCD, such that we are able to conclude how best to conceptualise OCD (e.g., an 
obsessional form, a content domain, or some other psychological process). Specifically, our 
second research question asks: how is doubt experienced, appraised, and neutralised by 
individuals with OCD? We made the following predictions: 
2.1 Prevalence of obsessional doubt. In light of the fact OCD is known as the doubting 
disease, we anticipate that obsessional doubt is a highly prevalent experience and that 
endorsement rates will be equivalent to or greater than those of images.  
2.2 Content of obsessional doubt. We also predict that doubt content, like other 
obsessional forms, will be reported across known OCD obsessional content domains (e.g., 
contamination that provokes washing, doubt that prompts checking, etc.).  
2.3 Characteristics of obsessional doubt. Doubt, like other obsessional forms, is 
hypothesised to be highly distressing, interfering, persistent, and convincing, despite recognition 
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by individuals that their doubt is excessive or unrealistic. From clinical anecdotal experience, we 
also predict that doubt will be primarily experienced as a felt sense in one’s body, making it 
further difficult to resist. 
2.4 Termination of obsessional doubt. Consequently, we also predict that doubt will 
terminate based on an internal sense or feeling within individuals (e.g., relief or satisfaction).  
2.5 Appraisals of obsessional doubt. We anticipate that individuals will readily report 
personal interpretations of OCD doubt in ways that are consistent with other obsessional forms. 
Specifically, we predict that individuals will primarily appraise obsessional doubt and its 
catastrophic consequences as revealing dangerous aspects of themselves (especially in terms of 
their morality), such as indicating that they are bad or evil. 
2.6 Doubt-related compulsions. We hypothesise that individuals will also perform 
compulsions in response to obsessional doubt and perhaps demonstrate a proclivity for certain 
types (e.g., checking and reassurance seeking). 
2.7 Correlates between doubt characteristics and OCD symptom severity. We further 
anticipate that overall OCD symptom severity is significantly correlated to the distress and 
interference associated with both obsessional doubt and its compulsions, in that the greater the 
distress and interference the more severe the OCD. We also predict that the poorer the ability to 
resist doubt-related compulsions, the more severe the OCD. 
RQ3. The final aim of the interview was to investigate obsessional images in OCD, both 
to determine if findings in the existing literature can be replicated and to clarify novel aspects of 
images not yet explored. Our third research question was thus: how are intrusive images 
experienced and appraised in OCD, and what compensatory strategies are performed in 
relation to images? We anticipate the following results: 
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3.1 Prevalence of intrusive images. Intrusive images are predicted to be highly prevalent, 
comparable to prevalence rates established in prior studies of obsessional images in OCD, 
namely 81 to 95%. 
3.2 Content of intrusive images. Consistent with extant literature, we also anticipate that 
the content of intrusive images will consist primarily of unacceptable ideas of harm, then of 
contamination and somatic complaints. 
3.3 Characteristics of intrusive images. We expect obsessional images to be rated as 
distressing, primarily visual, vivid, and difficult to dismiss or resist. We also hypothesise that 
they are largely experienced as akin to coloured, still photographs (like a visual snapshot). 
3.4 Termination of intrusive images. Such obsessional images are hypothesised to 
terminate only after an internal feeling has been achieved (e.g., satisfaction, calmness, etc.), as in 
the case of the ending of the episode.  
3.5 Appraisals of intrusive images. As we had predicted with obsessional doubt, we 
anticipate that individuals will report interpreting OCD images as indicating something 
dangerous or morally bad about themselves (i.e., dangerous or morality-based self-appraisals).  
3.6 Image-related compulsions. We expect that intrusive images will also elicit 
compensatory strategies such as checking and washing behaviours. As with De Silva’s early 
writings, we also expect that images will be utilised in a compulsive way, namely to be 
corrective or to reduce discomfort. Moreover, consistent with Rachman’s (2009) writings, we 
predict that attempts will be made to directly manipulate the image (e.g., rescripting, reshaping 
the image, etc.) 
3.7 Correlates between image characteristics and OCD symptom severity. As with 
obsessional doubt, we predict that overall OCD symptom severity is significantly related to 
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image-provoked distress and interference, as well as the distress and interference elicited by 
image-related compulsions. We also anticipate that more severe OCD symptomatology is 
correlated with poorer ability to resist image-related compulsions.  
Lastly, across all domains, we anticipate that clinical and subclinical participants’ 
descriptions of their OC experiences will be more phenomenologically similar than they are 
divergent. Specifically, we expect that clinical and subclinical experiences fall on a continuum 
from clinically insignificant (subclinical) to functionally impairing (clinical status). Thus, some 
aspects of the experience may differ between clinical and subclinical groups (e.g., number of 
forms, type and effectiveness of compensatory strategies, rated distress or interference of 
compulsions and obsessional forms), but the vast majority of other characteristics (e.g., 
sequential structure of the episode, appraisals of doubt and images, etc.) are expected to be 






Development of the Phenomenological Interview of the Obsessive-Compulsive Experience  
In order to better understand these elements of the obsessional experience, including the 
relationship between obsessions and compulsions, we sought to directly interview people with 
OCD about their lived experience of obsessive-compulsive episodes. As there are no such 
interview tools in existence, and given the scant phenomenological literature and the limited 
studies on obsessional phenomena, we first conducted a preliminary study with a narrower 
scope. We chose to focus this study on one of our research questions, with the intention to utilize 
study findings and lessons learned from participant responses to guide development of the 
broader phenomenological interview. We decided to investigate the phenomenological 
experience of obsessional images in a study administered online to individuals recruited from an 
existing participant pool, as there exists more of an empirical foundation for this domain than for 
our other research questions. A summary of these results is provided in the following section; 
full results are offered in Appendix A. 
Preliminary study of obsessional images.  The aims of this preliminary web-based 
study were to establish the prevalence of obsessional images in our pool of community 
participants; to determine the basic characteristics of the images, consistent with aspects of our 
image-specific research question; and to help guide the development of a detailed 
phenomenological interview that encompassed all three research questions. In particular, we 
hoped that results from this pilot study would verify that obsessional images are, in fact, a 
prevalent and significant component of the obsessional experience, enabling further study. 
Moreover, we hoped that participant responses to our questioning would clarify to what extent 
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respondents are capable of reporting on their lived obsessional experiences, highlight important 
findings in need of replication, and elucidate domains in need of further investigation. 
Participants were 54 members from the community who had endorsed OCD 
symptomatology on semi-structured assessment tools in a previous recruitment study for the 
participant database of the Anxiety Studies Division (full details available in Moscovitch et al., 
2015). All participants in this pool were members of the community assessed for anxiety, mood, 
and other disorders, and who had consented to being contacted for future research studies. Of the 
54 participants who completed this study, 42 met full diagnostic criteria for OCD (“clinical” 
group); the remaining 12 individuals reported subthreshold OCD symptoms (“subclinical,” i.e., 
symptoms did not cause clinically significant distress or impairment in functioning) but met full 
diagnostic criteria for another DSM disorder. Inclusion of this group allowed for interpretation of 
characteristics within some context (i.e., serve as a quasi-control group) while overcoming 
incompatibility issues for a phenomenological interview administered to individuals who 
experience no obsessional doubt or other obsessional experiences.  
Participants were recruited by email and provided with a link to the online study. After 
informed consent was obtained, participants were asked to identify a recent obsessional thought. 
If this recent obsession was not in the form of an image, attempts were made to identify whether 
they experienced any obsessional images. Participants were provided with a definition and 
several examples of OCD-specific obsessional thoughts and asked to identify and describe the 
most distressing obsessional thought they had experienced in the past week. Participants then 
identified the thought’s form (i.e., word-based or verbal thought, image or picture in one’s mind, 
or impulse). If they did not first identify an obsessional image, they were asked whether the 
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obsessional thought was accompanied by images, or, eventually, whether they had experienced 
intrusive images at any point in their lifetime.  
In order to understand image-related characteristics, appraisals, and compulsions 
identified in the second research question, all participants who reported an intrusive, recurrent 
image at some point in the study were asked to describe the image, verify its recurrent nature, 
and report on several characteristics. Specifically, we asked participants to rate characteristics 
previously explored in other studies (e.g., Lipton et al., 2010), such as frequency, duration, 
perspective, vividness, etc., as well as those not yet investigated but we identified as gaps in 
literature (e.g., the manner in which such images appear, whether as the initial intrusive 
experience or simply as part of the episode itself, after some other initial obsessional form). 
Participants also rated the distress and interference associated with the intrusive image, described 
the strategies they used to get rid of the image, and rated the perceived success of those 
compensatory strategies. All ratings were completed on an eight-point Likert scale. In 
appreciation of their time, participants were entered into a draw for one of two $50 gift cards.  
Full results can be found in Appendix A. In brief, intrusive images were highly prevalent 
in the past week (endorsed by 71% of clinical and 50% of subclinical participants) and more so 
in lifetime prevalence rates (86% of clinical and 50% of subclinical participants). The majority 
of people with clinically significant OCD (95%) experienced them weekly whereas just over half 
of those with subclinical OCD experienced them weekly. The image content was categorised 
according to OCD themes identified by Lipton and colleagues (2010) in their interview study of 
OCD images. Participants with subclinical OCD reported exclusively images depicting 
unacceptable ideas of harm or aggression (e.g., “I didn't [check the lock] right and play through 
the image of it not being locked”). The vast majority (74%) of clinical individuals also reported 
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harm-based images, while a portion (14%) endorsed images of contamination or somatic 
complaints (e.g., “black, fuzzy, crumbling growths on the inside of my throat”), much less 
commonly, images of social rejection (6%; e.g., “the reaction [of others] because of the racial 
slur [I fear I uttered]”) and miscellaneous images (3%; e.g., “I keep picturing my girlfriend being 
pregnant”). 
Consistent with our expectations, intrusive images were revealed to be brief, colourful, 
multisensory experiences that were moderately vivid, distressing, and interfering, regardless of 
the individual’s clinical or subclinical status. The duration of images reported by participants 
varied widely, spanning seconds to hours. However, it is unclear from the phrasing of our 
question (and by the participant responses) whether these duration estimates reflect one 
continuous occurrence of an image that spans the length of time reported, or if multiple 
recurrences of the image flash discontinuously across that time period (i.e., one image lasting an 
hour, or one hour-long episode with 60 one-minute recurrences). Direct inquiry of participants in 
dialogue would resolve this issue. 
All individuals reported feeling compelled to act in response to the images, and 
participants frequently reported using more than one strategy (e.g., distracting from the image, 
suppressing the image after it has arisen, and/or blocking the image before it appears). Strategies 
used did differ somewhat between groups, but comparisons are difficult due to the small 
subclinical sample size. Compensatory strategies were rated to be moderately successful at 
getting rid of the image; however, it may be that individuals have goals other than removing the 
image (e.g., relief from distress), for which these strategies prove more successful. Further 
exploration of image-based compensatory strategies performed by individuals is needed.  
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Significantly, this study offers some insight into the way in which intrusive and 
disturbing images arise. Specifically, it appears that images are often endorsed as the focal 
obsessional experience. Yet, for some individuals, they may not spontaneously report images as 
the principal obsessional cognition (instead typically endorsing verbal obsessions). However, 
when prompted with direct questions, these participants recognise images to be an additional, 
accompanying component of their main obsessional experience. However, our ability to draw 
such broad conclusions about the chronological structure of obsessions is limited by the study 
design. We therefore aimed to address this and other limitations in our main study.  
Considerations in creating the interview.  Although the online format of the 
preliminary study offered a brief exploration into OCD images, conclusions from findings were 
limited by several aspects of the methodology. First, there was a lack of clinician judgment in 
identifying OCD images (vs. those arising from other disorder content, such as depression or 
eating disorders), as they were exclusively based on participant self-report and participants’ 
understanding of disorder-driven images. The self-report format also hindered exploration of 
certain image characteristics (e.g., duration, details about compulsions and related motivations) 
and precluded queries about more nuanced but significant aspects of the experience (e.g., image 
appraisals, how images arise in these episodes or amongst any other obsessional forms, such as 
thoughts). There was also a sometimes-lengthy gap in time between diagnosis and study 
completion for some participants, ranging from months to years. It was therefore possible that 
participants, at the time of recruitment and study completion, may have had a slightly different 
diagnostic status. Additionally, it is possible that participants self-selected for the study based on 
existing experiences of images, given that descriptions of the study in recruitment materials 
focused on images, resulting in inflated prevalence statistics.  
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We therefore aimed to develop a comprehensive, structured interview that could be 
conducted with individuals reporting OCD symptomatology (at a clinically significant and 
subclinical level) in order to explore their experience of OCD phenomena and episodes. Most 
significantly, the use of a structured interview administered by one trained clinician would allow 
for the use of clinical judgement in identifying OCD images (vs. those related to other disorders) 
and in querying other key aspects that typically require further clinical prompts (e.g., appraisals), 
as well as ensuring consistency across respondents. 
This interview was built to meet all four dissertation aims, namely to better understand 
the sequential structure of obsessions and compulsions in the OC experience, as well as the 
manner in which obsessional images and doubt appear, are appraised, and provoke compulsions. 
As such, questions about images were couched within one module of a broader interview. This 
also served to prevent a self-selection bias among participants, i.e., wherein mostly those with 
obsessional images elect to complete the study because of its relevance to their experience, but 
inflating the seeming prevalence of OCD images. More specific and targeted screening of 
participants was also employed during the recruitment phase to ensure accurate and current 
diagnostic status for both clinical and subclinical OCD participants. Associated characteristics 
left unexplored in the online study were moreover incorporated into the interview (e.g., more 
details about compulsions and related motivations during perseverative behaviours).  
In order to facilitate comparisons and enrich our understanding of the phenomena, the 
interview was designed to be flexibly administrable to both individuals with clinically significant 
OCD and those who experience OC phenomena but do not meet full criteria for the disorder (i.e., 
subclinical OCD). This allows the interpretation of findings within the same context (i.e., serve 
as a quasi-control group for comparison) while overcoming incompatibility issues that would 
97 
 
undoubtedly arise when trying to administer a phenomenological interview to individuals who do 
not at all experience recurrent obsessions.  
It should be noted that the use of a clinician-administered interview to investigate these 
issues is limited due to the nature of retrospective participant report. Reported recollections may 
be distorted by the participant’s own ideas about the order in which events typically occur, rather 
than the actual order of the phenomena, or may be coloured by the very post-hoc rationalisations 
identified by Robbins and colleagues (2012), resulting in participants misremembering the true 
sequence in a more rationally explicable manner. Given that this appears to be the best available 
methodology, results will be interpreted with these limitations in mind. 
Participants 
Participants were 65 individuals from the community who had been assessed using the 
MINI 6.0 (Sheehan et al., 1998) or 7.0 (Sheehan, 2014) and ADIS-IV (Brown et al., 1994) or 
ADIS-5 (Brown & Barlow, 2015) within the past several years, as in the preliminary study. In 
order to be eligible for the study, participants had to meet criteria for at least one disorder (OCD, 
anxiety, or mood, etc.) and endorse current OCD symptomatology, whether at clinical or 
subclinical levels (i.e., clinical control group). Forty-four individuals met criteria for OCD 
according to DSM-5 criteria (68%), while 21 participants endorsed some OCD subclinical 
symptoms but did not meet full criteria for the disorder. These subclinical OCD participants also 
met criteria for at least one clinically significant anxiety and/or mood disorder. Clinician severity 
ratings (CSRs) from the ADIS-5 were assigned for all participants. According to the scale, a 
CSR of four or higher (to a maximum of 8) denotes clinically significant difficulties. Clinical 
participants were 81.8% female, and 32 years old on average (SD = 11.4).  
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For the majority of the clinical participants (72.7%), OCD was the principal or co-
principal diagnosis, moderately severe on average (mean CSR = 4.8, SD = .8, range = 4 to 7); the 
only co-principal diagnosis was generalised anxiety disorder (GAD). Subclinical participants 
were 85.7% female, with a mean age of 30 years (SD = 8.6). Principal or co-principal diagnoses 
of participants with subclinical OCD include anxiety disorders (social anxiety disorder, GAD, 
panic disorder, agoraphobia, specific phobia, and other specified anxiety disorder), posttraumatic 
stress disorder, depressive disorders (major depressive disorder and persistent depressive 
disorder/dysthymia), and eating disorders (bulimia nervosa, other specified eating disorder. The 
mean CSR for subclinical participants was 2.5 (SD = .7, range = 1 to 3), although CSRs were 
missing for four participants because they were not assigned by the assessor at the time of 
assessment.  
Phenomenological Interview of the Obsessive-Compulsive Experience.   
Please see Appendix B for the full interview. This interview was developed to assess the 
lived experience of OCD symptoms as they arise in individuals who endorse obsessions and/or 
compulsions. In particular, this assessment tool was meant to explore the sequential structure 
(including the component parts) of these OCD episodes, in addition to the characteristics, 
appraisals, and compulsions associated with obsessional images and obsessional doubt. The 
interview consists of five modules, the first three of which are administered to all participants 
and the latter two to only those who endorse those specific obsessional forms. The interview 
typically takes 1.5 to 2 hours to complete, depending on elements such as participant response 
style (verbose vs succinct), speed (slow and thoughtful vs efficiently direct), and insight 
(considerable vs lacking). The overall structure of the interview is as follows:  
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(1) Recent Obsessive-Compulsive Episode. All participants are first provided with a detailed 
description of obsessional thoughts:  
“We are interested in repeated unwanted, upsetting thoughts people have and the forms that 
they take. When thoughts are unwanted but keep coming back, almost like an upsetting pop-
up, we refer to them as obsessional thoughts. We are interested in obsessional thoughts that 
you might have.  
An obsessional thought can be a thought, image, or urge to do something, and it is 
unwanted, yet persistent and difficult to control. Obsessional thoughts tend to reflect 
concerns that are irrational, extreme, unnecessary, and/or excessive even though they can 
feel rational, normal, necessary, and justified in the moment. Obsessional thoughts can also 
reflect concerns about committing acts that contradict one’s values, morals and personality.  
Examples of obsessional thoughts include concern that the stove has been left on and will 
cause a dreadful accident; fear that your hands are ‘contaminated,’ and you will make 
someone terribly ill; concern that you have harmed someone without realizing it (e.g., by 
having hit them with your car); concern that you are not right with God; thoughts/impulses 
of doing or saying something terrible to someone whom you would never want to harm; 
concern that something you have done or failed to do will cause harm; and unwanted 
images or mental pictures of a sexual, morbid, or grotesque nature.   
Obsessional thoughts cause distress or discomfort and often lead to corrective action, such 
as checking, cleaning/washing, repeating, seeking reassurance, mental ‘correction,’ 
undoing, rationalizing or self-reassurance.  These are often called compulsive behaviours, 
or, when performed in a very specific way, can be referred to as compulsive rituals.” 
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Participants are then asked to identify a recent episode when they would have felt 
particularly distressed or emotional because of such an obsessional thought and provide 
details on the content and when it took place. The presence of a compulsive behaviour or 
act is also assessed. 
(2) Obsessive-Compulsive Episode Timeline. Participants are then asked to report on 
markers of the start and conclusion of their experience (i.e., the very first and last thing to 
happen), framing for the interviewer the boundaries of the episode. Participants are then 
asked to describe how they had subjectively determined that the episode had ended (“how 
did you know the episode had ended?”). Next, they are systematically queried on whether 
various obsessional forms arose in their experience:  
a) word-based (verbal) thoughts;  
b) an internal narrative, voice, dialogue, or conversation in their thoughts;  
c) images or pictures in their mind;  
d) doubt-related thoughts or impressions; 
e) a sense they were going to do something or act in a way they did not want to 
act (i.e., urges); and, 
f) felt senses, including sensations in their body (i.e., physiological sensations). 
If endorsed, participants are asked to offer additional descriptions for each form, rate how 
much of the episode would have been occupied by each form (e.g., 50%), and rank the 
forms from most to least distressing. They are also asked to identify the form that 
predominated their experience and the first form of which they became aware.  
These categories of obsessional forms were established by supplementing the three 
identified in the DSM-5 (verbal thoughts, images, and urges; APA, 2013) with additional 
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forms observed in clinical interviews and accounts (internal narrative or voice; Hallam & 
O’Connor, 2002), clinical and empirical accounts (doubt; e.g., Reed, 1985), and 
supported by emerging research (sensory phenomena; e.g., Ferrao et al., 2012). While 
some elements may overlap across the obsessional forms (e.g., word-based thoughts and 
internal narrative), participants are asked to identify the form that best captures their 
experience of the obsessional elements (e.g., internal voice or narrative if the experience 
was of someone speaking or voicing thoughts, vs. word-based thoughts if the experience 
is less like a running monologue narrated by an individual and/or involves short phrases). 
With respect to doubt, in both this section and in the module dedicated solely to 
obsessional doubt, the aim was to query participants about their experience in a manner 
that was parallel to that of other forms (e.g., images) but to remain agnostic about 
whether it could be understood or viewed in a way consistent with an obsessional form.  
In developing this section of the interview, particular attention was paid to any 
endorsement of an internal narrative, voice, or conversation in one’s thoughts. Drawing 
from clinical experiences, there were additional questions to ask about the tone of the 
voice(s) or conversation and any resemblance to people known to the participant. 
Recognising that the experience of an internal narrative, voice, or conversation would 
result in some type of interpersonal relationship or effect, we ask participants to 
specifically rate the quality of the narrative or voice. The interpersonal circumplex model 
of behaviour (Wiggins, 1992) was used as a framework, with the endorsed internal 
narrative, voice, or conversation being rated on dominance-submissiveness and 
affiliative-hostility continua. Participants are also asked to identify any compulsions that 
were performed in response to these obsessional experiences. 
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(3) Obsessive-Compulsive Episode Description. Participants are then asked to freely recount 
a detailed description of this recent episode, with the interviewer offering limited prompts 
to clarify or obtain additional details, including the chronological structure of the episode. 
Individuals are instructed to “think of the episode as happening along a timeline, and 
walk [the researcher] through a detailed play-by-play of what happened.” They are 
encouraged to describe the episode in present tense, as if they are reliving and 
experiencing it again in an attempt to capture, in vivo, the most vivid affect from the 
episode and therefore the most accurate descriptions of the episode. The clinician works 
to ensure that a fulsome description is presented, including ensuring that the participant 
does not omit in this description any forms endorsed in the previous section. 
Once the episode is recounted in detail, the participant is asked to answer two questions 
about the chronological nature of the experiential elements in the episode:  
1. Did any obsessions overlay (or co-occur temporally with) the reported 
compulsion(s)? 
2. Did any obsessional experiences start after the compulsion ended or continue 
beyond the conclusion of a compulsive act?  
(4) Doubt.  Participants who have already endorsed obsessional doubt are then administered 
this module; for those who have not yet reported doubt, they are asked if doubt was a 
relevant part of any OC experience (present or past) and complete this section if 
endorsed. After identifying the percentage of OC episodes involving doubt, participants 
are asked to report on several characteristics. Significantly, in a bid to clarify the marked 
variability in operationalisations of doubt in the literature, we asked respondents to 
describe how they experience their doubt. Consistent with literature and clinical 
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experience, they were provided with four categories: a verbal stream of thoughts, a felt 
sense in their body, a felt knowledge (e.g., a drawn inference that is just known to the 
individual), or some other sensory state. Some features are rated quantitatively on an 11-
point Likert scale, such as: felt conviction in their doubt, perceived excessiveness of 
doubt, difficulty dismissing doubt, ability to resist the doubt, doubt-related distress, and 
doubt-related interference. On other doubt characteristics, participant responses are 
recorded descriptively (e.g., doubt content, how they experience their doubt, emotions 
evoked by doubt, duration of doubt, how their doubt ultimately terminates, etc.).  
Next, we assess participant appraisals of their doubt, that is, idiosyncratic interpretations 
that highlight the personal significance of the obsessional doubt and why it makes 
compulsive urges so compelling. As appraisals of obsessions are not necessarily 
immediately accessible to each individual, much like negative core beliefs in the CBT 
model, participants are asked three introductory questions to facilitate clearer responses 
to the appraisal item. First, participants are asked to identify their most feared, worst-case 
scenario that would happen if their doubts came true. They then rate – again, from 0 to 10 
– the perceived likelihood (in the moment, when most emotional) of this worst-case 
scenario and then the severity of the consequences should it happen. Finally, they are 
asked to identify what it would mean (about them, other people, or the world) if this 
worst-case scenario came true and the consequences were real. If they struggle to report 
on this item, they are asked alternatively whether the doubt indicates anything about 
them, others, or the world.  
Ultimately, participants are asked whether they complete certain doubt-related 
compulsions. The doubt compulsions in our interview are categorized separately 
104 
 
according to those we hypothesized might be performed in response to the distressing 
doubt (we term these reactive compulsions, such as checking or washing repeatedly, 
distraction, reassurance seeking, etc.) and those performed preemptively to prevent any 
experience of the doubt (we term these proactive compulsions, such as avoidance, 
distraction, etc.). Participants describe their aims in completing these reactive and 
proactive doubt-related compulsions, their perceived success in achieving these aims, and 
the frequency of these behaviours. Lastly, respondents report on their attempts or ability 
to resist performing compulsions and rate the overall distress and interference provoked 
by all doubt-related compulsions. It is worth noting that this section refers to all 
behaviours as compulsions, despite the fact that we did not assess for the excessive nature 
of each act they endorsed in this section (as it would then have been a prohibitively long 
interview). Instead, we relied on the participant’s report that s/he feels compelled to 
perform these acts due to the doubt and on the understanding that, as a collective 
experience, the repertoire of these compulsive acts for each individual had already been 
established as inherently excessive and beyond functionality (or not, in the case of 
subclinical individuals) from previous assessment and diagnostic status clarification.  
(5) Images.  The last module focuses on obsessional images and is completed if the 
participant has ever experienced any image-based experiences in their OC episodes. The 
structure of this module mirrors that of the doubt module: participants report the 
estimated percentage of all OC episodes that involve images and then rate several image 
characteristics on an 11-point Likert scale (e.g., vividness of the image, how real the 
image feels, ability to dismiss the experience, ability to resist the image, image-related 
distress, and image-related interference). They are also asked to report on other 
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qualitative aspects of the obsessional images (e.g., the form of the image as photo or 
video, whether it appears in observer or field perspective, whether its origins are in 
fiction or memory, associated emotions, duration, etc.).  
In designing this section of the interview, we did not wish to make assumptions about 
why obsessional images were threatening to participants. As such, image appraisal 
questions probe for the personal meaning or significance individuals draw from these 
images in a broader way. First, participants are asked how they make sense of the image, 
or if the image means anything about them, others, or the world. Second, they are asked – 
much like with doubt – what they are afraid will happen as a result of the image, or (in 
the case of ongoing struggle to report negative consequences) what feels so bad about the 
image. Finally, they are asked to report on any self-related appraisals (what it would 
mean about them or their character) if the worst-case scenario happened and the 
consequences came true. 
Finally, participants are asked whether they complete image-related compulsions. These 
were again categorized according to reactive image compulsions (i.e., those performed 
after the image arises, including checking behaviours or superimposing an acceptable 
image) and proactive image compulsions (i.e., those performed pre-emptively, before the 
image arises and/or to prevent the image, such as blocking the image or avoidance 
behaviours). Individuals narrate the aim behind any endorsed reactive and proactive 
image-related compulsions, their success in accomplishing the aim, and the frequency of 
the acts. They then quantitatively rate their ability to resist these compulsions, the distress 
provoked by and impairment resulting from image-related compulsions. 
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(6) Conclusion. At the end of the interview, participants are invited to offer additional 
information or insights about their OC episodes or experiences (including aspects about 
which we have not yet asked). They are also given the option to offer feedback or 
suggestions and to reflect on the experience of talking about these phenomena. 
It is worth noting that earlier versions of the interview included a sixth section, which focused on 
sensory phenomena (i.e., physical sensations), with consideration of another section on verbal 
thoughts to allow for comparisons between forms. The sensory phenomena module, and the 
planned verbal thoughts module, was designed to parallel the image and doubt section’s third 
module on sensory phenomena, with consideration of a fourth module on verbal thoughts to 
allow for comparisons between forms. However, study appointments that involved use of the full 
interview took over 2 hours to complete, and participants appeared to be visibly fatigued with the 
length of the study and the details they were asked to provide. The decision was taken to remove 
this section from the interview. 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited for the study by email or by phone from the participant 
database used in Study 1. Participants were selected based on endorsement of OCD 
symptomatology in their diagnostic assessment. All individuals endorsing OCD symptoms – 
regardless of obsessional content – were invited to participate in the study, and it was broadly 
described to prevent a self-selection bias (e.g., wherein mostly those with obsessional images 
elect to complete the study because of its relevance to their experience, but inflating the seeming 
prevalence of OCD images). To ensure the most accurate and consistent diagnostic picture, those 
participants whose assessments had been completed over a year before the recruitment date were 
re-assessed for OCD symptoms by the author at the time of recruitment – typically within one 
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month of the actual study appointment – using the OCD module of the ADIS-5 (Brown & 
Barlow, 2014) and assigned an appropriate CSR. If eligible, participants were provided with a 
description of the study and offered a chance to participate in the in-person interview. 
After informed consent was obtained, including consent to be anonymously and directly 
quoted in publications and presentations, all participants were administered the 
Phenomenological Interview of the Obsessive-Compulsive Experience by this author. All 
participants but one consented to having their interviews audio-recorded for accuracy of data; 
these interviews were then transcribed by a trained research assistant and the transcriptions 
checked again by another trained research assistant for accuracy against the audio file. 
Participants were remunerated with a $30 gift card to one of three businesses in appreciation of 
their time commitment.  
Coding of termination responses.  A coding manual was developed – based on our 
theorised predictions – to score participant responses describing how they knew certain 
experiences had ended (i.e., termination of their OC episode, obsessional doubt, and intrusive 
image). We identified four categories of termination criteria based on our predictions and 
existing theories, namely that the experience was reported to have terminated:  
(1) upon completion of the compulsion (as current theories would indicate); 
(2) due to element(s) of the intrusive experience subsiding or going away, whether it 
appear as an internal narrative, verbal thought, image, sense of doubt, urge, or 
preidentified sensory experience (consistent with our own theorising); 
(3) after the experience of a subjective internal feeling, such as a sense of relief, release, 
yedasentience, or satisfaction, etc. (consistent with existing theories); or, 
(4) in a not applicable category.  
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Consistent with procedures utilised previously by Purdon and Holdaway (2006) and 
Purdon and Watson (2010), coding was completed independently by two researchers (this author 
and her advisor, who was blind to participants’ group membership) using this termination criteria 
coding manual. Initial levels of interrater agreement were high for coding of episode termination 
(kappas of .91, .93, and .72, across categories) and doubt termination (kappas of .76, .83, .94). 
Interrater agreement for image termination categories was moderate (kappas of .50, .43, .48) and 
noticeably lower than the other termination codes. Additionally, as we were aiming for perfect 
agreement between coders, discrepancies were identified and discussed.  
The discrepancies in coded termination responses highlighted a lack of clarity in how to 
differentiate between two coding categories for some participant responses, which were more 
prevalent in image termination descriptions. Definitions for categories 2 and 3 were therefore 
revised. In particular, the category for decreased or absent intrusive experiences (category 2) was 
modified to capture the removal of negative affect or sensations (e.g., less tension, anxiety 
symptoms, etc.). In contrast, the category for a subjective internal sense (category 3) was 
modified to catalogue the introduction or addition of new affect or sensations (often positive 
affect experiences, such as a sense of calm, relaxation, relief, etc.). This distinction parallels that 
between positive and negative psychotic symptoms. Please see Appendix C for the final 
termination criteria coding manual. Subsequent to this revision and discussion, interrater 
agreement was perfect. Significantly, participants are theorised to potentially use multiple 
criteria to determine that an experience has concluded. As such, responses were coded in terms 
of the presence or absence of each category, allowing for several concurrently endorsed 
termination criteria.  
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Coding of self-appraisal responses.  As a coding system for intrusion self-appraisals 
was developed by Ferrier and Brewin (2005), and utilized again by Lipton and colleagues (2010) 
for intrusive image appraisals, we did not develop one of our own. Instead, the appraisal coding 
manual was obtained from the original authors and, following a discussion between the same two 
coders, updated slightly to clarify further the categories. Interrater agreement was very high 
across categories, ranging from .74 to .94 for doubt appraisals and .77 to 1.00 for image 
appraisals. Discrepancies in coded appraisals between the two coders were identified and 
resolved quickly through discussion to achieve perfect agreement; the coding manual was 
revised accordingly and the final kappas are necessarily 1.00. Ultimately, participant appraisals 
of what they feared their obsessional doubts or intrusive images – and the anticipated 
consequences of these intrusive experiences – might indicate about their selves were coded 
independently using the following system (see Appendix D for the final appraisal coding 
manual). Participant responses were permitted to be coded as containing content from more than 
one domain (though few did). According to their categorisation, self-related appraisals in OCD 
address four domains: 
(1) a dangerous self, that is bad, evil, immoral, or likely to result in harm coming to others 
(e.g., irresponsible, careless, bad person, etc.); 
(2) a flawed self, involving negative traits that are undesirable but not inherently dangerous 
or harmful to others (e.g., weak); 
(3) a rejected self, involving self-views of oneself as alone or unloved (e.g., untrustworthy, 
disappointing to others); and, 
(4) a depressed or anxious self, wherein one’s self-perceptions are symptom-related or 
consistent with depressive self-concept (e.g., failure, worthless, incompetent, etc.). 
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Coding for doubt content responses.  Respondent descriptions of doubt content (i.e., 
“what is your doubt about?”) also required coding; however, there are no existing 
phenomenological studies of obsessional doubt and no extant literature on doubt content themes. 
As such, a content analysis of the reported content of participants’ OC doubt was completed by 
each coder and both analyses yielded three themes (of nearly identical domains). Definitions of 
these themes were developed, and a corresponding coding manual was created for reported doubt 
content. All participant responses were then independently coded by both coders according to 
three themes – doubt of obsessional content, doubt about having completed a compulsion 
properly, and doubt about one’s senses or memory abilities. Levels of agreement across the three 
categories varied widely, with kappa values of .28, .69, and .27, respectively. Given the weak 
agreement for the first and third themes, the two coders discussed and clarified conceptually the 
first theme, which was most vague domain – the idea of doubt content involving typical 
obsessional ideas. The more detailed version of the coding manual, with clear examples for each, 
is provided in Appendix E. These three themes consist of: 
(1) Doubt about one’s safety status or the state of things (i.e., obsessional content, an 
obsessional idea in the form of doubt that prompts or evokes the compulsion (e.g., 
“am I safe, or is it clean?” or “did I lock the door?”); 
(2) Doubt about having performed compulsions properly or sufficiently to avert harm 
(e.g., “did I lock the door or wash my hands properly or well enough?”); and, 
(3) Doubt about one’s senses, memory, or cognitive capacity (e.g., “I know I checked but 
can I trust what I saw,” “am I capable of doing it and keeping myself clean or safe,” 
or “I remember doing it, but can I believe my memory?”). 
After revising these categories, we achieved perfect agreement across the group. 
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Coding for image content responses.  Lastly, reported content of intrusive images was 
categorised according to the themes identified by Lipton and colleagues (2010) in their interview 
study of OCD images:  
(1) unacceptable ideas of harm (repugnant images of aggressive or violent harm, harm 
caused by acts of commission or omission, and catastrophic outcomes),  
(2) contamination and somatic complaints (contamination-related images of illness, 
disease, uncleanliness, etc.),  
(3) social rejection (images of negative social judgments or humiliation), and  
(4) miscellaneous superstitious or senseless imagery.  
As the image content descriptions were clearly elucidated with participants during the 
interview and straightforward to place into categories, the interviewer alone coded respondents’ 






I. On the Chronological Structure of OC Episodes  
The first aim of this interview was to better understand the basic element(s) or building 
block(s) of the obsessional experience, that is, the forms in which the obsessional content might 
appear. In order to elucidate the quantity and quality of forms that comprise the experience of 
intrusive cognitions, we analysed the frequency and number of endorsed obsessional forms in 
OCD episodes (including the relative distress associated with the form) and the reported 
descriptors for experienced internal narrative(s) or voice(s). 
1.1 Number and frequency of endorsed forms.  Consistent with our hypotheses, 
participants reported that the obsessional components of their episodes were typically marked by 
the presence of several forms, not simply one type. Across both participant groups, individuals 
reported experiencing on average 3 identifiable obsessional forms – out of 7 possible forms 
proffered – in their most recent episode (standard deviation of 1). In fact, it was relatively 
infrequent for individuals to report only experiencing one obsessional form in their OC episode, 
with nearly all clinical and subclinical individuals reporting at least two forms in their 
obsessional experience. Table 2 reports the frequency with which various numbers of forms were 
endorsed. These results indicate that obsessional states are typically complex and dynamic 
experiences (even before compulsions enter the equation), which may compound distress by 
virtue of their intertwined nature. 
Table 2.   
Number of Obsessional Forms Endorsed by Participants in the Most Recent OC Episode. 
 Clinical Group Subclinical Group 
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(N = 44) (N = 21) 
One obsessional form 9.1% 4.8% 
Two forms 22.7% 33.3% 
Three forms 31.8% 42.9% 
Four forms 31.8% 14.3% 
Five forms 4.5% 4.8% 
Average number of forms 3.0 (SD = 1.1) 2.8 (SD = 0.9) 
 
In fact, the forms we had predicted would be experienced most frequently were among 
the four most frequently endorsed types of obsessional forms across clinical and subclinical 
participants alike: obsessional doubt, sensory phenomena, internal voice(s), and images. While 
endorsement rates for each form differed somewhat between participant groups, it is striking that 
nearly 80% of clinical participants reported obsessional doubt (vs. over 60% of subclinical 
individuals), nearly two-thirds reported experiencing an internal voice (vs. over 75% of 
subclinical individuals), and just over half of each group endorsed obsessional images. Please see 
Table 3 for full results of the percentage of participants who reported experiencing each 
obsessional form. Obsessional forms reported by participants as fitting into the ‘Other’ category 
– because they determined it as not belonging to our provided categories – almost exclusively 
consisted of focused affective experiences (e.g., fear, anxiety, and worry). These affective 
obsessional experiences are consistent with Akhtar’s (1975) affect category. One other 
respondent noted that the experience was like a non-physical “feeling in [his/her] head that it is 




Table 3.  
Types of Obsessional Forms Endorsed in the Most Recent OC Episode. 
 Clinical Group  
(N = 44) 
Subclinical Group 
(N = 21) 
Doubt 79.5% 61.9% 
Sensory phenomena 70.5% 76.2% 
Internal voice(s) 65.9% 76.2% 
Image 54.5% 52.4% 
Verbal thoughts 11.4% 9.5% 
Other 11.4% 4.9% 
Urge 0% 4.9% 
 
1.2 Understanding the internal voice(s) form.  Next, as predicted, intrusive thoughts 
frequently did appear in the form of internal voice(s), alternately identified as a narrative, 
conversation, or dialogue. This format is not well captured by or necessarily equated with the 
ambiguously broad “verbal thoughts” umbrella, as participants readily identified this intrusive 
experience as distinct from verbal (or word-based) thoughts in their head. Indeed, participants 
were intentionally queried about verbal thoughts prior to the internal voice in the interview so 
that only the unique and true experience of internal voice(s) were captured, not by default 
inflating endorsement rates. When asked to label their experience of the voice(s), half of each 
group – the most popular response by far – called it simply a voice. The next most frequent 
descriptors in the clinical group included dialogue (25%), conversation (14%), and narrative 
(11%). By contrast, subclinical participants next most frequently preferred to call the experience 
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a narrative (19%), dialogue (12.5%), checklist or mental note (12.5%), or conversation (6%). For 
ease of reporting, and due to the most frequent endorsement of this experience as an internal 
voice, for ease of reporting, subsequent references to this form will allude to internal voice(s) but 
will encompass those identified by all labels. 
Internal voice tone. However, participant reports of the tone of the internal voice differed 
slightly from our predictions. Within Wiggins’ interpersonal circumplex framework, individuals 
were able to rate the voice(s) on its affiliative qualities (ratings of ‘friendly,’ ‘between neutral 
and friendly,’ ‘neutral,’ ‘between neutral and hostile,’ or' ‘hostile’) and dominant qualities 
(‘submissive,’ ‘between neutral and submissive,’ ‘neutral,’ ‘between neutral and dominant,’ or 
‘dominant’). When participants endorsed more than one voice (or conversation or dialogue), it 
was typically described as a “tug-of-war” or “back-and-forth” between a supportive or 
encouraging voice and a distress-provoking voice that fuelled OCD concerns; in such cases, we 
recorded the tone of the OCD-maintaining voice in the obsessional experience. 
 See Table 4 for findings on the tone of the internal voice. Contrary to expectations, 
clinical respondents did not describe their internal OCD voice as predominantly hostile in tone. 
Instead, over half described the voice as neutral in affiliation (neither hostile nor friendly, but 
rather “matter-of-fact” or “objective”), with one-third of respondents with OCD labelling the 
voice on the hostile side. Yet, consistent with our predictions, clinical OCD individuals generally 
reported the voice(s) as sounding anxious (70%). Although the vast majority of clinical 
respondents also described the voice as somewhat or purely dominant, a small percentage found 
the voice neutral or even submissive. Data on the dominant and anxious qualities of the voice are 
missing for 2 participants due to lack of clarity. Importantly, the general experience of the 
obsessional internal voice in individuals with OCD is revealed to be a fairly objective (neutral) 
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and authoritative individual who is anxious or worried; however, it is of note that over one-third 
experience this internal voice as anxious and authoritative but hostile. 
Subclinical individuals were significantly more homogeneous in their description of the 
internal voice; consistent with our expectations, the OCD voice in subclinical OCD respondents 
is largely experienced as hostile, dominant, and anxious. In fact, 75% of this group rated the 
voice as on the hostile side, and 88% described the voice as sounding on the dominant side. 
Reports of other tone descriptors were relatively infrequent. Over 80% of the subclinical group 
stated that the voice was anxious. Thus, unlike the clinical group, subclinical OCD voices sound 
generally hostile-dominant (“angry,” “stern,” “accusatory”) and anxious. 
Table 4.  
Identified Affiliation and Dominance of the Internal Voice Tone. 
 Clinical Group  
(N = 29) 
Subclinical Group  
(N = 16) 
Affiliation 
     Hostile 
     Between neutral and hostile 
     Neutral 
     Between neutral and friendly 














     Dominant 
     Between neutral and dominant 











     Between neutral and submissive 






 Internal voice distress. Regarding the distress provoked by the internal voice(s), more 
detailed results will be shared in the section immediately below (1.3 Relative rankings of distress 
among endorsed forms). However, of those clinical individuals who endorsed the internal voice, 
the relative ranking of its associated distress varied widely between the most distressing form 
(31%), second most distressing (31%), and third most distressing (28%), among others. 
Considering that on average three forms were endorsed, subclinical individuals tended to rate it 
as a slightly less distressing form (19% reported it as the most distressing form, 44% second 
most distressing, and 25% third most distressing). Thus, we can likely conclude that the internal 
voice has significant power in provoking distress but does not universally, by virtue of its 
presence, present as the most toxically distressing obsessional form. 
1.3 Relative rankings of distress among endorsed forms.  Third, we predicted that 
obsessional doubt and images would be perceived as more distressing than other obsessional 
forms, given our clinical experience (regarding the persistence of doubt) and the extant literature 
on images and emotionality. See Table 5 for full results. When clinical participants were asked to 
rank order obsessional forms they had endorsed experiencing in the most recent episode (from 
most to least distressing), doubt was most frequently reported to be the most distressing form. 
Images were relatively infrequently reported to be the most distressing form; rather, the next 
most frequently endorsed distressing forms were internal voice(s) and sensory phenomena. 
Lower ranks of distress (2nd and 3rd most distressing forms) were fairly evenly split between 
doubt, internal voice(s), and sensory phenomena when more than one form was endorsed in an 
episode. Intrusions that appear in the form of images overall seemed to be fairly low ranked in 
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terms of distress, especially when several forms (4 or more) were endorsed within the episode 
(over half the participants ranked images as 4th most distressing).  
Table 5.  
Percentages (and Frequency Counts) of Clinical Participants Endorsing Obsessional Forms at 




















(N = 1) 
Doubt 45.5% 
N = 20 
22.5% 
N = 9 
24.1% 
N = 7 
0% 0% 
Internal voice(s) 20.5% 
N = 9 
22.5% 
N = 9 
27.6% 
N = 8 
13.3% 
N = 2 
100% 
N = 1 
Sensory phenomena 18.2% 
N = 8 
25.0% 
N = 10 
31.0% 
N = 9 
33.3% 
N = 5 
0% 
Image 13.6% 
N = 6 
12.5% 
N = 5 
13.8% 
N = 4 
53.3% 
N = 8 
0% 
Other 2.3% 
N = 1 
10.0% 
N = 4 




N = 3 
3.4% 
N = 1 
0% 0% 




Notably, these relative distress results are influenced by the base rates of each forms. 
That is, rarely endorsed but distressing forms might look relatively unimpressive at the “most 
distressing form” variable due to low N, even if their presence guarantees the highest distress. 
We thus additionally looked at distress rankings within those who endorsed specific obsessional 
forms, which are captured by observing the counts across the rows (provided below the 
percentages) instead of down the columns on Table 5 above. Of particular interest, we reviewed 
relative rankings of distress for doubt, images, and sensory phenomena (internal voice is 
discussed above in Section 1.2).  
Results indicate that when endorsed, doubt was most likely to be the most distressing 
form – 56% of clinical participants ranked it first in distress – with a noteworthy 25% of clinical 
participants ranking it as second most distressing. Again, when images were a part of the 
obsessional experience, they were identified as provoking less distress (35% reported it as the 
fourth most distressing form, though a fair number – 26% and 22%, respectively – reported it as 
the top or second-most distressing form). Sensory phenomena appeared to be relatively broad in 
its range, spanning 25-31% endorsement rates for top three rankings of distress. Thus, doubt is a 
strikingly distressing obsessional form among participants with clinically significant OCD, while 
images are likely to be less distressing. 
Much like the clinical findings, subclinical participants frequently reported obsessions in 
the form of doubt as a most distressing form in their experience, while images were quite 
infrequently rated as such (see Table 6). Yet, uniquely, subclinical participants had the highest 
endorsement rates for sensory phenomena as the most upsetting obsessional form (greater even 
than doubt). We again explored distress rankings within groups of participants who endorsed 
specific obsessional forms. Strikingly, if sensory phenomena or doubt were a part of the 
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obsessional experience, they were most frequently reported to be the most distressing form 
present, relative to all other elements in their obsessional experience (56% and 54% for sensory 
phenomena and doubt, respectively). Images tended to be ranked second (36%) or third (27%) in 
distress. Therefore, among individuals with subclinical levels of OCD, sensory phenomena and 
doubt are most likely to be the most distressing form present, while images are again likely to be 
less distressing than other forms. 
Table 6.  
Percentages and Frequency Counts of Subclinical Participants Endorsing Obsessional Forms at 




















(N = 1) 
Sensory phenomena 42.9% 
N = 9 
20.0% 
N = 4 
23.1% 
N = 3 
0% 0% 
Doubt 33.3% 
N = 7 
15.0% 
N = 3 
15.4% 
N = 2 
20.0% 
N = 1 
0% 
Internal voice(s) 14.3% 
N = 3 
35.0% 
N = 7 
30.8% 
N = 4 
40.0% 
N = 2 
0% 
Image 9.5% 
N = 2 
20.0% 
N = 4 
23.1% 
N = 3 
20.0% 
N = 1 
100% 




N = 1 






N = 1 




N = 1 
20.0% 
N = 1 
0% 
 
A second component of the first aim of the interview was to better understand the 
timeline of elements in obsessive-compulsive episodes, namely the manner in which the 
previously investigated obsessional building blocks (i.e., forms) and compulsive acts are 
arranged chronologically. To analyse this, we asked participants to report on the obsessional 
form they first became aware of in the episode, the extent to which each obsessional form lasted 
through the episode, and whether any obsessional elements were being experienced at the same 
time as compulsive acts were being performed and/or extended beyond the conclusion of a 
compulsive behaviour (e.g., one iteration of a compulsion). Lastly, individuals were asked in an 
open-ended manner to identify how they knew the episode to be over (i.e., subjective termination 
criteria for the OC episode). 
1.4 First obsessional form experienced.  Among clinical participants, the internal voice 
(or narrative) was the form most frequently endorsed as the element in the episode that first came 
to the individual’s awareness (39.5%). The remaining participants were fairly evenly split, 
variably experiencing an image (18.6%), doubt (18.6%), or sensory phenomena (16.3%) first. 
Verbal thoughts (4.7%) and other forms (affect, 2.3%) were infrequently reported to be the initial 
obsessional form (one missing data point from question omission). Subclinically, the internal 
voice was also commonly endorsed as the initial form (28.6%); yet, sensory phenomena were the 
most frequently reported first form among subclinical participants (38.1%). Doubt (14.3%) and 
122 
 
images (9.5%) were endorsed by a few individuals, and only one person reported experiencing 
an urge (4.8%) and an ‘other’ form (4.8%) in the subclinical group. Thus, a good portion of 
clinical and subclinical individuals alike appear to first notice an internal voice in their 
obsessional experience; however, among subclinical participants, sensory phenomena appear to 
more frequently be the first form of which individuals become aware. 
1.5 Duration of each form and most predominant form experienced.  Participants 
were also asked to quantify the percentage of the OC episode through which each endorsed 
obsessional form would have lasted. Full results are provided in Table 7 below. Responses were 
possible from 0% (none at all) to 100% (the entire duration of the episode). Overall, obsessional 
doubt appeared on average to be the most persistent form experienced by both clinical and 
subclinical participants, lasting over 70% of the episode (except for obsessional urge, which was 
only endorsed by one subclinical individual at 100%). Both groups were aligned in identifying 
the “Other” category – most frequently identified as affect – as the next most persistent (about 
70% in duration) obsessional form, followed by the internal voice (approximately 60% of the 
episode). Strikingly, all obsessional forms in the clinical group were present for much, if not 
most, of the episode (nearly all 50% or more). By contrast, subclinical respondents either noted 
forms as being quite persistent (over 60% of the episode) or brief and fleeting (lasting for 15% or 
25% of the episode). 
Table 7. 
Average Duration of Each Form, Relative to Episode Length 




Doubt 72.6% (22.9) 70.4% (29.7) 
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Range: 20 to 100 
N = 35 
Range: 20 to 100 
N = 13 
Other 69.0% (20.7) 
Range: 50 to 100 
N = 5 
70.0% (0) 
Range: 70 to 70 
N = 1 
Internal voice(s) 57.7% (33.4) 
Range: 10 to 100 
N = 29 
61.3% (31.8) 
Range: 5 to 100 
N = 16 
Verbal thoughts  49.5% (32.7) 
Range: 13 to 90 
N = 5 
15% (7.1) 
Range: 10 to 20 
N = 2 
Sensory phenomena 47.6% (35.2) 
Range: 5 to 100 
N = 31 
63.4% (30.9) 
Range: 10 to 100 
N = 16 
Image 42.3% (31.5) 
Range: 5 to 100 
N = 24 
23.8% (23.5) 
Range: 2 to 80 




Range: 100 to 100 
N = 1 
N.B.: Number of individuals endorsing each form are provided in the bottom of each cell. 
Participants were asked separately what they perceived to be the most predominant form 
during the episode (in terms of duration and/or intensity), and results differed slightly from the 
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duration reports noted above. Specifically, doubt remained most highly endorsed as the 
predominant obsessional form by the clinical group (34.1%), with internal voice close behind 
(31.8%). However, the persistent “Other” form was almost never (4.5%) endorsed by clinical 
individuals as the most predominant form. Remaining endorsements among clinical respondents 
were low (image at 13.6%, sensory phenomena at 11.4%, and verbal thoughts at 4.5%).  
Curiously, subclinical individuals most frequently complained of sensory phenomena as 
the predominant form (38.1%), despite the fact that doubt was reported above to be the most 
persistent form on average. Doubt and internal voice were next most frequently endorsed 
subclinical participants (23.8% each) as the most predominant form, followed by minimal reports 
for image (9.5%) and urge (4.8%). Strikingly, though identified as nearly equivalent in its 
persistence to the topmost form (doubt), the “other” obsessional form category was not at all 
(0%) reported as the predominant form by subclinical participants. Thus, it appears that 
regardless of the self-reported duration of these forms, the subjective experience of obsessional 
forms that dominate the OC episode differs slightly, centering around doubt and the internal 
voice, as well as sensory phenomena in subclinical individuals.  
1.6 Do obsessions co-occur or overlap with compulsions in the episode chronology?   
We had predicted that obsessions and compulsions do not occur purely sequentially but that they 
occur concurrently and interact with each other in dynamic fashion. Thus, following the detailed, 
step-by-step recounting of the most recent OC episode, participants were asked to state whether 
their experiences of the obsessional forms occurred in the complete absence of aspects of their 
compulsive behaviours. Due to the thorough description, the interviewer was able to identify any 
potential discrepancies between the participants’ responses to this question and that made evident 
by the recounting immediately prior; no such discrepancies were identified. As we predicted, 
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nearly all participants (including 86.4% of clinical respondents and 79.2% of subclinical 
individuals) reported that obsessions and compulsions overlapped with each other in time to 
some extent. For example, one participant described the timeline of this experience as: 
“Well the voice and the sensations are almost always in tandem. They start 
almost simultaneously. There is a small portion where all three [internal voice, 
physiological sensations, and doubt] are active at once and it’s usually when I’m 
washing my hands. Afterwards, it’s the doubt and the sensations for a while and 
the sensations drop before the doubt does.” 
Other clinical participants described the overlapping experience of obsessions and compulsions 
as contributing to the urge to repeat compulsive behaviours. For example:  
“[While washing my hands, the internal voice is] basically saying, ‘Not done yet. 
Keep going. You’re- It’s not good enough. Not thorough enough.’ Which is why 
I do it twice. Because I’m doubting. I’m doubting that my hands were clean the 
first time… but then I doubt that I did my hands properly, so I have to do it 
twice.” 
Another clinical individual described this dynamic obsession-compulsion overlap as: 
“[While completing cleaning compulsions and wiping down the stove and 
counter, the internal] narrative would tell me to clean it, [and] make sure it’s 
clean. The doubt would be saying, ‘Are you sure it’s clean?’ So that’s why I do it 
multiple times instead of just doing just once.”  
Thus, aspects of obsessional forms do, in fact, co-occur or overlap in time with aspects 
of compulsions; significantly, this finding contradicts the sequential and mutually 
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exclusive (chronological) manner in which CBT models and theories portray obsessions 
and compulsions. 
1.7 Do obsessions extend beyond compulsions in the episode chronology?  Similarly, 
we asked participants to indicate whether elements of their obsessional forms extended beyond 
the conclusion of the compulsion (any one iteration of it) in their experience. Once again, as 
predicted, nearly all participants (86.4% of the clinical group and 81.0% of subclinical 
individuals) endorsed obsessions that either began or continued after the compulsive act(s) had 
been completed. One clinical participant described this dynamic as: 
“Sometimes when I’m done cleaning, I think it’s clean, but then I look at it and 
[the internal voice will] say, ‘That doesn’t look clean,’ and I clean it again and 
wipe it.” (Clinical) 
Another clinical individual reported that the doubt resurfaces after an initial check to 
prompt another compulsion: 
“As soon as I opened the kitchen door and I saw [the stove], I said, ‘Okay 
everything’s fine,’ but then I have the very massive thought that was playing 
around my head. Like, ‘Am I checking this right, am I looking at this right that it 
is off?’ Maybe that was all, there were so many other emotions going in my head 
or feelings. I checked it and then I asked, ‘Am I doing this right?’ so then I would 
do it again.” 
Subclinical participants similarly offered statements describing how elements of their 
obsessional experience persist beyond the completion of a compulsion, for example:  
“[Sometimes even after clean or wash has ended], the narrative for sure [will 
continue]. The bodily sensations… like if there was only a couple of dishes and 
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for some reason I had that same reaction, then the time in the hot water will be 
less [so] sometimes I will still feel like it won’t feel like enough. So either I’ll 
clean something else or I’ll end up like taking that and still feeling it in my body 
with whatever I’m doing next. Sometimes I’ll just end up leaving and going out 
again just to like walk it off or something.” 
Strikingly, this finding directly contradicts the general understanding that obsessions 
terminate upon initiation or completion of the compulsive act, and that the end of the 
compulsion also marks the ending of the episode. 
1.8 Episode termination criteria.  We also predicted that individuals would not 
typically use the conclusion of their compulsion(s) as their termination criterion, but would 
primarily utilise other criteria. Specifically, we anticipated that individuals would determine that 
the episode had terminated using: 1) an internal subjective feeling (e.g., yedasentience, relief, 
etc.), and/or 2) the decrease or absence of intrusive experiences (e.g., fewer thoughts, reduced 
doubt, less tension, etc.). Indeed, we found that clinical and subclinical participants tend to rely 
almost exclusively upon these two categories as criteria to know that their OC episode is over. 
See Table 8 for full results.  
More specifically, participants appear to depend most on the obsessional experience 
subsiding as an indicator of episode termination, as well over half of each group endorsed this 
criterion. In this category, various participants described knowing that the episode had 
terminated “because I didn’t think about it again” or when “everything, like all the doubt and 
thought is gone. It just evaporated.” Respondents often spoke of the voice, doubt, or anxiety 
symptoms “stopping” or the internal conversation becoming “quieter” than other thoughts 
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(retreating “into the background buzz”), such that they could then focus on other tasks. For 
example, one clinical individual stated that she knows the episode has terminated when she has: 
“The ability to start focusing on other activities. Like my thoughts, the thoughts, 
were…mine again, I guess. I can just start talking and enjoying other people’s 
company, like my boyfriend or whatever. It’s just life slowly starts to become 
normal again and that’s when I know the episode has decreased, or ended.” 
Internal feelings were somewhat less frequently endorsed but still markedly popular (half 
or slightly less reported relying on this information), with numerous individuals referring 
specifically to a “relief” or “release” sensation. Vivid descriptions of this category include an 
experience like a “psychological exhale,” much like a sigh of relief, or a sense that “I’m done 
with this.” Indeed, one participant stated that: 
“There’s just like a release, like a ‘you can let it go’ sort of feeling, like there is an 
actual mental sort of sensation that goes along with just it being done and ok… If 
you’ve ever gone to the chiropractor and had a really bad knot in your neck and 
when they crack the knot you sort of get that flood of heat from the blood being 
able to circulate again. It’s kind of like that where you get a flood of ‘it’s okay.’” 
Other types of subjective, internal feelings that cue the completion of the episode were 
described. For example, one clinical participant described it as, “when it felt right. Like 
those are honestly the best words to use for it, which is strange.” Another clinical 
individual stated that: 
“This is going to sound weird but when I feel dirty, I literally can feel the dirt on 
my hands. As soon as I’m washing them and as soon as I rinse off the soap, I can 
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just feel they’re clean so that’s the only reason why I know it’s done. Like that’s 
why as soon as I turn off the sink I just know. It’s a feeling.” 
Between groups, clinical individuals tended to use completion of the compulsion as a 
termination criterion more often than subclinical participants, but neither group endorsed it 
frequently. Clinical endorsement rates were slightly lower than subclinical rates for using 
reduced intrusions and slightly higher for using internal feelings. Those who did simply stated 
that the episode ended “because I had completed the routine…there is not much thought to it.” 
Another participant similarly reported that, “It’s a routine. I do it everyday. So as long as I do it 
three times, I think I’m okay, and I can walk away.” 
Table 8.  
Reported Criteria for Episode Termination Among Interview Respondents. 
 Clinical Group 
(N = 44) 
Subclinical Group 
(N = 21) 
Intrusive experience subsided 63.6% 76.2% 
Internal feeling or sense 50.0% 42.9% 
Completion of compulsion 27.3% 9.5% 
Not applicable 0% 0% 
 
Chi-square tests indicated no difference between groups on each termination criterion 
category, across completion of compulsion (χ2[65] = 2.7, p = .12 using Fisher’s exact test 
because the expected count for one cell fell below 5), the subsiding of the intrusive experience 
(χ2[65] = 1.0, p = .31), and the arrival of an internal feeling (χ2[65] = .3, p = .59]). 
130 
 
We had anticipated that clinical individuals might use a greater number of criteria than 
subclinical individuals to judge that the episode has concluded, but the mean number of 
categories used were nearly identical between groups (1.4 clinical and 1.3 subclinical, SD = .5). 
This appears to be in part due to limited range, as all but one participant described either one or 
two categories; the outlier was one clinical individual who endorsed three categories. However, 
these results may be constrained by the fact that we coded responses into broad categories 
instead of recording the absolute number of criteria reported that might be present within each 
category. Nevertheless, these results highlight the fact that individuals do not tend to rely upon 
cues from their compulsions to determine that their episode is over; instead, they require input 
from the obsessional experience and/or some other subjective feeling to know that the episode 
has ended. 
II. On Obsessional Doubt 
The second aim of this interview was to better understand the nature of obsessional 
doubt, how individuals appraise this doubt, and what sorts of acts they feel compelled to perform 
in relation to the intrusive doubt. In order to elucidate these factors, we computed descriptive 
statistics and coded participant responses from the module on doubt.  
2.1 Prevalence of obsessional doubt.  As predicted, intrusive doubt was very frequently 
endorsed, with all but one clinical participant (97.7%) and all but four subclinical participants 
(81.0%) reportedly experiencing recurrent obsessional doubt at some point in their lives. 
Similarly, doubt appears to be a persistent experience across the disorder itself, with reports that 
it intrudes in the vast majority of OC episodes for clinical (mean = 79.8%, SD = 26.5) and 
subclinical respondents (71.9%, SD = 34.3) who have experienced the form. 
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2.2 Content of obsessional doubt.  Participant responses to the query “what is your 
doubt about” were coded according to the three themes identified by our two coders. Quotes 
exemplifying each domain were excerpted from transcripts and are provided in Table 9. Contrary 
to expectations, doubt-related content was not limited to typical OCD obsessional content 
domains, instead extending to other topics (e.g., compulsive behaviours, individuals’ own 
cognitive capabilities, etc.). 
Table 9.  
Participant Quotes Describing Intrusive Doubt Content in Specific Content Domains.  
 Clinical Group 
(N = 43) 
Subclinical Group 
(N = 17) 
Doubt about 
one’s safety 
status or the 




"[My doubt is] about whether or not I 
would get sick or not…’cause I 
would have touched the railings to get 
on the bus or like the arm rest. I 
would think it’s dirty. ‘Have these 
been washed between shifts? 
Probably not. Have they ever been 
cleaned? Do people wipe these 
down?’ I see people eating food on 
the bus and touching things after, and 
I don’t know if they are smearing 
meat there or something that would 
go bad over time and manifest 
bacteria and I would touch it…Am I 
getting contaminated because I’m 
touching them or around them?" 
“I’ll doubt that I turned the stove off 
even though I didn’t use it. Also my 
hair straightener. It is pretty much 
specifically about things that I 
routinely check, and I can’t remember 
if I turn off, and then I have to go back 











One individual: “I’d say for most 
cases the doubt is that I did it the 
proper amount of times or I did it 
correctly. So the light switch maybe I 
have to do it 20 times or say I’m 
turning off something and I didn’t do 
it correctly.”     
Another participant: “For cleaning, it 
would be just did I do a good job? Is 
it actually clean? I know it won’t be 
100% clean but if it’s up to the 
cleaning standard, it’s clean in a 
way.” 
“I know I did it (i.e., turned things off), 
but I worry I didn’t do it properly (and 







“Whether or not I saw things being 
off or questioning whether what I saw 
was true. I know I’ve checked, so I’m 
not doubting the fact that I’ve 
checked. I’m doubting what I saw.” 
“I’m doubting my memory, like I can’t 
completely trust that what I’m 
remembering is accurate…of turning 
something off, making sure…I double 
check for stoves and stuff too.” 
 
It is worth noting that the second category of doubt content inherently captures a type of 
obsession that arises after one’s compulsive action(s), though it is unclear whether it onsets 
independently or if it is specifically influenced by the compulsion itself (the latter of which 
would in part support the reciprocal model). The frequencies with which doubt categories were 
identified among clinical and subclinical OCD participants are displayed in Table 10. Across 
groups, doubt appears most often to be about what might be considered typical obsessional 
content (e.g., the state of things and whether doors have been locked, surfaces are clean or 
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contaminated, etc.), though the prevalence rate of this doubt domain in subclinical participants is 
strikingly high. Both clinical and subclinical individuals less frequently reported doubt about the 
third domain, i.e., their senses or cognitive abilities. As individuals sometimes reported more 
than one type of doubt content, the columns do not sum to 100%. 
Notably, no subclinical participants reported doubting whether they had properly 
performed certain behaviours (i.e., compulsions) as a content domain on its own, whereas 23% 
of clinical participants endorsed that category alone. Rather, when subclinical individuals 
endorsed that content area, they invariably endorsed another category, such as the state of things 
(“Did I do that, and whether it’s locking a door, whether it’s turning off the stove…it’s basically 
me, did I do that correctly? I don’t think so, I should check”). One subclinical respondent 
endorsed all three categories (“[I doubt that] the response to some thought was executed 
appropriately. So, locked door, did I actually lock the door? Put keys in place, did I do that? And 
did I do it right, or did I forget that I did it, or was I not paying attention and accidentally didn’t 
do it?”). 
Table 10.  
Percentage of Interview Respondents Reporting Different Domains of Doubt Content. 
 Clinical Group 
(N = 43) 
Subclinical Group 
(N = 17) 
Doubt about one’s safety status or the 
state of things (i.e., obsessional content) 
58.1% 76.5% 
Doubt about having performed 
compulsions properly enough or 




Doubt about one’s senses, memory,  
or cognitive capacity 
27.9% 29.4% 
 
On average, clinical and subclinical individuals alike reported 1.4 doubt content 
categories. The distribution was nearly identical across groups as well, with the vast majority 
endorsing one doubt content category (70% clinical and 65% subclinical individuals), fewer 
reporting two categories (26% clinical and 29% subclinical participants), and very few endorsing 
three (5% clinical and 6% subclinical individuals). 
2.3 Characteristics of obsessional doubt.  Full results for endorsed characteristics of 
obsessional doubt are presented in Table 11. As predicted, participants reported that their 
experience of obsessional doubt is typically highly distressing, very interfering, and markedly 
difficult to dismiss. While clinical and subclinical respondents alike are able to recognise their 
doubt as very excessive, they rate it as exceedingly real in the moment and thus paradoxically 
report high conviction in their doubt (i.e., belief) at the time of their experience. Significantly, 
the emotion that is most intensely provoked by doubt is reportedly anxiety (endorsed by 79.1% 
of clinical and 58.8% of subclinical participants). Other common associated emotions included 
guilt, shame, and anger. The vast majority of participants thus report that they attempt to resist 
their doubt (72.1% of clinical and 64.7% of subclinical participants), though it appears that their 
ability to resist doubt is similarly poor (mean of 4.4 out of 10, SD = 2.3, for clinical participants; 
mean of 4.3, SD = 2.4 for subclinical individuals).  
Results further indicate that doubt is, across groups, experienced in various forms. The 
most frequently endorsed ways doubt was experienced were as a verbal stream of thoughts 
and/or a felt sense in the body. While some participants easily identified how they experienced 
their doubt, others struggled considerably to put to words their internal experience of doubt for 
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the interviewer. Doubt that took the form of a verbal stream of thoughts were described in words 
such as “a demon…that I’m fighting that I wish would stop, [and] it comes and goes” or like “a 
debate” that is taking place internally. Doubt as a felt sense in the body was reported variably as 
a “nagging feeling,” muscle tension with raised “hair on my arms or…goose bumps,” a “sinking 
feeling in [my] chest and stomach,” a “stomach in knots,” or a feeling in the “pit of [my] 
stomach like cold acid.” Clinical, but not subclinical, individuals also reported experiencing the 
doubt as a felt knowledge (e.g., “It’s just like I know it, like two plus two is four”). 
As individuals were able to report more than one sensory experience of doubt, the 
percentages do not sum to 100%. No participant endorsed more than two categories. One such 
individual (Clinical group) who endorsed doubt as a felt sense in her body as well as a felt 
knowledge described her experience as: 
“…more of a feeling, but like it’s a thought, but not like a verbal stream. I’m not 
sitting there and talking to myself about it. But I guess it’s more of a feeling. It’s a 
gut feeling and a thought at the same time. I don’t have to verbalize the thoughts 
in my head, so it’s kind of like a flash.” 
Both clinical and subclinical groups endorsed doubt in the category of a different sensory 
state that they deemed not to fit into existing categories. Clinical participants’ descriptions of 
their doubt experience were of “emotional guilt,” a “lack of confidence in [her] memories,” and 
an outright “blank mind (i.e., no memory)” of the action. Subclinical participants’ descriptions 
included “feelings of guilt, shame, or loss,” and a “fuzzy feeling in [the participant’s] brain” akin 
to “unsureness, feeling blurry, [so I] can’t be sure I did that.”  
We gathered information on the duration of obsessional doubt, but it proved not possible 
to code, as the estimates varied wildly both between individuals and within an individual (i.e., 
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they were unable to report on one consistent estimate), ranging from seconds or minutes to hours 
and days. As such, we are unable to report on an overall statistic to capture the duration of 
intrusive doubt. 
Table 11. 
Characteristics of Intrusive Doubt Identified by Clinical and Subclinical Interview Participants. 
 Mean (SD) or % endorsing 
 Clinical Group 
(N = 43) 
Subclinical Group 
(N = 17) 
1. Conviction in doubt, 0-10 7.0 (2.6) 6.7 (1.9) 
2. Sensory experience of doubt 
       Verbal stream of thoughts    
       Felt sense in body 
       Felt knowledge 











3. Perceived excessiveness of 
doubt, 0-10 
7.0 (2.8) 7.0 (1.8) 
4. Perceived realness, 0-10 7.7 (2.1) 7.7 (1.8) 
5. Associated emotion 
       Anxiety or fear 
       Shame  
       Guilt 













       Anger        38.1% 58.8% 
6. Difficulty dismissing doubt,  
    0-10 
7.6 (2.3) 8.2 (1.7) 
7. Distress, 0-10 6.7 (2.5) 6.6 (2.0) 
8. Interference, 0-10 6.7 (2.2) 6.4 (2.4) 
 
 2.4 Termination of obsessional doubt.  Full results are presented in Table 12, with 
frequencies summing to over 100% due to the possibility that more than one termination 
criterion could be endorsed. Contrary to expectations, clinical participants most frequently stated 
that their doubt ends when they complete their compulsion; just under half of subclinical 
respondents reported the same. These doubt experiences were quite simply reported as 
terminating “once I’ve checked,” after “the act of cleansing,” or “once I check and make sure 
that what I did was done.” Moreover, few clinical and subclinical participants reported that they 
used an internal feeling or sense to determine that their doubt had terminated. These individuals 
tended to note the presence of certainty, “relief,” or “some gratification…There’s this sense of 
empowerment. I feel sort of a regained my composure a bit. The confidence is there.” 
 Instead, among subclinical participants, the most frequent report was for termination of 
doubt through the intrusive experience subsiding. Participant descriptions of this experience 
commented on how “it retreats back into a background buzz, but this noise can raise or lower 
depending on the circumstance” or “it will end when I know that everything is fine and I’ll have 
like a [sic] peace of mind.” Thoughts that “go away” were mentioned by several participants who 
noted knowing their doubt has terminated because:  
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“Those thoughts go away. And I don’t feel the anxiety anymore, I don’t feel that 
it is dirty there or whatever.” (Clinical) 
“It seems to go away. It’s always there but it doesn’t permeate my thoughts 
anymore.” (Clinical) 
Two individuals reported that their doubt does not end and are thus captured under the ‘Not 
Applicable’ category. The average number of criteria endorsed was identical across both clinical 
and subclinical groups (1.2, SD of .4). 
Table 12.  
Categorised Reported Reasons for Doubt Termination Among Interview Respondents. 
 Clinical Group 
(N = 42) 
Subclinical Group 
(N = 17) 
Completion of compulsion 64.3% 47.1% 
Intrusive experience subsided 38.1% 64.7% 
Internal feeling or sense 16.7% 11.8% 
Not applicable 4.8% 0% 
N.B.: One missing data point from a clinical participant due to an unclear response. 
2.5 Appraisals of obsessional doubt.  To elucidate the personal significance of OCD 
doubt, we examined how compelling individuals find the feared consequences of their doubt and 
the way(s) in which they appraise their doubt in relation to their self-views. Feared consequences 
reported by participants included catastrophic outcomes (e.g., “[I] get sick and die,” or “the 
house would burn down…and the dogs would be in the house… [and with the door] locked they 
couldn’t get out”). Broadly, participants also noted concerns about their mental state (becoming 
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“severely depressed,” or “worst case would be being in an asylum somewhere with skin grafts on 
my hands and a straitjacket”) and social rejection (“being ostracized, and…being a horrible 
person”). Clinical and subclinical respondents alike reported that they believed these feared 
consequences to be highly likely in the thick of their OC episode (mean likelihood of 6.0 among 
clinical participants, SD of 2.7; subclinical mean of 6.3, SD of 2.2). The two groups also did not 
differ in severity ratings of the consequences, on average determined to be catastrophically 
severe should they come true (clinical mean of 9.3, SD of 1.4; subclinical mean 9.2, SD of 1.5). 
Participant descriptions of what the worst-case scenario might mean about them, others, 
or the world, should their doubt content come true, were coded according to Ferrier and Brewin’s 
scheme (2005). See Table 13 for full results. Nearly all participants reported a self-appraisal that 
was captured according to the four self themes, with four clinical individuals (9.3%) and two 
subclinical (11.8%) denying that such an event would mean something about their sense of self, 
thus reporting no self-appraisals. Endorsement rates are nearly identical across clinical and 
subclinical participants. Consistent with our expectations, most of the appraisals of doubt were 
reported to pertain to a negative view of one’s moral self (i.e., bad, evil, irresponsible, careless, 
etc.) should the worst-case scenario come true.  
Table 13.  
Endorsement of Categorised Appraisals of Obsessional Doubt Among Interview Respondents. 
 Clinical Group 
(N = 43) 
Subclinical Group 
(N = 17) 
Moralistic / Dangerous Self 53.5% 58.8% 
Depressed / Anxious Self 30.2% 23.5% 
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Rejected Self 18.6% 17.6% 
Negative Personality / Flawed Self 14.0% 5.9% 
 
Language used by some participants was particularly striking. For example, when 
describing negative, moralistic self-appraisals, participants shared such comments as: 
“It would mean I was a danger. It would be like leaving someone who has Alzheimer’s 
out in the world. Just, they don’t know what they are doing, it’s not safe for them, it’s not 
safe for the people around them...” (clinical), or 
“If the doubt was true, that I really am someone who would do that, then I’d be torturing 
animals, and it would be… Oh, I’d be a monster” (clinical), or 
“It would mean that I am very careless and that I am a bad person that shouldn’t be taking 
care of a cat” (subclinical), or 
“I can’t be trusted to leave my house. That people think of me as forgetful or 
irresponsible” (subclinical). 
Depressed or anxious negative self-appraisals were also endorsed. For example, one 
clinical participant stated that it would mean “I am a failure as a person and that I really am 
worthless,” and one subclinical respondent detailed that it would mean “I failed – I’m a loser.” 
The latter two domains were far less frequently reported. Rejected self-appraisals commented on 
concerns that “I would kind of just say, ‘How did you let this happen? You would be such a 
disappointment to others.’ Kind of like people would look at me differently.” Flawed self-
appraisals were least frequent; for example, one clinical respondent noted that “I guess it would 
mean that…I cut corners I guess… maybe I like to take the fast, easier route. Like I’m a bit 
messy or eager to be done.” 
141 
 
2.6 Doubt-related compulsions.  Every participant reported performing some 
compulsive or compensatory behaviour in response to (i.e., after experiencing) their obsessional 
doubt, but not every individual noted completing an act pre-emptively to prevent their doubt. 
Endorsement rates of doubt related compensatory strategies are displayed in Table 14, grouped 
according to their temporal relation to the doubt (i.e., behaviours performed after and in response 
to the doubt are labelled under reactive compulsions, while those completed preventatively prior 
to the doubt are proactive compulsions). As noted in our Methods, each reported action was not 
assessed for excessiveness consistent with a compulsive behaviour; rather, each behaviour 
identified here is understood to be a part of the repertoire of compulsions collectively determined 
to be excessive beyond the point of functionality.  
Table 14. 
Frequency of Endorsement for Doubt-Related Compulsions. 
 Clinical Group 
(N = 43) 
Subclinical Group 
(N = 17) 
Reactive Compulsion 100% 100% 
    Check repeatedly 67.4% 88.2% 
    Reassurance (from others or for oneself) 48.8% 76.5% 
    Distract 48.8% 35.3% 
    Wash repeatedly 41.9% 5.9% 
    Other reactive compulsion 39.5% 35.3% 
    Counteract thoughts 37.2% 11.8% 
142 
 
    Suppress or block doubt 30.2% 5.9% 
Proactive Compulsion 62.8% 70.6% 
    Other proactive compulsion 52.4% 58.8% 
    Avoid triggers / things  25.6% 11.8% 
    Distract 11.6% 0% 
 
Reactive doubt-related compulsions.  Clinical participants’ reactive compulsions appear 
to be fairly well distributed between the compensatory behaviour categories, albeit with a slight 
preference for checking in response to doubt. By contrast, there appeared to be a more 
differentiated profile among subclinical participants, with a particularly strong preference for 
checking and reassurance seeking in response to doubt.  
As noted by the high endorsement of the “Other” reactive compulsion category, our 
posited categories did not seem to capture well all types of doubt-related behaviours among 
clinical and subclinical participants. The various “Other” compensatory actions described by 
clinical participants include: five reports of conjuring up images of actual memories (mental 
checks of memories to fight off the doubt and one mention of proving their doubt is justified, 
11.6%), two reports of avoiding touching things that may further spread contamination, two 
reports of attempting to logically counter the doubting thoughts, and individual mentions of 
counting and “intentionally tensing [my] body to fight off the doubt.” Other compulsions 
reported by subclinical participants also include the use of mental images and “rationalising,” as 
well as taking actual “pictures of things unplugged so [I have] proof” of safety. While on average 
clinical and subclinical participants endorsed a fairly similar number of reactive compulsion 
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categories (clinical mean = 3.1, SD = 1.6; subclinical mean = 2.6, SD = .9), those with OCD 
diagnostic status reported a wider range of behaviours (1 to 7) than did subclinical (1 to 4). 
Chi-square tests comparing endorsement rates of reactive compulsions between groups 
either approached significance (reassurance seeking, χ2[65] = 3.8, p = .052, and suppressing 
doubt, p = .05, Fisher’s exact test due to low expected cell count) or were outright significant 
(washing repeatedly, χ2[65] = 7.3, p = .007). 
Participants reported various aims in performing these reactive compulsions. These 
reasons ranged from “alleviating the doubt” or “trying to quiet down the intrusive thoughts,” to 
preventing negative outcomes (e.g., “To reassure myself that everything – it’s fine. That I did 
whatever I could, everything I could. That I can find peace and that I don’t have to check 
again”). Some individuals also reported wanting to function more normally (e.g., “I want 
freedom from this invasiveness. I think it’s a waste of energy and I want to be more normal”). 
Both groups rated their compensatory strategies as highly successful in the long-term in 
achieving their doubt-related aims (mean of 7.3 out of 10 for clinical participants, SD = 2.9; 
mean of 7.5 for subclinical participants, SD = 2.5). 
Proactive doubt-related compulsions.  Most, but not all, participants reported performing 
behaviours pre-emptively in relation to the doubt. Avoidance behaviours reported by clinical 
respondents included “having others do dishes for me,” refraining from touching contaminated 
surfaces, or avoiding approaching people who might be contaminated. Yet, the most highly 
endorsed category of proactive compulsions across participants was the Other domain, capturing 
strategies we had not anticipated. A fair number of clinical participants reported completing 
preventative checks before the doubt arises (e.g., before leaving one’s home), sometimes 
repeatedly (18.6%). Similarly, 17.6% of subclinical individuals noted preventative checks; one 
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respondent reported doing tasks “early so by the time I leave, [the obsessional thoughts] cool 
down,” whereas another individual described leaving “later so I have no time to doubt.” 
Fascinatingly, a number of participants also independently reported completing more 
careful actions or slower actions in order to prevent obsessional doubt. Almost 10% of clinical 
respondents described making conscious, deliberate efforts to commit a check to memory (e.g., 
saying to herself “okay, you’re pulling this out, or when I’m with my partner, I’ll say, ok [name], 
the straightener’s off, we’re good to go, so kind of just like overemphasizing the situation”), 
paying special attention to checks, more thorough and careful washes, standing in front of the 
stove for longer in order to ensure its safety status is remembered, etc. Such careful or slower 
actions were also prevalent among subclinical participants (23.5%), with descriptions such as: 
“just focusing all my energy [on] doing it… trying to put all my conscious mental energy into 
being like, ‘Ok I did this right the first time’”; or, “I tell myself, ‘I am doing this,’ so that later on 
that doubt won’t be there…I do this, I lock the door, I turn off my computer…so the memory 
sticks.” Attempts were also made to “take a few extra minutes to be mindful of my checking, 
then I doubt less” and to “as I’m unplugging something…take this mental snap shot in my 
head…so when I start to worry that I’ve done it, I can remember that this is what it looked like 
when I was pulling it out.” Avoidance proactive compulsion endorsement frequency did not 
differ significantly between groups, p = .31, Fisher’s exact test. 
Individuals reported a variety of aims in performing these doubt-related proactive 
compulsions, such as avoidance of the fear (“that I won’t be anxious about it, that the fear won’t 
creep in”), a sense of certainty (“my goal is to do it so that when I start to think about it, I can 
say, no I’ve done that…I guess to reassure myself that it’s been done”), or to prevent any 
escalation in the persistence of that anxious, OC event (“that it will prevent the episodes”). 
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Overall, subclinical respondents noted that their proactive compulsions were very successful in 
accomplishing these aims (mean of 7.4 out of 10, SD of 2.4), with moderately high success also 
reported by clinical participants (mean of 6.6, SD of 2.4). 
Frequency of doubt-related compulsions.  Full results for how often doubt-related 
compulsions are performed are presented in Table 15. Of note, there is a striking discrepancy 
between clinical and subclinical participants in how often reactive compulsions are performed, 
with over half of clinical respondents reporting actions in response to the doubt multiple times a 
day but nearly half of subclinical respondents completing behaviours multiple times a week. The 
two groups were similar in reports of proactive compulsion frequency, with approximately half 
of each group feeling compelled to act preventatively multiple times a day. 
The frequency with which doubt-related reactive compulsions are performed is 
significantly different across groups, according to a two-sided Fisher’s exact test (p = .002). 
Specifically, clinical individuals are far more likely to report highly frequent occurrences of 
reactive compulsions (multiple times a day) and less likely than subclinical individuals to report 
that it takes place on a weekly basis (two to three times a week). 
Table 15. 
Frequency with which Doubt-Related Compulsions are Performed among Clinical and 
Subclinical Participants 
 Reactive Compulsions  Proactive Compulsions 
 Clinical 
Group 
(N = 43) 
Subclinical 
Group 
(N = 17) 
 Clinical 
Group 
(N = 27) 
Subclinical 
Group 
(N = 12) 
Multiple times a day 55.8% 17.6%  48.1% 50.0% 
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Once a day 20.9% 17.6%  11.1% 16.7% 
Two to three times a week 18.6% 47.1%  25.9% 33.3% 
Once a week 0% 0%  3.7% 0% 
Two to three times a month 0% 17.6%  0% 0% 
N.B.: As there are missing reactive compulsion data for 2 clinical participants and proactive 
compulsion data for 3 clinical participants, those columns do not sum to 100%. 
Doubt-related compulsion impairment.  Clinical and subclinical respondents differed 
significantly on two indices of doubt-related compulsion impairment. First, clinical participants 
rated the compulsions they perform in response to or to prevent doubt as significantly more 
interfering than those of subclinical respondents, t(57) = 2.3, p = .03 (clinical mean of 5.6, SD of 
2.0; subclinical mean of 3.8, SD of 2.6). Overall, participants varied in reports of whether they 
attempted to resist their doubt-related compulsions, with 41.9% of clinical and 27.1% of 
subclinical individuals endorsing resistance. However, clinical participants reported significantly 
lower ability to resist their compulsions, t(24) = -3.1, p = .005. In fact, on average, clinical 
respondents rated their ability as fairly poor (3.6 out of 10, SD of 1.8), whereas subclinical 
respondents noted moderately good ability to resist doubt-related compulsions (6.0, SD of 1.9). 
The groups reported fairly similar levels of moderately low distress provoked by doubt 
compulsions (clinical mean of 4.4 out of 10, SD of 3.1; subclinical mean of 3.5, SD of 3.2). 
2.7 Correlates between doubt characteristics and OCD symptom severity.  Contrary 
to expectations, when data was collapsed across groups and symptom severity (clinician severity 
rating, CSR) was used as a continuous variable, there were two significant correlations. 
Specifically, OCD symptom severity was correlated with ratings of doubt-related compulsion 
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interference, r = .32, p = .01. Participants’ OCD severity ratings were also significantly related to 
their ability to resist compulsions such that the greater their CSR, the worse they rated their 
resistance ability (r = -.43, N = 26, p = .03). Given the links between doubt compulsions and 
overall OCD symptom severity, we further explored some compulsion-related indices. Greater 
OCD symptom severity was found to be significantly correlated with greater number of reactive 
compulsion categories endorsed (r = .29, N = 60, p = .03). Significantly, CSR was negatively 
correlated with the rated success with which they achieved their proactive compulsion aims (r = -
.35, N = 39, p = .03), indicating that the more severe the OCD, the less able the participant felt to 
achieve their proactive compulsion aim. No other correlations (between CSR and doubt-
provoked distress or interference, ability to resist compulsions, or compulsion-related distress) 
were significant, with r-values ranging from .01 to .09, p > .05. 
III. ON OBSESSIONAL IMAGES 
The last aim of this study was to clarify the nature and characteristics of intrusive images, 
appraisals of obsessional images, and compulsions associated with these images. To clarify these 
factors, we again computed descriptive statistics and coded responses from the interview module 
on images. 
3.1 Prevalence of intrusive images.  As predicted, intrusive images were frequently 
endorsed across both groups. Of 44 clinical participants, 63.6% reported experiencing a 
recurrent, obsessional image at some point in their lifetime. A very similar 66.7% of the 21 
subclinical participants reported the same. Clinical respondents reported that obsessional images 
are present in approximately 60.4% of their OC episodes (SD = 35.4); subclinical participants 
similarly reported intrusive images in over half of their OC episodes (mean = 54.0%; SD = 42.4).  
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3.2 Content of intrusive images.  Excerpts of described image content from both clinical 
and subclinical participants are provided in Table 16, grouped according to Lipton and 
colleagues’ (2010) categories.   
Table 16. 
Participant Quotes Describing Intrusive Image Content in Specific Content Domains.  
 Clinical Group 
(N = 28) 
Subclinical Group  
(N = 14) 
Images involving 
unacceptable 
ideas of harm 
“I have no clue how YouTube 
allowed that…but the scene they 
showed was of a priest raping a 
nun who was like 70 and then … 
for some reason, like that image 
just stuck in my head a lot”; OR 
“Car accidents…construction, 
dump trucks backing into cars, 
something falls from construction 
site, another car hitting them, 
anything that ruins the car in a 
way, or the people inside of it” 
“If there were a hammer on the 
table, I would picture it hitting me.  
If there was a knife on the table 
…it would specifically be an 
image that I saw.  It could be that I 
walk by the hammer on the table 
like 50 times but then one…that I 
picture it hurting me.” 
Images involving 
contamination 
“My hands being dirty with germs 
on them. I [can] actually see the 
“A substance, just like a vague 





germs. It’s a rapid fire of stuff. 
Dogs going poop and surgeries 
and blood and all kinds of waste-
related images.” 
supposed to be there…dust or 




“Me embarrassing myself…things 




“A body of a dead woman, a 
coffin and she’s in a long white 
dress. Her skin looked really pale 
and…sometimes there is nothing 
scary in that image, but it’s a 
sensation of being buried in the 
darkness, alone” 
“Things like the door, the garage 
door, the oven – like the stove – 
the stove top…various appliances”  
 
Consistent with our predictions, images of unacceptable ideas of harm (i.e., repugnant 
images) were by far the most frequently reported image across both participant groups, followed 
by contamination content among clinical respondents and miscellaneous content among 
subclinical individuals. The frequencies with which image content categories were identified 
among clinical and subclinical OCD participants are displayed in Table 17. As a few respondents 
identified more than one category of image when describing image content, the summed 
percentages exceed 100% in both groups of participants. 
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Table 17.  
Percentage of Interview Respondents Reporting Images of Specific Content Domains. 
 Clinical Group 
(N = 28) 
Subclinical Group 
(N = 14) 
Unacceptable ideas of harm 67.9% 85.7% 
Contamination and somatic complaints 28.6% 7.7% 
Social rejection 7.1% 0% 
Miscellaneous 3.6% 14.3% 
 
3.3 Characteristics of intrusive images.  Please refer to Table 18 for quantitative results 
of intrusive image characteristics across participants. Images were reported to be brief (typically 
seconds long among both clinical and subclinical participants), colourful, vivid, and distressing. 
In fact, clinical respondents rated images as significantly more vivid than subclinical individuals, 
t(40) = 2.2, p = .03. The majority of respondents reported that anxiety- or fear-based emotions 
were the most intensely felt emotions elicited by the image (60.7% of clinical and 78.6% of 
subclinical individuals). Within the group of OCD participants, 85.7% reported that the image 
repeated itself within the episode, on average 6 times (SD = 7.8). Subclinical participants 
similarly endorsed nearly 6 repetitions within an episode (SD = 8.7, with one outlier excluded as 
the participant did not provide an actual estimate for “non-stop” repetitiveness) for the 71.4% 
who endorsed recurring images. Considerably more clinical than subclinical participants reported 
attempting to resist the image (57.1% clinical vs. 35.7% subclinical), and participants’ reported 
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ability to resist was comparably moderate-to-low between groups (4.3 out of 10 for individuals 
with OCD, SD = 2.0, but 3.6 for subclinical individuals, SD = 2.5).  
All images were visual in nature, both among clinical and subclinical participants, and 
typically involved one or two senses. Tactile (i.e., touch-based) sensations were more frequently 
noted by subclinical than clinical participants in their images. For example, one subclinical 
participant’s description of a tactile intrusive image of harm was that “it was weird – I didn’t feel 
the pain of it but I felt what it would feel like for the knife to go through my chest. The metal just 
going through and breaking a rib. It was weird, and I would feel the emotion. I feel like I felt like 
I was there.”  
When asked to describe the temporal association or “tense” of their intrusive images – 
i.e., when it felt like the image was taking place, whether past, present, or future – clinical and 
subclinical participants differed slightly in their report. Clinical participants generally reported 
present-focused images (e.g., “now” and a current “daydream”) with future-oriented images next 
most common (e.g., “very near future that could happen now” and “imminent, just about to 
happen”). One respondent with OCD offered a response categorised as having an ‘Other’ 
temporal association, because s/he described experiencing “all three [tenses] mixed together” in 
an image of contamination content: as if “there will be a cockroach and there was a bug there” 
and there is one currently. By contrast, subclinical respondents reported predominantly future-
oriented images (“about to happen”), then images that felt like they were in the present (“while 
it’s happening”), and lastly images that evoked a sense of the past (“if I could’ve done [a specific 
behaviour], I could’ve prevented it”). One subclinical respondent denied experiencing any 
temporal association, noting that it felt like an image that was “spliced onto a movie.”  
152 
 
While clinical individuals tended to report more than one format for the visual image 
(most frequently videos and still photos in their intrusive image experience; mean of 1.3 formats, 
SD of .4), subclinical participants only ever endorsed one image format (most often still photos). 
The endorsement rate of the video format was significantly different between groups, χ2(42) = 
4.2, p < .05. The majority of clinical participants (60.7%) reported images that were viewed from 
a field perspective (i.e., out of their mind’s eye), with only 25% endorsing images from an 
observer’s point of view. The remaining 14.3% of clinical participants noted a mix of field and 
observer’s perspectives in their intrusive images (switching viewpoints), on average more 
heavily of field (66.8%) than observer perspective (33.2%). Similarly, the majority of subclinical 
participants reported field perspective images (64.3%), with only 14.3% noting observer’s 
perspective images, and 21.4% reporting mixed perspectives (70% field, 30% observer).  
It appears that the source material for image content (i.e., is the image completely 
fictional or is it derived from lived experiences?) also varied between clinical and subclinical 
participants. While the majority of individuals with OCD reported images that were a mix of 
fictional material and actual memories (on average, comprised of 58.2% fiction and 41.8% 
memory), subclinical participants were split evenly. Half endorsed purely fictional images and 
half endorsed mixed images (on average, comprised of 68.9% fiction and 21.1% memory). In 
describing the mixed images, clinical individuals reported that they might take their actual stove 
and surroundings and envision repercussions using fictional “things seen in movies.” 
Alternatively, “I may not be wearing the same outfit as I did when I actually did it but it’s still 
my hands all the time so it’s kind of like a mixture of both.” Similarly, subclinical respondents 
noted that mixed images might consist of a background that is “real” with “positioning [of the 
doorknob that] is made up.” By contrast, a subclinical participant described a purely fictional 
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image as “almost like a 3D model that you’d see on the computer, that you could like spin 
around.” 
Table 18. 
Characteristics of Intrusive Images Identified by Clinical and Subclinical Participants. 
 Mean (SD) or % endorsing 
 Clinical Group 
(N = 28) 
Subclinical Group 
(N = 14) 
1. Black-and-white 
       vs. colour 
89.3% colour 100% colour 
2. Vividness, 0-10 8.0 (1.9) 6.6 (1.9) 
3. Image duration 
       < 10 secs 
       10-30 secs 
       30-60 secs 
       1 to 2 mins. 
       2 to 5 mins. 
       5 to 15 mins. 

















4. Associated emotion 
       Anxiety or fear 
       Sadness 











       Guilt 
       Shame 







5. Senses involved 
       Sight 
       Sound 
       Touch 
       Smell 













6. Temporal association 
       Past tense 
       Present tense 
       Future tense 
       Other association 













7. Image as…  
       Video 
       Snapshot/still photo 









8. Image content …  
purely from memory  
       vs. mix of both 











9. Perceived realness, 0-10 6.2 (2.8) 7.8 (1.6) 
10. Difficulty dismissing 
image, 0-10 
5.4 (3.0) 6.0 (3.3) 
11. Distress, 0-10 6.8 (2.3) 6.4 (2.7) 
12. Interference, 0-10 6.0 (2.7) 4.4 (2.4) 
 
3.4 Termination of intrusive images.  Full results are provided in Table 19. Contrary to 
our predictions, the vast majority of individuals – clinical and subclinical alike – reported that the 
image terminated “on its own,” “fading,” “going away,” or petering out of its own accord (e.g., 
“it just disappears”). Several respondents noted specifically that they knew the image had 
concluded because it had subsided sufficiently for them to focus on other tasks or think of other 
things (e.g., “As soon as I do something else, but that doesn’t mean it won’t pop up again. As 
we’re talking about it now it’s popping up”). A small portion of participants also reported that 
the completion of a compulsion terminated the obsessional image (e.g., the image ends “when I 
know for a fact that I’ve turned it off and I’ve met that standard of ‘standard’ of checking it.”). 
Although individuals were again able to report more than one termination criterion with respect 
to their images, the average number of reasons reported was identical across both groups (1.1, 
clinical SD of .4 and subclinical SD of .3). 
Table 19.  
Categorised Reported Reasons for Image Termination Among Interview Respondents. 
 Clinical Group 
(N = 28) 
Subclinical Group 
(N = 14) 
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Intrusive experience subsided 82.1% 85.7% 
Completion of compulsion 25.0% 21.4% 
Internal feeling 7.1% 0% 
Not applicable 0% 0% 
 
3.5 Appraisals of intrusive images.  As with the intrusive doubt module, we explored 
the personal significance of OCD images by examining individuals’ feared consequences of their 
images and what they might mean about them (i.e., self-appraisals) if they came true. Participant 
descriptions of the most feared consequences of their images conveyed concerns about the image 
itself coming true (e.g., “it will become reality”) as well as the downstream effects (e.g., “that I 
did forget something and…it’s a symbol of me forgetting to do something…so it means I didn’t 
do other things,” or “that more dogs are going to go through that abuse…and those people…are 
going to keep doing it with many others”). A feared consequence that appeared to be almost 
exclusive to subclinical participants is that the image will lead to worse anxiety or the 
perpetuation of the obsessive-compulsive episode (e.g., “if I focus too much on it…it could 
develop into its own anxiety” or “spiral into” other parts of the OCD episode [subclinical]).  
Curiously, clinical respondents seemed to identify the feared image consequences as less 
likely to happen than the subclinical respondents, though the difference did not quite reach 
statistical significance, t(34) = -1.9, p = .06 (clinical mean of 4.7, SD of 3.3; subclinical mean of 
6.8, SD of 2.5). Both groups reported the feared consequences as similarly catastrophically 
severe (clinical mean of 9.1, SD of 1.6; subclinical mean of 9.5, SD of .8).  
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The reported implications of these worst-case image scenarios, should they come true, 
were again categorised according to the four self-appraisal domains utilised by Ferrier and 
Brewin (2005) and by Lipton and colleagues (2010) in their image-specific study. See Table 20 
for full results. Contrary to our predictions, the most frequently endorsed category across groups 
was the “no appraisal” category. That is, nearly half of clinical and nearly 60% of subclinical 
participants denied that the image, should it come true, meant anything about themselves (or 
even the world and others). These individuals tended to interpret the image as a warning or 
“safety precaution” of some sort (e.g., a “reminder of why I’m doing what I’m doing and why I 
need to double check. It is my body’s warning” [clinical] or “my brain just moves a little too 
much… and the image is more of a reminder to me…have I done this, have I not done this” 
[subclinical]). Some individuals truly denied any appraisal at all (e.g., the image was “just 
visually disgusting” or meant “nothing”). Yet, a sizeable proportion of subclinical individuals 
appeared to interpret the obsessional images in moralistically negative ways. 
Participant descriptions of moralistic self-appraisals expressed concerns such as “I am 
bad person” or “careless” (clinical), or “that I am violent, that I am angry, that I am sadistic” 
(subclinical). One individual expressed worries about repugnant images, fearing “that I was a 
bad person for thinking them…because I thought I was consciously thinking these things and 
that there was something wrong with me and that I was bad. That I couldn’t tell anyone or they 
would think I was crazy, or think I was evil” (subclinical). Concerns coded under the ‘depressed 
or anxious self’ category captured fears of being “incompetent,” whereas ‘rejected’ self-
appraisals included interpretations that “I’ve let somebody down or that I can’t be trusted …that 
I’m not dependable, I’m not loyal or things like that” (clinical). Image appraisals that consisted 
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of negative personality traits were typically of being “weak,” “stupid” (subclinical), or “that I 
don’t have the initiative, that I’m not strong, that I’m not powerful” (clinical).  
Table 20.  
Categorised Appraisals of Obsessional Images Among Interview Respondents. 
 Clinical Group 
(N = 28) 
Subclinical Group 
(N = 14) 
No Appraisal 46.4% 57.1% 
Moralistic / Dangerous Self 21.4% 42.9% 
Depressed / Anxious Self 17.9% 0% 
Negative Personality / Flawed Self 10.7% 7.1% 
Rejected Self 7.1% 14.3% 
 
 3.6 Image-related compulsions.  The vast majority of clinical and subclinical 
participants reported performing some compulsive or compensatory behaviour related to their 
intrusive images; of note, a small percentage of each group (14.3% of OCD participants and 
28.6% of subclinical) denied doing anything in relation to their images. Participant endorsements 
of image-related compensatory strategies are presented in Table 21. As with the doubt-related 
compulsions, compensatory strategies are grouped according to their temporal relation to the 
intrusive image, such that behaviours performed in response to the image (i.e., after the image) 
are labelled as reactive compulsions, whereas those completed in a preventative manner (i.e., 
before the image) are called proactive compulsions. Although participants could report both, 
neither, or one of these types of compulsion, participants invariably did not endorse a proactive 
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compulsion without a reactive compulsion, and the prevalence rate of reactive compulsions is 
thus the same as the rate of image-related compulsions in general. Additionally, as with the 
doubt-related compulsions, we did not attempt to determine whether each behaviour was 
performed repetitively past the point of functionality; instead, we considered these acts to be part 
of the repertoire of compulsions assessed to be either clinically or not significantly interfering, 
consistent with diagnostic status. 
Table 21. 
Frequency of Endorsement of Image-Related Compulsions 
 Clinical Group 
(N = 28) 
Subclinical Group 
(N = 14) 
No Compulsion 14.3% 28.6% 
Reactive Compulsion 85.7% 71.4% 
    Distract 53.6% 35.7% 
    Check repeatedly 50.0% 35.7% 
    Suppress or block image 50.0% 28.6% 
    Superimpose acceptable image 32.1% 0% 
    Reassurance (from others or for oneself) 28.6% 42.9% 
    Other reactive compulsion 28.6% 21.4% 
    Wash repeatedly 17.9% 0% 
    Reshape or correct image 10.7% 14.3% 
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Proactive Compulsion 35.7% 21.4% 
    Distract 14.3% 14.3% 
    Avoid triggers 14.3% 7.1% 
    Block image 7.1% 14.3% 
    Other proactive compulsion 14.0% 0% 
 
 Reactive image-related compulsions. Reactive compulsions in the clinical group 
included the superimposition of more acceptable images (e.g., “happy pictures of my daughter,” 
“things I like,” “visualize I’m crossing it out…it’s a big X [and] it’s wrong,” or “imagine myself 
healthy”) or a correction or reshaping of the existing image (e.g., replaying “the tape to the end 
to where I come home and it’s either just a drill that had happened or it was my neighbour that lit 
her stove on fire and it didn’t affect my unit at all”; or, imagining “my hands clean”). Other 
noted reactive image-related compulsions in the clinical group included recruiting one’s 
“husband to check” and verbal statements (“saying aloud, ‘No!’” or in one’s head, “go away,” or 
“stupid”). Yet, the most commonly reported compulsions performed in reaction to the images 
were acts that did not necessitate any such direct interaction with the image (i.e., distraction, 
suppression, or checking behaviours).  
Reactive compulsions in the subclinical group resembled those of the clinical group, with 
slightly varied distribution of endorsement and some colourful variations (e.g., reshaping the 
image by “photoshopping it, editing it, the bits and pieces I don’t like” or “maybe think of a way 
to escape”; and other acts like steering widely clear of individuals featured in intrusive images of 
harm). There was a notable absence of some strategies (superimposing acceptable images and 
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washing) and less frequent reliance on some (checking, distraction, and suppression), including 
more reports of no associated compulsion, in the subclinical group compared to the clinical OCD 
group. In fact, group differences were statistically significant for the superimposing strategy, p = 
.025, Fisher’s exact test, but not for reassurance or washing.  
Participants were also queried about their aim in performing these reactive behaviours. 
These responses covered various topics, such as to improve how they felt (“get rid of stress” or 
“make me feel better”), to stop the image (“get rid of image” or “image will go away”), to satisfy 
their obsessional concern (“done due diligence” to prevent negative outcome or ensure safety), 
and to stop the escalation of the episode (“stop cascade” or “not get caught in cycle”). Clinical 
and subclinical OCD participants alike reported generally perceiving that their reactive 
compulsions were successful at completing the noted aim (clinical mean of 6.3 and SD of 2.9, 
and subclinical mean of 6.3 and SD of 3.8).  
Proactive image-related compulsions. Proactive compulsions were significantly less 
frequently endorsed than reactive compulsions within groups, and less frequently utilised by the 
subclinical (3 individuals) than the clinical group (10 individuals). Indeed, most participants 
remarked on the fact that it was “not possible” to act proactively, as obsessional images are 
highly intrusive and difficult to anticipate. Between groups, fewer types of compulsions were 
endorsed by subclinical than clinical individuals (e.g., no preventative checks or ‘other’ 
compulsions). Refer to Table I for results. Proactive compulsions endorsed by clinical 
individuals that fall in the ‘Other’ category included checking preventatively, ordering or tidying 
objects in one’s environment, avoidance of triggers (e.g., “graphic images”) “to add less fuel to 
the fire,” or saying “NO instantly” at the first sense that an image is forming.  
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Participants spoke very frequently of their aim to simply prevent the occurrence of the 
image, with some mentions of aiming to stop the escalation of the episode (“not to go through 
the whole sadness and the whole [cycle] – all those symptoms that I mentioned”). Both groups of 
participants noted good success in accomplishing their specific proactive compulsion aim (mean 
of 6.0, SD of 2.1 in clinical OCD group, and mean of 7.2, SD of 1.9 in subclinical group). 
Frequency of image-related compulsions.  Detailed results for the frequency with which 
different types of compulsions are performed across groups are displayed in Table 22. 
Approximately half of clinical participants reported performing compulsions on a daily basis, 
both in terms of reactive and proactive compulsions. Frequency reports of subclinical 
compulsions varied quite widely (though tending to be at least multiple times a week), although 
results are likely hindered by the very small sample size. 
Table 22. 
Frequency of Image-Related Compulsions among Clinical and Subclinical Participants. 
 Reactive Compulsions  Proactive Compulsions 
 Clinical 
Group  
(N = 24) 
Subclinical 
Group 
(N = 10) 
 Clinical 
Group 
(N = 10) 
Subclinical 
Group 
(N = 3) 
Multiple times a day 16.7% 30.0%  10.0% 33.3% 
Once a day 25.0% 0%  40.0% 0% 
Two to three times a week 20.8% 40.0%  30.0% 33.3% 
Once a week 12.5% 0%  0% 0% 
Two to three times a month 4.2% 10.0%  0% 0% 
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Once a month 4.2% 0%  0% 0% 
Multiple times a year 4.2% 20.0%  20.0% 33.3% 
N.B.: As there are missing reactive compulsion data for 3 clinical participants, that column does 
not sum to 100%. 
Image-related compulsion impairment.  Although clinical and subclinical participants 
alike reported moderately low interference by the image-related compulsions (mean = 3.9, SD = 
2.6 for clinical group, and mean = 3.0, SD = 2.2 for subclinical group), there was a notable 
difference between the rated distress caused by image-related compulsions, t(34) = 6.4, p = .02, 
with clinical individuals identifying their image-provoked behaviours as significantly more 
distressing (M = 3.6, SD = 2.8) than subclinical individuals (M = 1.5, SD = 1.5). Of those 
participants endorsing compulsions, a small percentage reported actually attempting to resist 
their compulsions (29.2% of clinical and 16.7% of subclinical individuals). These participants 
reported moderate to low ability to resist their compulsions, across clinical individuals (mean = 
4.9, SD = 1.9) and subclinical individuals (mean = 3.3, SD = .4).  
 3.7 Correlates between image characteristics and OCD symptom severity.  When 
collapsed across groups using the continuous CSR data, correlational results contradicted our 
expectations. The only significant correlation was between CSR and rated distress of image-
related compulsions, r = .38, N = 36, p = .02. Additional exploration of links between image-
related compulsions and OCD symptom severity did not yield any significant correlations, 
though the relation between CSR and number of reactive compulsion categories endorsed did 
approach significance (r = .30, N = 34, p = .08). The remaining hypothesised relations between 
CSR and rated image-related distress, rated interference by the image itself, rated interference 
posed by image-related compulsions, and rated ability to resist image-related compulsions were 
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not statistically significant (r-values ranging from .03 to .32, Ns ranging from 9 to 42, p > .05). 
However, it is worth noting that our results are likely limited by low N for some variables given 







This study aimed to investigate through clinical interviews the phenomenological 
experience of obsessive-compulsive episodes in OCD, with a focus on better understanding 
obsessional phenomena, the chronological nature of events, and the unexplored or poorly 
understood areas of obsessional doubt and images. In so doing, we interviewed 44 individuals 
with a principal diagnosis of OCD (clinical OCD group), as well as 21 individuals with a mood 
and/or anxiety disorder diagnosis but subclinical symptoms of OCD (subclinical OCD group) to 
serve as a point of comparison. Analyses of their rich responses answered our three main 
research questions and will inform theoretical understanding and clinical applications in OCD. 
I. On the Chronological Structure of Obsessive-Compulsive Episodes 
 Obsessional forms. The first aim of the study was to clarify the sequential, or 
chronological, structure of the OC episode by first parsing the obsessional experience into its 
elemental building blocks (i.e., obsessional forms) and then, once clarified, determining how 
these elements interact – or not – temporally with compulsions. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first systematic exploration of obsessional forms in recent history and one of the few 
existing phenomenological studies, thus shedding new and necessary light onto the basic 
structures embedded in our CBT model. Our study findings indicated that the obsessional 
component of OC episodes are complex and dynamic experiences perhaps more accurately 
represented as an obsessional state. Episodes are typically marked by the presence of several 
obsessional forms, each of which varies in duration throughout the episode. On average, both 
groups alike reported 3 obsessional forms in the most recent OC episode, with nearly a third of 
clinical individuals reporting four forms (rarely reported by the subclinical group). In fact, it was 
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very infrequent for any individual to report only one obsessional form in the episode, which is an 
underlying and inherent assumption in current theoretical and treatment models of OCD. This is 
consistent with reports by Reed (1985) indicating that episodes consist of multiple, overlapping 
forms painting a complex picture, rather than endorsement of only one obsession. 
Moreover, the most frequently endorsed obsessional forms in these described episodes 
were not actually the three typically highlighted in the DSM (namely, verbal thoughts, images, 
and urges). Instead, the three most prevalent forms – true across clinical and subclinical 
individuals alike – were intrusive cognitions that were experienced as doubt, sensory 
phenomena, and an internal voice or narrative. Endorsement rates were high across clinical (80% 
reporting doubt, 71% sensory phenomena, and 66% internal voice) and subclinical participants 
(62% doubt, 76% sensory phenomena, and 76% internal voice). Among the obsessional forms 
noted in the DSM, images were still fairly common (endorsed by just over half of each group), 
but very few individuals reported general verbal thoughts or urges. These findings highlight the 
significance of intrusions that appear in the form of doubt, sensory phenomena, and internal 
voices or narratives. 
These prevalence rates for various obsessional forms are very much in keeping with those 
reported by Akhtar and colleagues (1975), who found relatively low endorsement rates for 
current DSM forms and a similar whopping 75% for doubt. The high prevalence rate of sensory 
phenomena is also consistent with existing study estimates of 65 to 73% in the OCD literature 
(Ferrao et al., 2012; Moritz et al., 2014). It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which these 
frequencies compare to Reed’s (1985) results, given the vastly different categories he used and 
the ambiguity regarding the boundaries of these forms (e.g., how thoughts differ from 
ruminations, how the unpopular ‘affects’ fit within our categories or are distinguished from his 
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own ‘fears’ category, etc.). Thus, these findings support existing phenomenological studies and 
offer a point of concern, as they highlight the mismatch between current clinical or conceptual 
approaches and the phenomena as it is actually experienced at ground level (by participants). 
The form that the obsession takes (e.g., doubt, image, voice, etc.) does seem to affect the 
associated distress perceived by the individual. Specifically, doubt – already most frequently 
reported in general – was most often identified as the most distressing form among clinical 
individuals, while nonclinical individuals frequently reported sensory phenomena and doubt to 
be the most distressing forms in their episodes when present. Somewhat contrary to expectations, 
given the intrusive imagery literature, obsessional images were relatively infrequently reported to 
be the most distressing form, often being ranked less distressing relative to other forms. 
Significantly, these study findings are not necessarily indicative of the distribution of obsessional 
forms across all episodes, as participants were simply asked to report on a recent episode, and it 
is unclear to what extent it was representative of their average experience. Further research is 
necessary to first replicate results, including a more exhaustive ecological sampling study to 
obtain a truer sense of the prevalence of forms across episodes. 
The OCD voice. While further discussion about doubt and images as obsessional forms 
follows below – and sensory phenomena are explored in another pocket of literature (see Ferrao 
et al., 2012) – to our knowledge, this study offers the first look into understanding the internal 
(obsessional) voice and its phenomenological qualities. From participant reports, we can glean 
that the internal voice is highly prevalent and, while distressing, is not consistently topmost in 
distressing forms (though typically in the top three). It thus has significant power in provoking 
distress but does not in large measure – by virtue of its presence – serve as a toxically distressing 
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obsessional form. Although individuals conceptualise this internal narrative in different ways 
(e.g., conversation, dialogue, etc.), it is most often described as an OCD-maintaining voice. 
The described tone of the internal OCD voice is particularly illuminating and echoes the 
brief mentions available in literature. When offered some structure within Wiggins’ interpersonal 
circumplex framework, the OCD group experienced their internal voice as a fairly objective or 
neutral (i.e., neither friendly nor hostile), yet authoritative or dominant, individual who is 
anxious and worried; about one quarter of the clinical group would experience it to some extent 
as a hostile but anxious and authoritative figure. The subclinical group were more homogeneous 
in their description, with the vast majority experiencing the OCD-provoking voice as sounding 
dominant, hostile, and anxious (“angry,” “stern,” and “accusatory”). These findings are 
consistent with those reported by O’Neill (1999), characterising the OCD voice in the case study 
as dominant and imperative (though almost to the point of threatening). They also echo Hallam 
and O’Connor’s (2002) study characterising the narratives as “voices” that seem to judge a 
person and engage them in persuasive dialogues about moral conduct.  
This difference in tone between groups is a novel finding and interesting in that a non-
hostile, dominant, anxious voice may be one that should be obeyed rather than fought, offering a 
possibility for understanding distinctions between the clinical disorder and subclinical status. 
One option is that the OCD voice evolves over time into an ego-syntonic presence in the clinical 
disorder and loses its hostile façade because the individual aligns with (or buys into) the internal 
voice as something that helps rather than hinders. This would be the opposite of the path outlined 
by Pugh (2016) in the evolution of eating anorexia. Alternatively, it may be that those 
individuals whose OCD voice is originally a neutral, dominant voice are consequently driven to 
develop OC symptoms that reach clinical significance. Indeed, it may feel hard to combat a voice 
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that sounds concerned and authoritative but objective (like a knowledgeable expert), as opposed 
to a hostile, critical voice that may be dismissed as unfair or biased and resisted easily. 
The quality of the OCD voice may have significant implications, and future research 
should explore how the internal voice – just like any other obsessional form – tends to be 
appraised by individuals. Models of auditory hallucinations suggest that the distress linked to 
those voices is related not to intensity or content of voices but the appraisals held by the 
individual. Rather counterintuitively, voices that individuals perceive to be benevolent are more 
likely to be engaged with, provoking greater distress, than those perceived to be malevolent or 
omnipotent (which are resisted; Pugh, 2016). Indeed, Hallam and O’Connor (2002) posit that 
compulsions and their associated distress are more intimately linked to and driven by the power 
of the narrative than by traditional ‘catastrophic misinterpretations’ or appraisals. More detailed 
and targeted explorations of the internal OCD voice can further clarify aspects of the experience. 
OC episode timeline. Our phenomenological, interview-based exploration of the 
chronological structure of the OC episode is also, to our knowledge, the first of its kind and adds 
to existing attempts to elucidate the longitudinal, temporal relationship between obsessions and 
compulsions. We found that the manner in which these obsessional elements are arranged 
sequentially amongst themselves (i.e., other obsessional forms) appears to present a fairly diffuse 
picture, but there is marked consistency in how they interact with compulsive acts. 
Chronologically speaking, the obsessional form that clinical individuals become aware of first 
(i.e., most frequently detected first) is the internal voice; as the OCD voice narrates the 
symptom-provoking stance, this finding perhaps explains the heavy focus on verbal cognitions 
within current models and treatment. The internal voice is also frequently endorsed as the initial 
form for subclinical individuals, but sensory phenomena were more commonly reported to 
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appear first, in keeping with their sense of distress. There was fairly even endorsement (16-19%) 
between three other forms (image, doubt, and sensory phenomena) for the clinical group; only 
doubt in the subclinical group approached this level of frequency (14%). 
Yet, the average duration of obsessional forms (measured in terms of the proportion of 
the entire episode length it is present) varied somewhat between clinical and subclinical groups. 
When present in the episode, all obsessional forms are fairly persistent in clinical individuals, 
lasting on average at least 40% of the episode, with nearly all forms extending through most of 
the OC episode (≥50%). By contrast, the distribution of durations in the subclinical group was 
split, with either very brief experiences of the obsessional form (15-25% for verbal thoughts and 
images) or markedly persistent states (over 60% of the episode length). Significantly, it appears 
that doubt and the internal voice are consistently enduring obsessional forms across both groups, 
lasting approximately 70% and 60% of the episode, respectively. The ‘Other’ category, most 
often capturing diffuse affect or fear, though infrequently endorsed, was similarly long lasting 
across clinical and subclinical individuals (70%). Reports differed on the sensory phenomena 
front, which occupied approximately half of clinical episodes but the majority of subclinical. It is 
conceivable then that clinically significant episodes differ from subclinical not in the number of 
forms experienced but in the extent to which the forms endure in the episode. Importantly, these 
results highlight that among those meeting diagnostic criteria, OC episodes are marked by 
layered and overlapping obsessional forms which may stop and start across the episode but do 
not appear one at a time. This may compound distress by virtue of their entwined nature. 
 Participants were also asked to reflect on what form seemed to predominate in the 
episode, in order to assess their subjective experience of the most overwhelming, dominant, 
and/or distressing aspect of the episode. Results echoed the duration and distress findings, with 
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both groups noting doubt and internal voice as predominant forms, with the even more frequent 
report of sensory phenomena in the subclinical group. Of note, the persistent ‘Other’ category is 
not mentioned anywhere. Thus, regardless of the self-reported persistence of individual forms, 
the subjective experience of predominating obsessional forms align with distress and duration 
ratings, once again highlighting the significance of doubt and internal voice across groups, as 
well as sensory phenomena in subclinical individuals. 
 Thus, obsessional states are complex and dynamic experiences even before compulsions 
enter the equation; once present in the episode, compulsions also overlapped with the obsessional 
forms for nearly all participants. That is, the vast majority of all participants stated that at least 
one obsessional form appeared concurrently with part or all of the compulsive act. Some 
participants detailed how the presence of the obsessional forms during the compulsive act 
contributed to the urge to repeat the compulsion or fuelled the need to perseverate with the 
compulsive behaviour.  
Moreover, nearly all participants – clinical and subclinical alike – reported that elements 
of their obsessional forms extended beyond the conclusion of compulsive acts (sometimes 
specifically after any one iteration of the compulsion). This occurred sometimes when the entire 
obsessional form began anew, prompting a full repetition of the compulsion (e.g., a voice that 
intrudes after an attempt at cleaning and prompts further cleaning again). At other times, there 
was simply a continuation of the obsession that exceeded the length of the compulsive act and 
thus continued to fuel repetitions of the compulsion (checking, washing, etc.).  
Together, these findings suggest that obsessions and compulsions are significantly more 
dynamic and interlinked than the CBT model currently assumes, with compulsions overlapping 
temporally with obsessional forms, obsessions extending beyond the completion of a 
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compulsion, and even obsessions initiating anew after a compulsion has concluded. This is true 
of clinical and subclinical participants alike. Specifically, these results contradict the sequential 
and mutually exclusive or chronological manner in which current treatment models and theories 
portray OC phenomena.  
These findings support the goal-directed model, as participant descriptions clearly 
indicate that obsessions provoke compulsions longitudinally. It is unclear whether elements of 
the descriptions can be interpreted as supporting the reciprocal model, as the doubt findings and 
descriptions of obsessional doubt content that transpire after the compulsion may possibly offer 
support for habit-driven model sequencing. Specifically, while we have examples of obsessions 
that onset or arose after the initiation and/or completion of compulsions, we did not inquire as to 
whether these were causally linked, or if the compulsion influenced in some way the onset of the 
obsession. It is entirely possible that obsessions would have recurred on their own in time, 
completely independent of the occurrence or presence of compulsions in the cycle. Additionally, 
it is worth noting that not all acts after which these individuals reported doubt are necessarily 
compulsive in the defined sense (i.e., repetitively done or performed in a way that surpasses its 
function), as this level of distinction was not assessed in our study. Moreover, this level of proof 
is not evident in other obsessional forms. Further research can clarify these points. 
These outcomes also challenge the idea that the episode terminates at the end of the 
compulsion, like one neat cycle of obsessional thought producing a compulsive act that 
terminates the episode. Indeed, the dynamic nature of the obsessive-compulsive state may be 
better depicted as a whack-a-mole like experience or multi-pronged, like the mythological Hydra 
with its many, ever-generating heads. These analogies highlight the extent to which such a 
layered and iterative experience may be chaotic, distressing, and difficult to combat.  
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How then do episodes terminate? Only one quarter of clinical participants reported that 
their OC episodes ended at the conclusion of the compulsion (as current thinking would imply), 
with an even smaller 10% of the subclinical group reporting the same. Instead, the majority of 
individuals relied most on the obsessional forms or the obsessional experience subsiding as an 
indicator that the episode was over. This criterion encompassed statements such as, “I didn’t 
think about it again”; “everything was (all the doubt and thoughts were) gone, evaporated”; 
intrusions “stopped”; the internal voice because “quieter” than other thoughts so s/he could focus 
on other things. The use of internal feelings as criteria to know the episode was over was also 
frequently reported, though this transpired to a lesser extent. Such internal feelings used to 
determine that the episode was determined were most frequently described as “relief,” a 
“release,” a “psychological exhale,” sense of being “done with this,” “it’s okay” feeling, sense of 
being “right,” and a sense of “just know[ing]” it was clean. Chi-square test results indicated no 
significant difference between groups, though it is tempting to wonder whether clinical 
respondents grow to rely less on the obsessional experience subsiding as a termination criterion 
and more on other categories (completion of compulsion, internal feelings). 
In describing their termination criteria, respondents struggled to report exactly the 
number of criteria at which their threshold for concluding the episode was met; instead, they 
tended to describe their experience just prior to and at the end of the episode. We were able to 
code the number of categories respondents used, which did not differ between groups at just over 
one criterion endorsed. Our study thus did not support the findings by Wahl and colleagues 
(2008) which found that individuals with OCD use more criteria to terminate their OC episodes. 
Rather, these findings suggest that they tend to persist with compulsions and/or struggle with 
obsessional distress until they achieve their particular termination criteria of choice.  
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In OC episodes, then, people do not tend to rely on cues from their compulsions to 
determine that their episode has ended. Instead, they rely heavily on obsessional cues and require 
input from their obsessional experience and/or some other subjective feeling to know that it has 
ended. More research is needed to clarify how they choose these criteria and whether this 
evolves over time as diagnostic status changes, or if the strategy remains static across time, 
ultimately driving clinical status. Moreover, it is unclear at this time whether the episode persists 
because of a threshold issue (i.e., the level at which the termination criterion is met is simply too 
high to be perceived for some time) or if it is a difficulty in achieving a very normal threshold 
(i.e., the level at which the termination criterion is appropriate, but the individual cannot access 
or does not feel confident in it for some time).  
The chronology of the OC episode requires further attention, and additional research will 
be required to concretely confirm whether the reciprocal model of OCD is the best fit (as 
opposed to the consistently supported goal directed model) and how bidirectional relations might 
affect treatment. These results also suggest the need to at least include these dynamic relations in 
the CBT model, both within the obsessional state (i.e., between obsessional forms) and between 
obsessions and compulsions. This more involved interplay between OCD phenomena, 
specifically the recurring nature of obsessional forms within an episode itself and their power in 
provoking perseveration and repetitions of a compulsive behaviour even after its conclusion, is 
likely currently being overlooked. This would help inform how the episode – and furthermore 
the disorder – is maintained. Significantly, we lack some significant pieces of information, 




II. On Obsessional Doubt 
The second aim of this study was to understand how doubt is experienced, appraised, and 
neutralised by individuals with OCD. To the best of our knowledge, this exploration was the first 
attempt to define doubt in the obsessive-compulsive experience by interviewing individuals on 
their lived experiences. This has enabled us to operationalise OCD doubt using a bottom-up 
approach, that is, driven by descriptive data from participants themselves, rather than a top-down 
approach, hypothesised and arbitrarily settled upon by researchers. These novel insights stand 
apart from the existing literature, which reveals a scattered landscape, in which researchers 
conceptualised and therefore tested their own definitions of doubt in silo-like fashion without 
directly exploring the phenomenology of obsessional doubt among individuals with OCD.   
Doubt characteristics. From participant descriptions, it is clear that doubt is so prevalent 
that it is experienced by nearly all individuals with OC symptoms at some point across their life, 
subclinical and clinical alike. Moreover, for those who endorsed having experienced OCD doubt 
at some point, it appears to occur in the vast majority of their OC episodes, thus continuing to 
exert its distressing and interfering presence. This doubt is difficult to dismiss, highly real and 
convincing in the moment – even though the individual recognises it to be excessive – and 
almost always anxiety-provoking. The manner in which the doubt manifests across groups is also 
varied, predominantly being experienced verbally, like a stream of thoughts, and even a sensory 
experience in the body. While the strongly verbal presentation might be tempting to subsume 
under verbal thoughts and/or the internal voice, it is important to note that doubt was identified 
by individuals as a form distinct from both of these forms (and was queried about and thus 
endorsed after them). The strongly verbal presentation of this obsessional doubt – albeit often 
more complexly accompanied by other sensory experiences – can be understood as perhaps part 
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of the format in which this obsessional form appears. It is also possible that the highly verbal or 
storytelling way in which we inquired about this experience – and in which people often make 
sense of experience – may colour this endorsement. 
In our experience interviewing participants, OCD doubt is an elusive phenomenon that 
requires significant insight and/or emotional awareness by the individual to pinpoint and 
describe, even when guided clinically by a knowledgeable interviewer, further explaining why 
experimental tests of the concept struggle to shed a light on the lived experience and/or coalesce 
with other experimental studies. Significantly, a fascinating clinical presentation of doubt is as a 
“felt knowledge” (i.e., a drawn inference that arrives, complete and convincingly, that for 
instance the door is not locked or the stove is not turned off), which might make it more 
powerful and difficult to combat, much like the authoritative but neutral internal voice.  
Definition of OCD doubt and its content. The content of the doubt as identified by the 
individuals themselves – i.e., what they consider their doubt to be about – is fairly diverse, 
encompassing various themes or domains. The three coded categories we identified seem to 
capture a wide range of content, and thus comprise our definition of OCD doubt. Specifically, 
obsessional doubt encompasses doubt about one’s safety status or the state of things (i.e., did I 
lock the door or do the task? Is it clean?), whether one’s actions were done properly enough to 
avert harm (i.e., did I lock the door properly or well enough?), and ultimately one’s senses or 
cognitive capacity (i.e., I remember doing it, but can I trust that my senses are or my memory is 
correct?). We conceptualise the first doubt content domain as typically provoking an initial 
compulsive behaviour, with the latter two content domains perhaps explaining perseveration 
(i.e., repetitions and several iterations) of a completed compulsive behaviour. 
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The far-reaching nature of these three themes that thus define obsessional doubt may 
explain why researchers have captured such a scattered, yet often fruitful, landscape in 
researching OCD doubt. Indeed, many of the doubt literature pockets reviewed in our 
introduction can be identified as falling within or across our identified doubt content categories. 
Our first identified category, regarding one’s safety status, seems to subsume well the literature 
investigating doubt as an obsessional content domain or topic (e.g., utilising the YBOCS item, 
“was I responsible for something terrible happening?”). Papers factor analysing the YBOCS thus 
target this type of doubt (e.g., Pinto et al., 2007). Our domain further broadens the scope, 
extending beyond the range of harm-related doubt and adding state-related concerns from other 
obsessional content domains to it (e.g., am I contaminated? Am I clean? Is the door locked?). 
This doubt category likely also captures the inferential confusion research by O’Connor and 
colleagues (O’Connor et al., 2005; Aardema et al., 2009; etc.), which focuses on the individual’s 
distrust of reality (e.g., the door has been locked) in favour of hypothetical, even improbable, 
dangers (e.g., the door is unlocked). This doubt domain would identify the type of content that 
the inferential confusion research would explain mechanistically. 
Doubt about having completed a task satisfactorily or properly enough, sometimes even 
in the face of clear and accurate memories, captures our second category. This section appears to 
incorporate the literature exploring doubt as an obsessional or compulsive form, taken across 
content domains, like those identified by Akhtar and colleagues (difficulty believing that a task 
had been achieved to satisfaction; 1975) and Stern and Cobb (‘striving for completeness’ due to 
doubt the activity had been completed correctly; 1978). These researchers conceptualised this 
doubt slightly differently, with the former considering it an obsessional concern and the latter as 
related to a compulsive form. This does call to question the extent to which the first two doubt 
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categories have different associations and consequences, as the former is most likely to precede 
and the latter more likely to follow a compulsive behaviour. 
Our last category established from the data, namely doubt about one’s senses, memory, or 
cognitive capacity (i.e., I have a memory of doing it, but I cannot trust my senses, memory, or 
attention) may encapsulate the literature related to the Seeking Proxies for Internal States model, 
namely that individuals doubt their internal states (emotions, memory, bodily states, etc.) to such 
an extent, due to poor access to the information, that it provokes their OCD symptoms. It is also 
consistent with Nestadt and colleagues’ (2016) conceptualisation of doubt regarding internal 
experiences, although his definition of OCD doubt is firmly embedded in the decision-making 
deficit research. Marton and colleagues’ (2019) Doubt Questionnaire is thus a measure of this 
specific domain of OCD doubt. Meanwhile, the literature linking OCD doubt to pervasive 
indecisiveness is likely better conceptualised as a product or outcome of this doubt. That is, the 
indecisiveness is a behavioural – perhaps at times cognitive – indicator of one of these doubt 
domains.   
The metamemory literature as it has evolved over time does appear to encompass these 
three doubt themes, albeit with a sole focus on doubt about checking behaviours. While it 
appears to have begun with a focus on having checked or checked well enough (i.e., our first two 
categories), it has now extended into a putative mechanism around doubting one’s memory, the 
products of which (checked repeatedly) further fuel the doubt. It thus reflects well the three ways 
in which we would define OCD doubt within the specific symptom domain of checking (e.g., 
Radomsky et al., 2014) that could conceivably and easily be extended to the domain of 
contamination / washing. This begins to support the conceptualisation of obsessional doubt as an 
obsessional form that provokes compulsions and can appear across various content domains. 
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Curiously, the questions asked on the YBOCS for the pathological doubt item (Goodman 
et al., 1989) and utilised in the phenomenological study by Samuels and colleagues (2017) 
almost perfectly parallel our categories. Of note, our content domains were independently arrived 
at, as this paper was found in a review of the literature only after we had coded our data. The 
YBOCS item, which is not typically in use, is comprised of three questions which cover exactly 
our three domains in a slightly different order: “After you complete an activity, do you doubt 
whether you performed it correctly? Do you doubt whether you did it at all? When carrying out 
routine activities, did you feel you didn’t trust your senses (i.e., what you see, hear, or touch)?” 
(Samuels et al., p. 119). While this captures a broader scope than the metamemory literature, as it 
allows for doubt of activities beyond checking, our conceptualisation offers an even greater 
scope. Our definition allows for this three-pronged doubt of more abstract concerns, such as 
one’s or an object’s state of being (e.g., clean or contaminated) and character or identity (e.g., 
immoral thoughts of a sexual or blasphemous nature). Might this obsessional doubt that people 
describe then be a multi-layered state that mimics other types of obsessional forms, in terms of 
appraisals and compulsions? 
Doubt appraisals. Compellingly, obsessional doubt does apparently evoke feared self-
beliefs and threaten specific aspects of their sense of self. Reportedly, this OCD doubt led 
individuals who experienced it to believe primarily that their moral self-worth is compromised or 
at risk (e.g., I am a monster or danger to others, as endorsed by over half of each group). The 
doubt itself is personally threatening, and it is often deemed as indicating that they are a bad, 
careless, or immoral person. These doubt appraisals are particularly powerful, as the threat 
behind them feels realistic and frightening; the worst-case scenario that participants reported as 
ensuing from doubt content, should it turn out to be true, was rated as highly likely in the heat of 
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the moment and maximally catastrophic if accurate. It is perhaps no surprise then that 
participants would find this obsessional doubt distressing and interfering, as previously 
described, and feel motivated to end the experience, disprove the content, or negate the appraisal. 
The ‘moralistic self’ focus is also consistent with existing literature highlighting the sensitive 
nature of the moral construct in one’s sense of self among individuals with OCD (see Bhar & 
Kyrios, 2007; Doron et al., 2008). 
Other self-appraisals were noted in this sample, with a small percentage endorsing 
symptom-related interpretations of the self (i.e., as reflecting a hopeless, fearful, ‘depressed or 
anxious self’). This area of self-concept focus is more typically associated with anxious controls 
(Lipton et al., 2010) but was still associated with a good portion of OCD doubt respondents, 
likely reflecting the overlapping anxiety experiences and processes. Fewer than 20% endorsed a 
‘rejected self’ appraisal; very few endorsed ‘flawed self’ interpretations, consistent with the 
general understanding that a flawed self or “negative personality” appraisal is more typically 
associated with non-anxious control participants. The diverse endorsement is somewhat 
surprising although it does highlight the heterogeneity of the disorder and the importance of 
working within each individual’s idiosyncratic belief and appraisal system. It is unfortunately not 
possible to compare the proportions of each category against those of the Ferrier and Brewin 
(2005) study population, as they did not tabulate the appraisals by self-related categories. 
However, these doubt appraisal findings echoed almost exactly the results by Lipton and 
colleagues (2010) on intrusive image appraisals in OCD, further adding support to the idea that 
doubt might fit well among the obsessional forms, given its similar appraisal patterns with the 
image form appraisals. 
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Across the board, distribution of appraisal categories was nearly identical between the 
clinical and subclinical group, rather contrary to the idea that it is the catastrophic interpretation 
that gives it clinical significance. The interpretations from intrusive doubt thus do not differ 
between those meeting and those not meeting the diagnostic threshold; rather obsessional doubt 
is consistently compelling in a personally appraised way, and differences in clinical status likely 
originate elsewhere in doubt-related phenomena. It is unclear whether this suggests that we did 
not appropriately measure or investigate an aspect of the appraisal experience that would have 
differentiated the two groups. Alternatively, this may simply reflect that the self-appraisals 
underlying doubt serve as a necessary stepping stone to the disorder (e.g., a stop on the train 
prior to reaching clinical status) and it is thus some other characteristics or process that moves an 
individual along the dimension or continuum from non-clinical to clinical OCD status. 
It is worth noting that approximately 10% of each group denied any self-appraisal, and it 
is unclear whether this reflects poor insight, defensiveness, unwillingness to disclose negative 
self-beliefs, or true lack of appraisal. We are mindful of the fact that this was the first and last 
point of contact for participants completing the study, and that the lack of appraisal reported in a 
more established therapeutic relationship or longstanding alliance may more accurately reflect 
such an obsessional phenomenon that would exist outside the CBT model. Further research will 
clarify this aspect. 
Doubt-related compulsions. As we expected, obsessional doubt provoked all individuals 
to perform compulsive behaviours in reaction to the doubt and, moreover, compelled most to act 
proactively to prevent the experience. It appears that both groups show high frequency of 
checking in response to doubt, and subclinical individuals for reassurance seeking, but the 
remaining reactive compulsion categories were well distributed for clinical individuals. It is 
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difficult to determine if the significant difference between groups on washing behaviours (and 
the near significance of doubt suppression) may be due to our small subclinical N and therefore 
the limited scope of their reported doubt content. If, however, this remains consistent in a larger 
sample, it would rather suggest that wash-provoking doubt is a clinical phenomenon and that the 
doubt suppression strategy is specific to the clinical group.  
It is fascinating to note that the subclinical group trended toward relying more on 
reassurance seeking than clinical individuals. It is unclear whether strategies implemented more 
frequently by subclinical individuals are actually more effective strategies, allowing them to 
remain at subclinical status, or if clinical individuals have attempted them but discontinued their 
use due to lack of success (i.e., it fails at more intense or frequent levels). Perhaps the more 
illuminating insights will come from more detailed exploration of strategies reported in one 
group but not at all in the other. Alternatively, it may be that the specific type of strategy used is 
not significant in achieving respite or relief from doubt so much as it is about what the strategy 
symbolises or what fears it quells. Support for this notion comes from the fact that rated success 
of compensatory strategies in subclinical individuals is not significantly higher than that of 
clinical individuals’ rated success. However, it should be noted that respondents were asked 
specifically to rate success in getting rid of the doubt, which presupposes that doubt removal is 
their aim. It may be that individuals have other goals (e.g., relief from distress, or achieving 
some other feeling) rather than getting rid of the doubt, for which these strategies prove more 
successful or for which they perform other acts.  
Significantly, the participants taught us that a strategy often used to prevent doubt is to 
simply complete a more careful or slower initial behaviour (e.g., check, wash, lock, etc.) in hopes 
that certainty will be achieved and persist. As we did not directly query all participants about this 
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strategy, it is possible that more individuals rely on the strategy but neglected to mention it; our 
findings thus do not constitute true endorsement rates for this strategy, and we are similarly 
unable to make statistical comparisons between groups. Yet, this meticulous action warrants 
further investigation to determine whether this is an effective strategy and whether the manner in 
which it is performed may minimise the doubting experience or restrict OCD severity to 
subclinical levels. Another important question to clarify whether the habit-driven hypothesis is 
valid – rendering the reciprocal model the best fit for OCD – is whether such proactive 
compulsions ever arise before an OC episode even begins. That is, if a pre-emptive action meant 
to prevent doubt – habitual, perhaps, in nature – does in fact provoke a full iteration of an 
obsessional state and compensatory compulsions. This would support the reciprocal model in its 
truest form. Further exploration of doubt-based compensatory strategies performed by 
individuals, their aim in performing such behaviours, and their perceived success in 
accomplishing that goal is needed. 
Lastly, perhaps a clue in the clinical vs subclinical divide lies in the significant difference 
between groups in their compulsions, specifically those performed in response to doubt. While 
proactive compulsions appear to take place at a similar frequency, the highly frequent reactive 
behaviours may betray any or all of the following in clinical individuals: (1) a higher frequency 
with which obsessional doubt intrudes, (2) more ineffective compensatory strategies, which 
allow doubt to persist and necessitate repetition of compulsions, (3) a lower doubt threshold at 
which the individual feels compelled to react with a compensatory strategy, and/or (4) a more 




The fact that the clinical group find their compulsions significantly more interfering and 
more difficult to resist than the subclinical group, in spite of their comparable ratings of 
obsession-specific distress, indicates that the struggle may lie not in one’s experience of 
obsessional doubt or one’s appraisal of it but in one’s strategies in responding to the obsessional 
phenomenon. Indeed, significant correlations between OCD symptom severity and numerous 
doubt compulsion-related characteristics – namely, greater rated interference of compulsions, 
worse ability to resist compulsions, greater number of reactive compulsion categories endorsed, 
and less success in achieving proactive compulsions – further supports this notion that 
obsessional doubt is interfering through its compensatory strategies. 
Further research will be vital in clarifying the difference between compulsions or 
compensatory strategies utilised by those with clinical vs subclinical levels of OCD 
symptomatology. Specifically, are those with subthreshold OCD simply able to establish a sense 
of certainty through their pre-emptive or proactive strategies, assuaging their doubt? Do they 
simply have “tidier” or more effective compulsive behaviours? Consider the compulsion parsing 
studies that found OCD compulsions to look almost messier (i.e., shared acts with controls with 
several chains of unique acts interspersed) – is it possible then that messy sections of 
compensatory strategies degrade rather than facilitate certainty?  
Termination of doubt.  Groups differed somewhat in the criteria involved in the end of 
their doubt. Specifically, clinical individuals most often noted their doubt as ending when the 
compulsion was completed, whereas subclinical participants reported that doubt terminated by 
subsiding or simply going away (e.g., retreating into the background buzz). A good portion of 
each of these categories was still endorsed by the other group. This is a fascinating divide, as it 
would rather support the fourth proposed explanation for the reactive compulsion frequency 
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results. Namely, in spite of somewhat similar reported characteristics regarding its distress and 
meaning, it is possible that something about the doubt experience or the individual’s own traits in 
subclinical individuals renders their obsessional doubt a phenomenon that can terminate by just 
subsiding without behavioural intervention. It is unclear whether this is a matter of: a less 
powerful or intractable doubt experience in subclinical participants (on a characteristic we did 
not measure) that permits this subsidence, greater individual ability to tolerate the experience 
(letting it thus extinguish gradually in a way clinical participants cannot withstand), or superior 
doubt-related strategy that when compromised contributes to clinical status. Further research will 
be necessary to clarify this matter. 
Of interest, termination criteria for obsessional doubt appear to be distinguishable from 
overall episode termination criteria. For one, there is minimal endorsement of using an internal 
feeling or sense to know that the doubt has ended, compared to the episode in general. For 
another, there is significantly greater mention of compulsion involvement in the obsessional 
doubt form but not the whole episode. Consistent across both sets of termination criteria is the 
focus on intrusive experiences subsiding or going away. These initial findings seem to indicate 
that the experience of the full episode – and efforts to terminate it – is qualitatively different and 
separate from its most distressing and persistent obsessional form alone. Specifically, methods to 
terminate doubt do not necessarily align with methods to terminate the episode. Rather, it is 
likely the case that with its many dynamic parts, the OC episode is a complex and moving target 
that is more than the sum of its parts, let alone an obsession and subsequent compulsion. This 
complexity is not accounted for within the model and may explain why current treatments – 
which are based on a simpler model – seem often not to resolve the distress and/or perseverative 
drive behind current episodes. 
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Conclusions about doubt. Results of the first study aim illuminated how the obsessional 
doubt form is situated within the broader OC episode and relative to other obsessional forms. 
Specifically, doubt is powerful, often rated as the most distressing, most pervasive, and longest 
lasting among the forms. In the second study aim, we closely investigated the OCD doubt 
experience on its own and found that it presents in varied forms but is a nearly ubiquitous, 
distressing, compelling, cognitive (thought-based) and viscerally felt (involving bodily senses) 
phenomenon. When defined by individuals themselves, OCD doubt includes concern about one’s 
safety status (Is it locked?), as well as uncertainty about how properly a task was executed (Did I 
lock it properly?) and one’s senses or cognitive functioning (Can I trust my memory of locking it 
or my senses when I did it?). These discriminations may be important, because they may offer 
increasingly greater individual responsibility for any possible negative outcome. This 
obsessional doubt is highly convincing, interfering, and often interpreted in ways that threaten 
their moralistic sense of self, prompting compensatory strategies in response to doubt and often 
prior to it arising. 
Significant parallels and similarities exist between clinical and subclinical doubting 
experiences, but aspects of doubt-related compulsions appear to reliably discriminate between 
the two. Indeed, clinical individuals differ from subclinical on some strategies used, frequency 
with which they perform reactive compulsive behaviours, and even possibly reliance on 
compulsion completion as a termination criterion. Compulsive strategies are also intimately 
connected to doubt-related interference, including direct ratings of elevated interference as well 
as significant correlations between symptom severity and several compulsion-related 
characteristics (e.g., ability to resist them, failure to achieve the aims of doubt-preventing 
behaviours, etc.). It may thus be that the experience of doubt as an obsessional phenomenon is 
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fairly consistent between clinical and subclinical status, but that elements around individuals’ 
strategies in response to or in an attempt to prevent doubt contribute to or arise out of differences 
between the two groups.  
The metamemory literature (e.g., Radomsky et al., 2014) offers an explanation for how 
compulsive behaviours – especially those that are repeated – may ironically further drive doubt 
and maintain or perpetuate the OCD cycle. It is possible that this process may apply to other 
compulsive behaviours, with frequent compulsions or rehearsal of one’s memory further 
reducing the vividness of one’s memory for and consequently one’s confidence in that which is 
being doubted (e.g., contaminated or clean status, completed behaviours, memory, etc.). If this is 
the case, treatment efforts should be focused at breaking this cycle and attempts to increase 
certainty and/or tolerate uncertainty. More detailed discussion about intervention efforts follows. 
 Further research will need to replicate and further extend these findings. On a qualitative 
note, there was such variability in some aspects of the obsessional doubt experience that it is 
hardly surprising that the literature is in a state of disrepair. Even when one trained clinician 
attempted to collect information in a fairly standardised way, different participants spoke about 
doubt in very different ways, and it was evident at times that the variability made it difficult to 
use one overall statistic to capture a specific element of the picture (e.g., doubt duration). 
Nevertheless, participants did readily endorse experiencing doubt and further identified it as such 
a significant and distressing element of their obsessional experience that it warrants further 
investigation. 
III. On Obsessional Images 
The third aim of this study was to clarify how obsessional images are experienced and 
appraised by individuals in OCD, and what individuals feel compelled to do preventatively or in 
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response to the intrusions. This interview-based study allowed us to explore OCD images in a 
more rigorous, detailed, and phenomenologically-rich manner than most existing studies. We 
were able to implement clinician judgment, focused pre-interview screening for OCD diagnostic 
status, recruitment of participants with all obsessional forms (not simply images), use of 
subclinical participants for comparison, and detailed inquiry about all aspects of the intrusive 
image phenomenon and its associations.  
Image characteristics. Our findings suggest that obsessional images are highly prevalent 
experiences, both across clinical and subclinical individuals and across obsessive-compulsive 
episodes (when experiencing OCD symptoms, images were present over half of the time). 
However, the lifetime prevalence of images revealed in our study is lower than the 81-95% 
reported in the few existing studies on OCD images (Lipton et al., 2010; Speckens et al., 2007). 
It may be that image-focused papers have thus far yielded an overestimate of image prevalence 
estimates due to self-selection biases in the recruitment phase of OCD image studies. In 
couching this exploration within a broader phenomenological study, our findings of roughly 65% 
represent a more accurate estimate of the phenomenon. The existing studies of OCD images, 
advertised as in-lab interviews about images, may be vulnerable to inflated prevalence statistics, 
as individuals who do not experience obsessional images may simply decline to participate in a 
study about which they know themselves to have no information. Of note, prevalence estimates 
were nearly equivalent between clinical and subclinical groups, lending further support to the 
notion that intrusive images, like any other obsessional thought, are a common experience on a 
dimensional scale – not exclusive to individuals with OCD – that in certain individuals leads to 
the development and/or maintenance of OCD.  
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As expected, images were visual, colourful, often video-like in nature, anxiety-
provoking, and distressing, much like those specified by Lipton and colleagues (2010) and 
Speckens and colleagues (2007). Clinical individuals’ images were significantly more vivid than 
subclinical individuals’ images. Most images were noted to be seen from a field perspective, 
with percentage endorsements matching closely results by Speckens and colleagues (2007), 
which are less dichotomised than Lipton and colleagues (2010). Yet, the images were notably 
brief across both groups (85% reported a duration of one minute or less and over half of 
respondents described images that lasted mere seconds), suggesting that images pack an 
emotional punch in what they represent, rather than distress simply from its ongoing presence. 
One clinical individual did appear to be an outlier, reporting an hours-long image that persisted 
continuously, which no subclinical respondent did, though subclinical OCD individuals did 
report images of more intermediate duration (2 to 15 minutes). 
Reported image content domains were narrower in subclinical than clinical participants, 
though the vast majority of both groups reported experiencing intrusive images that portrayed 
harm or aggressive outcomes (86% of subclinical individuals and 68% of clinical respondents, 
similar to the 75% estimated by Lipton and colleagues [2010]). Contamination-related images 
were reported by a good portion of clinical individuals (28.6%) but by very few subclinical 
participants (7.7%); the remaining categories were endorsed by few participants across groups 
(or none, as in the case of social rejection images in subclinical individuals). These content 
distributions thus tell us that the vast majority of images inherently convey some implied threat 
of harm or unwanted outcome in the manifestation of the form itself. 
In consequence, images are complex emotional stimuli, as previously reported (Lipton et 
al., 2010), triggering more than anxiety alone – in fact, among clinical individuals, images 
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frequently provoke difficult moral emotions (specifically, guilt and shame) and sadness. There 
was a near consensus among participants that anxiety was associated with intrusive images; 
similarly, (nearly) equivalent proportions of respondents endorsed shame (one-third) and disgust 
(<15%) with their images, which may explain why images are not often voluntarily or 
spontaneously disclosed. Significantly, clinical participants stood apart in their uniquely strong 
endorsement of sadness and image-provoked guilt and anger.  
Some phenomenological qualities in this study differed from those reported in the few 
existing studies of clinical participants. Considerably more of our participants tended to report 
images that appeared as videos rather than still photos, and even fewer still noted experiencing 
images in the form of series of photos. This finding differs somewhat from Speckens and 
colleagues (2007), who found nearly equivalent reports of video and snapshots of photos, a 
finding more consistent with our subclinical group. 
This study also revealed novel aspects of OCD images, such as the fact that obsessional 
images in the clinical group most often seemed to be created from a mix of fictional material and 
memories, while those in the subclinical group were split evenly between a mix and pure fiction. 
This most closely echoes findings by Lipton and colleagues (2010) that 70% of participants with 
OCD connected their recurrent image to a memory or an earlier event, although even more of the 
anxious control group reported the same. As we know from imagery literature, connections to 
actual memories, besides serving as threatening reminders of incidents that have happened in the 
past, allow images to provoke more intense emotional experiences by drawing from emotions of 
the lived experiences from which the images draw their fragments. As such, memory-based or 
associated images may drive individuals to feel additionally compelled to react or act. It is worth 
noting that it is difficult to know whether the images are originally formed using snippets of 
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one’s memory (i.e., organically, upon first appearance), or whether the individual makes this 
association as it takes on personal significance, evolving the image over time.  
It also appears that clinical and subclinical respondents experience images in slightly 
different temporal perspectives – nearly half of clinical participants experience their image in the 
present tense (happening “now”) whereas nearly half of subclinical individuals report 
experiencing it in the future tense. Few individuals reported images as feeling like they occur in 
the past. The heightened present focus in clinical respondents’ images may explain the greater 
vividness, the slightly different emotional reactions, and the greater difficulty in letting the image 
be without performing some compulsion. It may be that the experience of the image currently 
happening (temporally oriented in the present) or, to a lesser degree, imminently about to happen 
(future-based), renders the threat of the image into something that is more powerful. Such 
imagined events may provoke similar affective reactions to the real event and lead the individual 
to feel it is more likely to happen. Further research will need to replicate this finding and clarify 
more accurately the temporal perspective associated with the images (past, present, or future 
focus). 
Moreover, instead of persisting in one continuous manner, obsessional images are 
repetitive experiences, returning for nearly 6 recurrences within an episode. One clinical 
individual did appear to be an outlier, reporting an hours-long image that persisted continuously, 
which no subclinical respondent did, though subclinical OCD individuals did report images of 
more intermediate duration (2 to 15 minutes). The consistently visual nature of images, with 
frequent accompaniment of auditory and tactile sensations, shed light on the very physically felt 
sense of intrusive images and may help researchers understand why images are difficult to 
ignore. Additionally, tactile sensations in images were unexpectedly a larger part of subclinical 
192 
 
images than clinical images. It may be that individuals with OCD have greater difficulty 
accessing physical senses as one of their internal states, as observed in studies conducted by 
Lazarov and colleagues (2012), and this deficit is particularly noticeable because of the 
frequency of tactile sensations in images.  
Image appraisals. Indeed, exploration of image appraisals yielded interesting findings 
that differed from those of Lipton and colleagues (2010). The fact that the most highly endorsed 
category was one of no appraisal, with participants denying any type of self-related interpretation 
as a result of viewing the images, contradicted our expectations. These individuals who tended to 
view the images as a warning, safety precaution, or reminder, denied that the content or its 
related worst case scenario would indicate anything about their sense of self or reflect in any 
manner on their being. Moralistic self concerns were next most highly endorsed, consistent with 
our predictions relative to other possible self-appraisals. Curiously, clinical respondents reported 
feeling that feared image consequences were less likely to happen than subclinical respondents, 
with both endorsing high severity of consequences.  
It is unclear why these striking differences in appraisals may have arisen, as the Lipton 
study did not explain their self inference assessment process study beyond specifying that they 
used open-ended questions to collect image-related beliefs about the self. Our own study 
procedures were similar in that we queried participants using typical core belief exploratory 
questions often applied in CBT (“what would it mean about you, others, or the world”) to 
ascertain inferred beliefs about the self from the intrusive images. It is possible that the nature of 
the questioning between studies differed enough to allow insistence that there was no appraisal in 
our study but an answer for a self-related appraisal in the study by Lipton and colleagues (2010). 
Indeed, in soliciting image-related appraisals, we were more curious about broad interpretations 
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about the image, and we thus investigated both appraisals about the image that related to the self 
and more general appraisals that might exist outside of the self (“how do you make sense of this 
image?”).  
Alternatively, it may be that the population and/or the types of images we captured in our 
interview strategy differed from those in the study by Lipton and colleagues, which resulted in 
discrepant appraisal results. For example, if our sample included people whose images are not 
the prominent obsessional concern and play more of a supporting role for other, more distressing 
obsessional forms (i.e., accompany rather than drive distress), their lack of image-related self-
appraisal might actually be true to their experience. By contrast, if the 2010 study happened to 
recruit participants whose images tend to be the distressing obsessional form that initiates and/or 
drives the OC cycle, it would make sense that feared self-appraisals would be endorsed by all 
participants.  
Image-related compulsions. Although the vast majority of each group reported doing 
something in response to the images, with prevalence rates roughly equivalent to that of the 
Speckens and colleagues sample (2007; the Lipton study did not specifically query about what 
individuals did in response to images), a notable portion denied doing anything in response to or 
to prevent obsessional images. Of interest are the findings that, much like in obsessional doubt, 
subclinical individuals report higher rates of reassurance seeking than clinical individuals, but an 
absence of some strategies noted by the clinical group (washing, superimposing an acceptable 
image). As with doubt, it may be worth investigating the strategies themselves to determine if 
they are in and of themselves particularly helpful or toxic behavioural interventions in relation to 
the OC cycle and symptom severity. After all, both groups report moderately high success in 
compulsions meeting their intended aims. At quick glance, it is possible that some compulsions 
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mimic or closely resemble current treatment approaches (e.g., reshaping or correcting the image, 
which could potentially approximate imagery rescripting), although the endorsement rate is quite 
low. Perhaps more detailed queries of most relied upon or putatively effective strategies might 
further clarify image-related behaviours that keep them at bay vs. those that perpetuate the cycle. 
Moreover, similar sorts of patterns arose with image-related compulsions that were 
observed with doubt-related compulsions. Specifically, there appear to be indications that the 
struggle or interference offered by obsessional images arises not primarily from the obsessional 
phenomenon itself but from the compulsions associated with the images. Once again, although 
distress ratings of the image itself were equivalent between groups, clinical image-related 
compulsions were significantly more distressing than subclinical compulsions. Associations were 
significant such that the greater the rated distress of the image-related compulsions, the higher 
the clinician severity ratings were for the individual’s OCD. Even the correlation between CSR 
and the number of reactive compulsion categories endorsed approached significance, suggesting 
that compensatory strategies related to intrusive images may primarily drive the interference 
offered by the form. 
Image termination. Rather unexpectedly, the vast majority of participants noted that the 
images subside or fade on their own. It is unclear whether this is simply a cue they rely upon 
subsequent to performance of some compulsive behaviour(s) or if it is a truly spontaneous 
manner in which the image simply “goes away.” That is, it is not clear whether the strategies are 
directly effective at making images subside, or if they are completed regardless of their effect on 
the image’s duration, with the image ultimately terminating on its own. This has important 
implications on the OCD cycle and therapeutic interventions, given the notable distress 
associated with the compulsive side. It would be interesting to ascertain individuals’ attributions 
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in this respect and to test these strategies in blanket fashion. Indeed, the moderation in the ratings 
of how successful the compulsions are at achieving their aim, and the varied reports of the 
intentions behind their compulsions, make it difficult to make such conclusions. Roughly one 
quarter of respondents in each group still relied on completion of some image-related 
compulsion.  
Conclusions about images. All in all, this study adds compelling new insights to the 
literature on obsessional images, as it is one of the few existing phenomenological studies on 
intrusive images in OCD and is – to our knowledge – by far the most comprehensive study to do 
so. Our findings across these two research aims offer new perspectives into obsessional images. 
While the literature suggests that intrusive images are significantly distressing and interfering, 
contributing to disorder maintenance and severity, our findings suggest that in the context of the 
entire episode – and relative to other obsessional forms that are present in an episode – images 
may be comparatively innocuous. This finding requires replication through other 
phenomenological investigations but is only possible by the broad approach of our interview. 
Significantly, it appears that image do play a part in the maintenance of the disorder, alongside 
the other form, but perhaps more as fodder or fuel that continues the episode rather than starting 
or driving it. Indeed, intrusive images are not as much at the crux of the episode for most 
individual with OCD as we had thought and research would indicate; in our sample, obsessional 
image were not a crucially interfering component of the episode. 
Obsessional images appear to be less prevalent than expected when more broadly 
investigated, with 64% and 67% in the clinical and subclinical group respectively endorsing its 
presence. They appear to focus predominantly on harm content and to be associated with 
memories (drawing from autobiographical information mixed with fiction) in clinical 
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individuals. Unexpectedly, the most often endorsed appraisal category was one of no self-
appraisals, contrary to existing research, suggesting that the CBT model might not hold true for 
images in the way we might expect. This does not negate the fact that the images might still be 
concerning at face value, raising the stakes of inaction, but participants were fairly insistent that 
they did not catastrophically interpret, at a self-concept level, the meaning of the upsetting 
images. It is of course still possible that this is a function of poor insight or profound shame, 
making it difficult to fully emotionally engage in the material to assess appraisals or report to a 
stranger; additional research can help clarify this point. The high lack of appraisal perhaps 
explains why a number of individuals denied any compensatory strategies in response to their 
images. Nevertheless image-related compulsions are significant in that they appear to drive a lot 
of the distress and interference (symptom severity) suffered by the individual in the disorder. 
This study is the first to explore certain new characteristics of images (e.g., temporal 
orientation of images, image termination criteria, etc.). We discovered that clinical images often 
feel as if they are happening now, with some endorsement of feeling portentous (future-oriented, 
as if they are about to happen). When considered in conjunction with the harm content, rated 
vividness and realness, recurrent nature, and associations with real memories, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that images, when they appear in the OC episode, serve to maintain distress, 
aggravate feared self-appraisals, and provoke compulsive action. Curiously, the overwhelming 
majority of individuals noted that their images terminated by subsiding on their own, which 
contradicts and erodes support in our current understanding of the CBT cycle.  
Of note, the four categories of images reported by De Silva (1986) appear to be well 
reflected here. Both his obsessional and disaster images categories seem to be encapsulated by 
typical obsessions in the form of mental images. His compulsive image category also aligns well 
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with the broad scheme of image-based compulsions, whether produced in response to an 
obsessional image or an obsession in another form (e.g., verbal thought, doubt, etc.). However, 
the ‘disruptive image’ category most closely lines up with a timeline-specific event clarified by 
our first study aim, namely a resurgence of an intrusive image after or during the completion of a 
compulsion.  
This study is also the first interview study to investigate images in subclinical OCD. 
These explorations help us better understand that obsessional images might in fact exist on a 
continuum, much like other intrusive thoughts, as the images of those meeting criteria for OCD 
are not fundamentally different in phenomenology from those without OCD. In fact, clinical and 
subclinical individuals reported vastly similar experiences of their images, especially image 
characteristics, appraisals (or lack thereof), and termination criteria. Slight differences arose in 
vividness ratings and compulsion-related characteristics (and one strategy), cluing us to those 
elements that contribute to diagnostic status and might warrant attention in treatment, should it 
be deemed helpful.  
Theoretical Implications 
Results of this study indicate that there may be a need to update the CBT model in order 
to capture the dynamic and complex relations inherent in OC episodes. First, the basic elements 
or building blocks that comprise the obsessional experience are more varied and layered than we 
assume, with the most frequently endorsed forms consisting of those not even mentioned in the 
DSM, namely, doubt, sensory phenomena, and internal voice. These forms are identified as more 
distressing, more dominant, and more likely to be perceived to initiate the obsessional 
experience. This focus on the form in which obsessional content takes place is significant 
because of the differential impact that the forms have on the experience among individuals and 
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their engagement with the content, provoking the rest of the cycle. In particular, there is good 
evidence that obsessional doubt – capturing many types of obsessional uncertainty – though 
fairly ubiquitous, can be conceptualised as a form, fitting into the CBT model just as verbal 
thoughts or images. There is thus some impetus to further explore and update in the model the 
obsessional forms consisting of doubt and possibly internal voice and sensory phenomena. 
Moreover, while current thinking conceptualises obsessions as almost singular events in 
form (e.g., thoughts about contamination which then washing compulsions), this is evidently 
oversimplified. Significantly, these obsessional forms tend to persist, overlapping with each 
other through much of the OC episode and ever co-occurring with the compulsive act(s). 
Contrary to the position widely held by the CBT community (e.g., Rachman, 1997; Salkovskis, 
1985), the vast majority of these obsessional forms then extended beyond the termination of the 
compulsions, or onset again after the completion of the compulsive behaviour. It may thus be 
more helpful to think of the obsessional experience as an obsessional state. This obsessional state 
would itself be a dynamic and flowing entity with forms interlinked, starting and stopping or 
interacting amongst themselves. The obsessional state would then precipitate and serve as a 
backdrop for compulsive and compensatory behaviours, either persisting throughout or ebbing 
and re-intruding at the same time as the acts. There seems to be consistent support for the goal 
directed model and some possible indicators for the reciprocal model, but additional 
investigation is necessary to properly clarify whether the obsessions that recur after compulsions 
are longitudinally related to compulsions or do so independently. These findings echo Reed’s 
(1985) cautions that the obsessional experience is more like a complex, interconnected web than 
it is the simple picture painted in models of the time. 
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Given this dominant positioning of the obsessional state, it is perhaps not surprising that 
OC episodes were determined by participants to be over through use of termination criteria that 
typically did not involve the compulsion, focusing instead on the absence or subsiding of the 
intrusive obsessional experience or the presence of another subjective internal feeling or sense as 
proxy. It is also possible that these results support the Seeking Proxies for Internal States model 
posited by Lazarov and colleagues (2012), if we conceptualise the internal feelings as a proxy for 
internal states that the individual cannot reach (e.g., the relative absence of a distressing 
obsessional form). It is conceivable that the framing of some of the criteria (waiting for the onset 
of new feelings, such as relief or release, or the ability to “focus on other things”) serve as a 
proxy for internal states that are difficult to access or achieve (e.g., the relative absence of a 
distressing obsessional form). Of note, these termination criteria results offer strong support to 
the SMS posited by Szechtman and Woody (2004). Several descriptions of OC episode 
termination criteria closely resemble their description of yedasentience, especially in terms of the 
internal feelings experienced (e.g., “just knowing” that the object was clean, a sense of “being 
done,” etc.). Further research will be necessary to clarify this. 
We also know that concern about the obsessional content prompts individuals to react 
after their occurrence and, in some cases, pre-emptively intervene before the obsession even 
arises (proactive compulsions, as we have termed them). This provides a new angle into the ways 
in which individuals might further fuel the OC cycle, prime the self-appraisal, or provoke 
obsessional distress without directly interacting with the obsession itself. Indeed, this may 
highlight a pathway between self-appraisals and compulsions that does not (yet) involve the 
obsession directly. More research needs to be completed to determine the impact of proactive 
200 
 
compulsions, especially whether there might be scenarios where they help more than they hinder. 
Their place in the CBT model and cycle is not immediately clear. 
The more detailed phenomenological investigations into doubt and images call into 
question the role of the appraisal in the maintenance of the disorder. While there were strong 
endorsements of problematic self-related appraisals in relation to obsessional doubt, there was 
weaker support among obsessional images. It is unclear at this time whether this is a finding 
specific to the image form but not to doubt or thoughts. At one level, it is possible that images 
are largely sensory experiences that provoke emotions by non-verbal pathways, making it either 
difficult to ascribe verbally-based impressions to it or leading such verbally-mediated appraisals 
to not exist at all. At another level, it may be that the appraisals simply allow obsessions to evoke 
more powerful distress or are only associated with the primarily distressing obsessional form for 
the individual (which was not often the image). This would make obsessions with appraisals and 
those without almost different rungs on the hierarchy of distress and interference. Alternatively, 
it is possible that, as Szechtman and Woody (2014) have posited, appraisals can be produced but 
are not fundamental to the disorder cycle. Further research into various obsessional forms and 
their appraisals will need to clarify this point; in particular, comparisons between verbally-
mediated forms (e.g., internal voice and doubt) and non-verbal forms (e.g., sensory phenomena 
and images) will be particularly useful in determining the role of the appraisal. 
Moreover, these findings do debunk the model by Robbins et al. (2012) positing that 
OCD should be named COD. Indeed, there is such a strong presence of obsessional phenomena 
and detailed, consistent ability to report on various aspects of these obsessional forms that 
obsessions cannot simply be epiphenomena following from compulsions. Instead, the frequent 
similarities between obsession characteristics investigated in our interview (albeit only images 
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and doubt), as rated by clinical and subclinical individuals, support the notion that obsessions are 
dimensional phenomena that exist on a continuum. The obsessional experiences described by 
those with clinically significant OCD and those without are not categorically different 
phenomena, especially at the obsessional level. Instead, the diagnostic status appears to become 
apparent through compensatory strategies, especially with respect to the number and frequency 
of reactive compulsions, though their impact on appraisals may require further investigation. 
Clinical Implications 
These theoretical modifications may also be helpful in clinical practise across assessment 
and treatment. In understanding the true sequential order of OC phenomena, it is clear that there 
is a need to carefully assess and clarify for each individual the manner in which their obsessional 
forms (what type and number) arise and interact, not only amongst themselves but their interplay 
with compulsions. Do the obsessions persist throughout the compulsive behaviours, making it 
difficult to stop, or do they make a resurgence after the completion of these acts, prompting 
repetitions that are difficult to resist? Verbal reports from some respondents informed us that this 
type of insight, outside of any actual intervention, offered some therapeutic relief for the 
individuals, as it helped to distill and explain their chaotic experience and provided a framework 
for understanding their distressing episode. Moreover, parsing the confusing episode into its 
component parts provided participants with some semblance of control and the opportunity for 
spontaneous intervention of their own (e.g., the ability to observe the absurdity of the images or 
doubt, etc.).  
Targeted intervention may also be possible following this individual chronological 
formulation. For example, identifying and understanding the cues currently used to determine 
when the episode has terminated may allow individuals to modify them accordingly. Behavioural 
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experiments can be used with earlier or more practical termination points determined ahead of 
time, according to updated termination criteria from a better-understood episode experience. In 
so doing, individuals would concurrently learn to tolerate the sensations or anxiety, allowing it to 
extinguish, and challenge thoughts or beliefs about what might happen as they learn that 
outcomes remain benign and fine.  
Due to the highly prevalent and distressing nature of these forms, it will also be important 
to inquire specifically about obsessional doubt, the presence of an internal voice, and sensory 
phenomena in the episode. Finding out more about the tone in which the narrative takes place, 
how the individual engages with it, and whether it is accordingly resisted can offer an avenue 
into behavioural experiments to challenge the compelling OCD ideology. Treatment would then 
possibly focus on countering this internal voice and learning whether its tone shifts unhelpfully 
(e.g., more hostile, urgent, and/or dominant?) through CBT exposures or behavioural 
experiments. The introduction of a compassionate, affiliative therapeutic clinician (and later 
internal) voice may be helpful in convincingly contrasting (especially from an interpersonal 
circumplex perspective) this OCD voice. Similarly, inquiring after and attending to sensations 
that may insidiously perpetuate the cycle or heighten distress will allow interventions such as 
behavioural experiments and/or opportunities for exposures with response prevention aimed at 
tolerating the sensations. Assuming that these obsessional phenomena are distressing and 
disorder-maintaining clinical phenomena in OCD, failing to address or target them in an 
appropriate manner may contribute to treatment nonresponse in OCD. 
We are also able to comment in more detail on the obsessional forms we more closely 
investigated. Findings from our doubt exploration suggest that it is necessary to investigate the 
manner in which their doubt manifests, its content, and – perhaps often overlooked – what 
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individuals might be doing proactively to avoid doubt’s occurrence. It may be helpful to explore 
behavioural strategies, such as: tolerating the doubt without intervening (as exposures with 
response prevention or behavioural experiments); completing simply one iteration of the 
compensatory behaviour without repetition; and perhaps incorporating more careful attention to 
the sensory experience to make the memory more vivid.  
Cognitive strategies may also be important, beginning with understanding the manner in 
which their doubt initiates and/or maintains the OCD cycle and ensuing distress. It may also be 
helpful to identify the appraisals being made in relation to their sense of self (What does the 
individual think the obsession and its content reveals about him/herself? How is it personally 
threatening?) and evaluate its accuracy appropriately. The questions utilised in the interview 
invariably extracted from individuals direct self-appraisals and may thus be helpful in this 
purpose. Core belief work (often used in CBT) focused in this manner may render these intrusive 
obsessional forms less compelling and thus more tolerable without compulsive intervention. 
Cognitive intervention may also require individuals to challenge their worst-case scenarios with 
most likely outcomes and clarify and strengthen their self-concept, especially in the moral 
domain. Other helpful and necessary strategies may become clear as the obsessional doubt 
phenomenon is further clarified.  
Currently, assessment of obsessional imagery has not yet become a standard part of 
clinical work and may thus be underreported if neither the client nor clinician know to 
distinguish between thoughts, impulses, and images. Of note, if the CBT model does not actually 
apply well to the non-verbal imagery experience of individuals with OCD, then CBT strategies 
may doubly fail to treat OCD. That is, verbally-based CBT with ERP may neglect to reach 
image-related distress and impairment, unless clinicians specifically attend to the OCD images, 
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and will not detoxify this type of obsession if that is not the mechanism of their maintenance. 
There is some indication that self-appraisals still apply to some individuals’ images, and they 
may thus still benefit from CBT. For those endorsing no appraisals, there are a variety of 
imagery-based treatments that might be noteworthy. Specifically, imagery techniques can exist 
on two dimensions: (1) targeting intrusive negative imagery as opposed to promoting positive 
imagery, and (2) addressing and working with the image either directly or indirectly. For 
example, direct image-based strategies encompass interacting with the image itself by way of 
imaginal exposure, imagery rescripting, or creating new and positively valenced imagery. 
Indirect strategies, on the other hand, conceptualise the image as a mental representation and thus 
more broadly aim to intervene by offering imagery-competing tasks, focusing on mindfulness 
strategies, or even retrain one’s attention (Holmes et al., 2007). It is possible that the 
comparatively lower distress provoked by images indicates that the relative benefit of targeting 
images will also be less than that of more distressing forms (e.g., internal voice or doubt). 
Indeed, it may be that image-specific interventions are ‘low-hanging fruit’ for individuals whose 
primary obsessional complaint is not of images. It may be worthwhile exploring its power as an 
adjunctive treatment. 
Limitations  
To the best of our knowledge, this exploration was the first attempt to 
phenomenologically explore and elucidate the chronology of the OC episode, as well as define 
and explore doubt in OCD, by interviewing individuals on their lived experiences. This has 
enabled us to rebuff assumptions about the nature of obsessions and their (seemingly) 
straightforward relation with compulsions. This was possible through a wide-angle approach 
(i.e., setting the scene with the episode at large first) before focusing on obsession-specific 
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queries. This broad approach also instills confidence in our prevalence estimates, as there would 
be minimal concern for selection biases toward specific obsessional forms. Yet, significant 
questions remain about certain aspects of the obsessional experience, as revealed in gaps in our 
study, and it will be helpful for future research to address these phenomenological questions. 
Specifically, clarifying the role that image appraisals play, as well as gathering more information 
about the internal voice or narrative and its possible place as an obsessional form alongside 
sensory phenomena.  
These findings have also allowed us to operationalise OCD doubt using a bottom-up 
approach, that is, driven by descriptive data from participants themselves, rather than a top-down 
approach, hypothesised and arbitrarily settled upon by researchers. These novel insights stand 
apart from the existing literature, which reveals a scattered landscape, in which researchers 
conceptualised and therefore tested their own definitions of doubt in silo-like fashion without 
directly exploring the phenomenology of obsessional doubt among individuals with OCD. In a 
similar vein, our own questions regarding the experience, while attempting to remain open-
ended, are yet guided by our conceptualisations of doubt (e.g., inquiring about conviction, the 
way in which it manifests, etc.). As such, our results are not nearly as driven by a bottom-up 
approach as a purely qualitative study. 
Another strength is that each participant interview was conducted by this author, who is 
trained in clinical assessment, offering both trained clinical judgement and consistency 
(removing interrater variabilities in how questions asked and how answers rated or interpreted). 
Yet, we recognise that this study was limited by a small subclinical OCD group sample, and 
participants’ retrospective self-report will necessarily be skewed by hindsight bias and filtered 
through their own understanding of their obsessional experience. As always, it is also possible 
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that demand characteristics contributed to participant responses, in spite of attempts to ask open-
ended questions of participants, by the types of questions being asked by the researcher.  
 We also recognise that the explorations into compensatory strategies did not offer an 
exhaustive check into whether each reported behaviour was conducted in an excessive and/or 
time-consuming manner, given our lengthy interview and its time constraints. Instead, the 
entirety of the behaviours performed in relation to the obsession were confirmed to meet 
compulsion criteria. As such, it is difficult to ascertain if some individual behaviours may not be 
as repetitively performed or excessive in terms of its intended functionality as we would expect 
of truly defined compulsive acts. On the other hand, it is possible that compulsions may be better 
understood as a repertoire of acts performed with some distress- or obsession-related intent, 
rather than a more singular action performed repetitively. Later studies will need to clarify this, 
as it may distinguish those helpful acts (i.e., appropriate and helpful in terminating the episode) 
from those that maintain the disorder cycle.  
It also should be noted that the use of a clinician-administered interview to investigate 
these issues is limited due to the nature of retrospective participant report. Reported recollections 
may be distorted by the participant’s own ideas about the order in which events typically occur, 
rather than the actual order of the phenomena, or may be coloured by the very post-hoc 
rationalisations bemoaned by Robbins and colleagues (2012), resulting in participants 
misremembering the true sequence in a more rationally explicable manner. Given that this 
appears to be the best available methodology, results will have to be interpreted with these 
limitations in mind. Future research can undoubtedly advance both study methodology and 





 All in all, these study findings highlight the need to update some key elements of the 
CBT model widely used to understand the development and maintenance of OCD and to treat the 
disorder. It appears that our current understanding of OCD is somewhat incomplete, as it fails to 
capture significant elements of the OC experience and the correct chronology of events. Given 
that these results diverge in ways from our current assumptions, there is a need to acknowledge 
that the obsessional experience may in fact be a dynamic state consisting of multiple, interlinking 
forms that start and stop throughout the episode, driving distress. This obsessional state likely 
serves as a backdrop that persists through and extends beyond the compulsive experience, which 
itself must be broadened to capture compulsions performed preventatively (prior to distress) in 
addition to reactively (after obsessional distress). Of import, obsessional doubt and the internal 
OCD voice are overlooked but highly impactful forms and warrant further theoretical and 
clinical investigation. This research thus offers another way of investigating the OCD experience 
and a clarified foundation from which we can develop a better understanding of the development 
and maintenance of the disorder. Moreover, we are hopeful that by targeting overlooked forms 
and their related self-appraisals and compulsions in therapy, individuals with OCD may improve 
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Appendix A 
Summary Report on Preliminary Imagery Study 
Methods 
Participants. Participants were 54 members of the community assessed in the past 
several years using the Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview, Version 6.0 (MINI 6.0; 
Sheehan et al., 1998) and the OCD module of the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for 
DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; Brown et al., 1994) for those assessed before DSM-5 and, post-DSM-5, the 
MINI 7.0 (Sheehan, 2014) and ADIS-5 (Brown & Barlow, 2014). Forty-two individuals were 
diagnosed with clinically significant OCD (61.9% according to DSM-IV-TR criteria and 38.1% 
according to DSM-5 criteria). The subclinical sample comprised 12 individuals with a principal 
diagnosis of another DSM disorder (16.7% assessed according to DSM-5 criteria) but who 
reported OCD symptoms that did not reach clinical significance (i.e., symptoms did not occupy 
over one hour per day and/or were not associated with distress or impairment in functioning). 
OCD was the principal or co-principal diagnosis for 74% of clinical participants; other 
principal or co-principal diagnoses included social anxiety disorder, panic disorder, agoraphobia, 
specific phobia, major depressive disorder, bulimia nervosa, generalised anxiety disorder, 
posttraumatic stress disorder, and dysthymia. Clinician severity ratings (CSRs) from the ADIS 
were assigned for all participants. According to the scale, a CSR of four or higher denotes 
clinically significant difficulties. Participants in the clinical OCD group were 83.3% female with 
a mean OCD CSR of 5.1 (SD of 0.8) and a mean age of 29.6 years (SD of 8.7). Subclinical OCD 
participants were 83.3% female with a mean OCD CSR of 2.6 (SD of 0.5) and a mean age of 
26.2 years (SD of 4.0). 
Procedure. Participants were recruited by email from an existing participant database 
and provided with a link to the study, designed on the Qualtrics platform. After informed consent 
was obtained, they were provided with a definition and several examples of OCD-specific 
obsessional thoughts and asked to identify and describe the most distressing obsessional thought 
from the past week they had experienced. Participants then identified the form in which they had 
experienced the thought (i.e., word-based thought, image or picture in one’s mind, or impulse). If 
they did not immediately identify an obsessional image, they were prompted further (e.g., “Did 
you experience any images associated with the thought” or, eventually, “have you experienced 
any intrusive images ever?”).  
All participants who reported an intrusive, recurrent image at any point in the study were 
asked to describe the image, verify its recurrent nature, and report on several characteristics. 
They were asked to rate the frequency, duration, perspective, sensory experience, and vividness 
of the image, among other characteristics. Participants also reported on the distress and 
interference associated with the intrusive image, the strategies they used to get rid of the image, 
and the perceived success of those compensatory strategies. All ratings were completed on an 
eight-point Likert scale. In appreciation of their time, participants were entered into a draw for 
two $50 gift cards. See Figure 1 for study outline.  
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Figure 1. Procedure for online study of intrusive images. 
Study 1 Results 
Content of obsessional thoughts. All but three clinical participants (92.9%) reported 
experiencing an obsession in the past week, whereas 66.7% of subclinical participants reported 
experiencing an obsessional thought in the past week. The content of the obsessions/obsessional 
thoughts reported by participants was categorised according to content domains used by 
Radomsky and colleagues (2013) in a multisite study of intrusive thoughts: contamination, 
doubting, harm-related, religious or immoral (i.e., repugnant), sexual, and other obsessions. An 
additional category, symmetry/exactness (e.g., not just-right experiences), was added because 
there is good evidence for its existence as a distinct content domain (Goodman et al., 1989) and 
in OCD literature (e.g., Coles, Frost, Heimberg, & Rheaume, 2003).  
Obsessional content in the clinical OCD group was distributed widely across the content 
domains. See Table 1 for details. The most commonly reported type of intrusive cognition 
pertained to harm, injury, or aggression. Obsessions categorised under “other” were surprisingly 
similarly common, most typically capturing superstitious fears (e.g., “unable to enter certain 
areas of my house [for fear of] something horrible happening”) or imagined failures 
(interpersonal conflict or failing to achieve personal values) that were difficult to categorise 
under other OCD domains. Doubting intrusions were the next most commonly reported among 
clinical OCD participants, followed by contamination concerns. The least common intrusion 
types were symmetry/exactness, religious/immoral (i.e., repugnant), and sexual obsessions. 
Those in the subclinical OCD group reporting a recent intrusive thought described a much 
narrower set of obsessional content, only endorsing three types of obsessions overall. Doubting 
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obsessions were most common among subclinical participants, followed by harm / injury / 
aggression and contamination intrusions. 
Table 1. 
Percentage of Online Respondents Reporting Obsessions of Specific Content Domains 
 Clinical (N = 42) Subclinical (N = 12) 
Harm/Injury/Aggression 23.8% 16.7% 
Other intrusion 23.8% -- 
Doubt/Checking 19.0% 33.3% 
Contamination 11.9% 16.7% 
Symmetry/Exactness 4.8% -- 
Religious/Immoral 4.8% -- 
Sexual 4.8% -- 
No obsession 7.1% 33.3% 
 
Prevalence of intrusive images. Of 42 clinical participants, 25 individuals (59.5%) 
experienced their most recent obsessional thought in the form of a mental image or picture. 
When prompted further, an additional 5 participants (11.9%) – who had denied experiencing 
their most recent obsession as an image – reported that an intrusive image did accompany their 
verbal or urge-based obsession; images reportedly co-occur with these alternative forms 63.4% 
of the time on average (range 30 to 90%). A total of 36 (85.7%) participants reported 
experiencing intrusive images at some point in their lifetime. These intrusive images were 
largely noted to be recurrent (97% of participants).  
Similarly, of the 12 subclinical participants, 6 (50%) reported experiencing their most 
recent obsessional thought as an image. The remaining 6 participants reported that their 
obsessional thoughts are not accompanied by images, nor had they ever experienced intrusive 
images in their lifetime.  
Content of intrusive images. Given that not all obsessional content co-occurred with, or 
was even linked to, intrusive images, the content of the intrusive images was categorised 
separately from intrusive thoughts initially described. Reported content of intrusive images was 
categorised according to the themes identified by Lipton and colleagues (2010) in their interview 
study of OCD images:  
(1) unacceptable ideas of harm (repugnant images of aggressive or violent harm, harm 
caused by acts of commission or omission, and catastrophic outcomes),  
(2) contamination and somatic complaints (contamination-related images of illness, 
disease, uncleanliness, etc.),  
(3) social rejection (images of negative social judgments or humiliation), and  
(4) miscellaneous superstitious or senseless imagery.  
Prevalence rates of images according to these content domains are displayed in Table 2. 
Examples of harm-based images described in our sample of OCD individuals include “my cat 
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climbing to the windowsill and then leaning on the net and falling through” and “heaps of bodies 
being cleaned out of a gas chamber, being tortured, skinned alive, set on fire, disemboweled, 
etc.” Descriptions of harm-related images experienced by subclinical participants did not appear 
to differ from those of clinical individuals. For example, subclinical participants reported 
mentally seeing “I didn't [check the lock] right and play through the image of it not being 
locked” or “images of [my husband] hurt somewhere, or having to identify him [at the morgue], 
or crying over him when he's dead.”  
No subclinical participants reported any images of other content domains, whereas 
clinical OCD individuals described other images such as “black, fuzzy, crumbling growths on 
the inside of my throat” and “paint… on my feet, hands or clothing causing it to spread to 
unwanted areas” (contamination and somatic complaints). Clinical participants also described 
images of social rejection (“the reaction [of others] because of the racial slur [I fear I uttered]”) 
and miscellaneous images (“I keep picturing my girlfriend being pregnant”).  
Table 2.  
Percentage of Online Respondents Reporting Images of Specific Content Domains 
 Clinical (N = 25) Subclinical (N = 6) 
Unacceptable ideas of harm 74.2% 100% 
Contamination and somatic complaints 14.3% -- 
Social rejection 5.7% -- 
Miscellaneous 2.9% -- 
 
Frequency of intrusive images. Clinical participants reported experiencing their 
identified intrusive image frequently, with 61.1% endorsing at least daily recurrence of the 
particular image (and 41.7% noting that it recurred multiple times a day). One third (33.3%) 
reported experiencing their images on a weekly basis, and the remaining 5.6% of clinical 
participants experienced images only several times a year (i.e., not quite monthly). By contrast, 
subclinical participants reported more even distribution in the perceived frequency of their 
reported intrusive image. Only 41.6% of subclinical participants endorsed intrusive images at 
least daily (33.3% noting multiple recurrences in a day). One quarter (25%) of subclinical 
participants reported monthly images, 16.7% weekly, and another 16.7% noted images that 
intruded several times throughout the year (less than monthly). 
Characteristics of intrusive images. Images were reported to be rich sensory 
experiences, involving on average two senses for clinical and subclinical participants alike, but 
always visual. Although individuals mostly reported experiencing images in only one of the 
offered formats – a snapshot-like photo, a series of photos, or a video – a small portion (25% of 
clinical and 33.3% of subclinical individuals) noted that their images were more complex, 
involving two or more of these formats. Images were typically observed from the field 
perspective – i.e., as if out of one’s own eyes – according to 58.4% of clinical and 50% of 
subclinical participants. A smaller portion of individuals reported images viewed from an 
observer’s perspective (19.5% clinical, 16.7% subclinical), or an even mix of the two (e.g., 
switching between the two views). Of those reporting images, 66.7% of clinical and 58.3% of 
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subclinical participants reported that their image had added significance, because it was linked to 
an actual, unpleasant memory or an imagined, feared prediction. Participant descriptions were 
coded to clarify whether their image was linked to the past memory or to the future prediction. 
Images were generally reported to be moderately distressing and interfering. See Table 3 for 
detailed results. 
Table 3. 
Characteristics of Intrusive Images Identified by Clinical and Subclinical Online Participants. 
 Mean (SD) 
 Clinical (N = 36) Subclinical (N = 12) 
1. Vividness, 0-7 4.6 (1.7) 4.6 (1.4) 
2. Senses involved 
       Sight 
       Sound 
       Touch 
       Smell 













3. Image as…  
       Video 
       Snapshot 










       vs. colour 
88.9% colour 100% colour 
5. Image duration 
       < 1 min. 
       1 to 2 mins. 
       2 to 5 mins. 
       5 to 15 mins. 
       15 mins to 1 hr 















6. Temporal association 
       Past memory 
       Future prediction 
       Mix of both 











7. Distress, rated 0-7 4.7 (1.3) 4.1 (2.2) 
8. Interference, 0-7 3.5 (1.8) 3.5 (2.0) 
 
Image-based compensatory strategies. All individuals reported feeling compelled to act 
in order to remove the images. See Table 4 for rates of endorsement for the various strategies 
offered in the study; as participants frequently reported more than one strategy, percentages do 
not sum to 100%. A large percentage (61% of clinical participants and 75% of subclinical 
individuals) reported performing an image-based compulsion other than those offered as options 
in the study. Consequently, their described compulsions were further coded into recurring 
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themes, such as avoidance, self-reassurance, superimposing a different sensory experience (e.g., 
“turn up the music or TV loudly,” “focus on a very intense stimulus [i.e., cold shower/hot 
shower],” or “shake my head”), playing the image out to the end, etc. The remaining 
miscellaneous compulsions included such acts as using humour, counting to three, and repeating 
the phrase “broken brain back of the train” to oneself. Image-based compensatory strategies (i.e., 
compulsions) were only moderately helpful in removing the image. 
Table 4. 
Percentage of Online Respondents Reporting Image-Related Compensatory Strategies 
 Clinical (N = 36) Subclinical (N = 12) 
Distract from image 66.7% 91.7% 
Suppress image in head 58.3% 58.3% 
Block image 30.6% 58.3% 
Correct image 22.2% 16.7% 
Other compulsion 61.1% 66.7% 
    Self-reassurance 27.8% 16.7% 
    Satisfy compulsive urge 
(e.g., check, wash) 
16.7% 8.3% 
    Superimpose sensory 
experience 
8.3% 16.7% 
    Avoidance 5.6% -- 
    Breathing skills 2.8% 8.3% 
    Play the image out to end -- 16.7% 
    Miscellaneous 11.1% 8.3% 
Success of compensatory 
strategies, 0-7 
3.4 (1.6) 4.1 (1.5) 
 
Study 1 Discussion 
The results of this online study support our expectations and corroborate the results of the 
limited literature on obsessional images in OCD, although discussion of the results is necessarily 
limited by the small sample size of the subclinical participant group and the online format of the 
study. Consistent with our expectations, given extant literature (Lipton et al., 2010; Speckens et 
al., 2007), intrusive images were revealed to be common, brief, and multisensory experiences. 
These images, often seen as if out of participants’ own eyes (from a field perspective), are 
colourful, moderately vivid, distressing, and interfering, regardless of the individual’s clinical or 
subclinical status. They appear to be future-oriented images (i.e., seemingly predictive intrusive 
images), highlighting the need to further explore its implications and clarify more accurately the 
temporal perspective associated with the images (past, present, or future focus). 
The content of the images themselves were largely of unacceptable ideas of harm or 
aggression, which may explain the affective impact of obsessions: ego-dystonic aggressive 
images may provoke fear and distress and also invoke moral emotions, such as guilt and shame, 
in turn making individuals more sensitive to such images and obsessional content. Unfortunately, 
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individual appraisals of intrusive images and emotions provoked by intrusive images were not 
explored in this study, and we plan to address this lacuna in our next study. 
The duration of images reported by participants varied widely, spanning seconds to 
hours. However, it is unclear whether these duration estimates reflect one occurrence of an image 
that spans the length of time reported, or if these episodes capture multiple recurrences of the 
image, which flashes in much briefer fashion (i.e., one image lasting an hour, or one hour-long 
episode with 60 one-minute recurrences). The open-ended phrasing of the question (“how long 
did the (image) experience last?”) makes it difficult to interpret the findings, beyond a notable 
brevity in the subclinical image experience, also warranting a more thorough exploration in our 
next study. It may be that clinical images are inherently longer in duration than subclinical 
images, or that they more persistently recur within an episode. It is also possible that clinical 
levels of distress lead to difficulty disengaging attention from the image and lengthier 
experiences with the distressing images.  
 All participants attempted to get rid of the image, often using strategies such as 
distraction, suppression, and blocking the image. Strategies used did differ somewhat between 
groups, but comparisons are difficult due to the small subclinical sample size. It is unclear 
whether strategies implemented more frequently by subclinical individuals are actually more 
effective strategies, allowing them to remain at subclinical status, or if clinical individuals have 
attempted them but discontinued their use due to lack of success (i.e., it fails at more intense or 
frequent levels). Alternatively, it may be that the actual type of strategy used is not significant in 
achieving respite or relief from images; support for this notion comes from the fact that rated 
success of compensatory strategies in subclinical individuals is not significantly higher than that 
of clinical individuals’ rated success. It should be noted that respondents were asked specifically 
to rate success in getting rid of the image, which presupposes that image removal is their aim. It 
may be that individuals have other goals (e.g., relief from distress, or extinction of doubt) rather 
than getting rid of the image, for which these strategies prove more successful or for which they 
perform other acts. Further exploration of image-based compensatory strategies performed by 
individuals, their aim in performing such behaviours, and their perceived success in 
accomplishing that goal is needed. 
Significantly, this study offers insight into the way in which these intrusive and 
disturbing images arise. It appears that images are often and easily endorsed as the focal 
obsessional experience. For some individuals, images accompany the main obsessional 
experience, typically verbal in nature; while these individuals seemingly do not consider these 
images to be the principal obsessional cognition, the images do appear to be an additional 
component of their obsessional experience. These images serve as rich sensory experiences that 
evoke distress, interfere with functioning, provoke compensatory action, and often prompt 
flashes forward (of a predictive nature) or backward (into past memories). Curiously, they would 
not report obsessional images unless otherwise prompted, though the images frequently co-occur 
with their obsessional verbal thoughts or urges. This renders these images a likely overlooked 
but recurring issue that may undermine attempts to intervene therapeutically. It is therefore 
important to further investigate and explore the way in which intrusive images arise in OCD. 
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Although the online format of this study offered a more inclusive look into OCD images, 
conclusions from our study findings were limited by several aspects of our study methodology. 
Limitations of this study include the lack of clinician judgment in identifying OCD images (vs. 
those arising from other disorder content, such as depression or eating disorders) and a 
sometimes-lengthy gap in time between diagnosis and study completion for some participants, 
ranging from months to years. This study also lacked information about other aspects of OCD 
images, such as associated emotions, relevant appraisals, and more specific details about the 
duration and recurrence of images. Additionally, it is possible that participants self-selected for 
the study based on existing experiences of images, given that descriptions of the study in 
recruitment materials focused on images. A broad study of the phenomenology of all types of 
obsessions may in fact better reveal the true prevalence of intrusive images, which may be lower 
than estimates from image-focused studies. To address these limitations, we designed a 
comprehensive interview-based follow-up study focusing on the phenomenology of obsessions, 




Phenomenological Interview of the Obsessive-Compulsive Experience 
 
ID #:  ASD ID #:  DATE:  
SEX: M   /    F AGE:  DOB:  
 
We are interested in repeated unwanted, upsetting thoughts people have and the forms that they take. 
When thoughts are unwanted but keep coming back, almost like an upsetting pop-up, we refer to them 
as obsessional thoughts. We are interested in obsessional thoughts that you might have.  
An obsessional thought can be a thought, image, or urge to do something, and it is unwanted, yet 
persistent and difficult to control. Obsessional thoughts tend to reflect concerns that are irrational, 
extreme, unnecessary, and/or excessive even though they can feel rational, normal, necessary, and 
justified in the moment. Obsessional thoughts can also reflect concerns about committing acts that 
contradict one’s values, morals and personality.  
Examples of obsessional thoughts include concern that the stove has been left on and will cause a 
dreadful accident; fear that your hands are “contaminated,” and you will make someone terribly ill; 
concern that you have harmed someone without realizing it (e.g., by having hit them with your car); 
concern that you are not right with God; thoughts/impulses of doing or saying something terrible to 
someone whom you would never want to harm; concern that something you have done or failed to do 
will cause harm; and unwanted images or mental pictures of a sexual, morbid, or grotesque nature.   
Obsessional thoughts cause distress or discomfort and often lead to corrective action, such as checking, 
cleaning/washing, repeating, seeking reassurance, mental “correction”, undoing, rationalizing or self-
reassurance.  These are often called compulsive behaviours, or, when performed in a very specific way, 
can be referred to as compulsive rituals. 
 
A) RECENT OC EPISODE 
 
1. Can you think of a recent episode when you were feeling particularly distressed or emotional 
because of an obsessional thought?   Y    /    N  [N: probe for any obsession, ever] 
 
2. When was this? 
 
 
3. What was the nature / content of your obsessional concern? 
 
 
4. Is this the obsessional thought that has been bothering you the most in the past week? 
 Y    /    N [Y: “I’d like to get more information about this recent episode.” 
 N: Elicit most distressing thought in past week (A3) and when (A2).]  
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B) OC EPISODE TIMELINE 
 
I’d like to get some more information about this episode. I would like to get from you a detailed recap of 
the episode in a bit, but these first few questions will help me get a broad sense of your experience. 
 




2. In this episode, can you recall experiencing… 
  
✓ /  
How much of the 
episode was occupied 
by … (% or duration)? 
Rank from 
most -> least 
distressing. 
… any word-based thoughts?  Examples. 
 
 
   
… an internal voice, dialogue, or conversation in your 
thoughts?  Whose voice?  What was the tone? 





   
… any images or pictures in your mind?   
 
 
   
… any doubt-related thoughts or impressions? 
 
 
   
… a sense you were going to do something or act in a 
way you did not want to act?  Describe. 
 
 
   
… any felt senses, including any felt sensations in your 
body?  Describe. 
 
 
   
… any other types of experiences? 
 
 
   
 
If more than one endorsed: Which one was predominantly your experience? 
If more than one endorsed: Which one did you become aware of first in your experience? 
 
3. Do you feel compelled to do anything in response to these intrusive experiences?      Y    /    N 
What do you do?  
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4. If you count from the first thought to when you knew the episode was over, how long did the 
episode last? What was the very last thing to happen? 
 
 
How did you know the episode had ended? What made you feel like or know that it had ended? 
(e.g., did it end with the completion of the compulsion, or did the obsessional thought stop 






5. In as much detail as possible, try to give me a vivid sense of what the experience was like for 
you.  Think of the episode as happening along a timeline, and walk me through a detailed play-
by-play of what happened.  Put yourself back in time, as if you are currently reliving and 
experiencing it again, and then walk me through the episode as if it is in the present.  For 
example, first I feel __ then I realise I’m thinking __ and I do ___. If it helps, you can mark the 
different parts of your experience on this line (provide pen and sheet with timeline).  If you feel 
comfortable, you can shut your eyes to try to bring the episode clearly to mind.  [Note: Ensure 
all endorsed forms are covered on the timeline. Make sure you code the point at which the 
compulsion took place.  See below for prompts.] 
 
a. What happened right before ___ OR right after ___? 
 
b. Tell me about what happened next.  
And then what happened? 
 
c. When you thought / felt / were doing ___, what else was going on for you? 
 
d. Walk me through that experience in detail. 
 
e. To pinpoint place on timeline: Was that experience before / after ___?  
 
f. At what point did you do [compulsion]? 
 
g. Only to elicit more detail if they have already identified a form / behaviour: 
What did you do in response to ___ ? 
What did that feel like in your body? 
What was going through your mind at that time? 


























Did any obsessions overlay (or co-occur temporally with) the reported compulsion?   




Now I’d like to ask you about doubt in your experience.   
If Y to doubt in section B2, skip to C2 and say, “You mentioned earlier that you felt a sense of doubt or 
uncertainty in this most recent episode.” 
 
1. Do you ever experience a feeling of doubt or uncertainty in these OC episodes?  Y   /   N 
[If N, confirm that participant has NEVER experienced any doubt, uncertainty, feelings of 
hesitation or reservation at any point in past for both obsessional thoughts and during, before, 
or after performing compulsion or ritualised act.  Skip to Section D if no doubt ever.] 
 
2. Has this doubting experience happened more than once?   Y   /   N 
How often does this take place? (% of time doubt exists within OCD experience) 
 
 
3. If doubt WAS endorsed in current episode, say: 
I’m going to ask you some questions about various aspects of your doubting experience.  I’d like 
you to focus on the doubt and uncertainty that came up in the episode we just talked about. 
 
If doubt WAS NOT endorsed in current episode, say: 
I’m going to ask you some questions about various aspects of your doubting experience.  I’d like 
you to focus on the most recent OC episode in which you experienced this feeling of doubt.  
When did this take place? 
 
 
DOUBT: CHARACTERISTICS  
4. Content / Context 
What was the doubt about / what were you doubting?  [Note: if unclear, inquire as to whether 




5. Sensory experience 
How would you describe this doubt / feeling of uncertainty? (What would you call it?) 
 
 
How do you experience your doubt?  Is it a felt sense in your body, a verbal stream of thoughts, 
a felt knowledge, or some other sensory state? 
 
 
Depending on how doubt is experienced: What does the doubt sound like?  Where in your body 
do you feel this doubt?  What senses are involved in the experience (sight / sound / smell / taste 






To what extent do you believe the doubt? Is the doubt warranted / a real probability or is true?  






Does your conviction or belief in your doubts ever change or fluctuate?    Y    /    N  
How much / often does it fluctuate?  0 to 100% of time.   









What emotions does this doubt elicit / evoke? 
anxiety /   fear Y   /   N 
depressed / low  mood Y   /   N 
anger    Y   /   N 
guilt    Y   /   N 
shame    Y   /   N 
What emotion do you feel the most? 
 
If do not endorse any emotions from above list, prompt with, “Do you feel ___ with the doubt?” 
 
10. Excessiveness / Insight 
To what extent do you believe your doubt is excessive or senseless?  How do you know this? 











12. Resistance / Success of efforts to resist 
Do you try to resist the doubt?  To what extent do you feel able to resist the doubt? 0 (not at all) 


















16. Interference / Impairment 
How much does the doubt interfere with your ability to do other things at the time?  0 to 10.  





17. Intrusive quality 
Does the doubt seem to pop up / intrude into your awareness, without you deliberately thinking 





18. Situation / Trigger 
When does it come up?  What are the circumstances under which it occurs?  What tends to 








19. Anticipated consequences of doubt 
What would happen if the doubts came true?  What would be the worst case scenario if your 





20. Likelihood of anticipated consequences of doubt 




21. Severity of anticipated consequences of doubt 




22. Meaning of anticipated consequences of doubt 
What would it mean about you / other people / the world if these doubts came true and the 





23. Appraisal of doubt 
How do you make sense of the doubt?   
 




24. Reactive doubt-related compulsions 
Do you do anything in response to the doubt once it has occurred?  What do you do? 
 
Check things repeatedly  
Distraction  
Think specific thoughts to counteract doubt  
Suppress thoughts  
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Seek reassurance  




25. Aim of reactive doubt-related compulsions 
What is your aim or goal in performing these behaviours?  What are you hoping will happen 




26. Success of reactive doubt-related compulsions 
How successful are these strategies in the short term?  0 to 10.  In the long term?  0 to 10. 
 
 
27. Frequency of reactive doubt-related compulsions 





28. Proactive doubt-related compulsions 
Is there anything that you do to try and prevent doubt from entering your mind in the first 
place?  How do you do this?   
 
Distract yourself  
Avoid thinking about things  




29. Aim of proactive doubt-related compulsions 
What is your aim or goal in performing these behaviours?  What are you hoping will happen 
after or while you complete these acts? 
 
  
30. Success of proactive doubt-related compulsions 





31. Frequency of proactive doubt-related compulsions 




Do you resist the urge to do any of these behaviours?    Y   /   N    How?  Why/Why not? 
 
33. Success of efforts to resist 
If Y to 33, Do you generally feel able to resist performing these behaviours?  0 to 10.  What helps 





Are these behaviours (summarise above) distressing or upsetting to you?  How distressing?  




35. Interference / Impairment 
Do these behaviours (summarise above) interfere with your ability to do other things?  How 
much do these doubt-related behaviours interfere with what you are doing at the time?   





Now I’d like to ask you about intrusive images in your experience.   
If Y to images in section B2, skip to D2 and say, “You mentioned earlier that you experienced images or 
pictures in your mind in this most recent episode.” 
 
1. Do you ever experience unwanted images/pictures in your mind in these episodes? Y   /   N 
[If Y, ensure that they are unwanted, intrusive, and unpleasant.   
 If N, confirm that participant has NEVER experienced any intrusive images or pictures in mind at 
any point in past for both obsessional thoughts and during, before, or after performing 
compulsion or ritualised act.  Skip to Section E if no image ever.] 
 
2. Have these intrusive images happened more than once?   Y   /   N 





3. If intrusive image WAS endorsed in current episode, say: 
I’m going to ask you some questions about various aspects of the image(s) you experience.  I’d 
like you to focus on the image(s) that came up in the episode we just talked about. 
 
If intrusive image WAS NOT endorsed in current episode, say: 
I’m going to ask you some questions about various aspects of the image(s) you experience.  I’d 
like you to focus on the most recent OC episode in which you experienced this intrusive image.  
When did this take place? 
 
 
IMAGE: CHARACTERISTICS  
4. Perspective 
From which perspective do you experience this image? Field/own eyes vs. observer/other’s eyes.  
 





In what form do you experience the image?  Is it like a photo, a series of photos, or a video?  
 
 
6. Content / Context 
What is in the image?  What are the images of?  [Note: if unclear, inquire as to whether the 
image is related to the obsessional thoughts or the compulsive behaviour] 
 
 
7. Sensory experience 
How do you experience your image?  Is it a felt sense in your body or some other sensory state?  




Is the image in colour or black & white? 
 
9. Vividness 
How vivid is the image?  0 to 10 
 
10. Fictionality 
Is the image entirely of an actual memory?  Is it a purely fictional creation?  Or is it a mix of both 






How real does the image feel?  0 (completely unreal) to 10 (completely real) 
 
 
12. Temporal orientation 




To what extent do you believe the image is actually in this tense?  0 – 100% 
 
14. Emotions 
What emotions does this image elicit / evoke? 
anxiety /   fear Y   /   N 
depressed / low  mood Y   /   N 
anger    Y   /   N 
guilt    Y   /   N 
shame    Y   /   N 
What emotion do you feel the most? 
 
If do not endorse any emotions from above list, prompt with, “Do you feel ___ with the image?” 
 
15. Duration 
How long does your image typically last? Is this image with you throughout your OC experience 




Does your image ever change or fluctuate?  0 to 100% of time.  How?  Under what conditions? 
 
 
17. Resistance / Success of efforts to resist 














Is the image distressing or upsetting to you?  How distressing?  0 (not at all) to 10 (extremely).   
 
 
21. Interference / Impairment 
Does the image interfere with your ability to do other things?  How much does the image 
interfere with what you are doing at the time?  0 to 10.  Examples of impairment (social / work / 





22. Intrusive quality 
Does the image(s) seem to pop up in your awareness, without you thinking about them first? OR 




23. Situation / Trigger 
When does it come up?  What are the circumstances under which it occurs?  What tends to 




Do you experience this image on its own OR does it co-occur with other kinds of obsessional 





25. Appraisal of image 
How do you make sense of this image? 
 
 




26. Anticipated consequences of image 





27. Likelihood of anticipated consequences of image 




28. Severity of anticipated consequences of image 
How bad would it be if that happened / the consequences came true?  0 to 10 
 
 




29. Reactive image-related compulsions 
Do you do anything in response to the image once it has occurred?  What do you do? 
 
Correct image  
Superimpose acceptable image  
Reshape image  
Check repeatedly  
Distraction  
Suppress image  
Seek reassurance from others  
Other strategy  
 
30. Aim of reactive image-related compulsions 
What is your aim or goal in performing these behaviours?  What are you hoping will happen 




31. Success of reactive image-related compulsions 






32. Frequency of reactive image-related compulsions 




33. Proactive image-related compulsions 
Is there anything that you do to try and prevent the image from entering your mind in the first 
place?  How do you do this?  
 
Block image  
Distract yourself  
Avoid thinking about image  




34. Aim of proactive image-related compulsions 
What is your aim or goal in performing these behaviours?  What are you hoping will happen 
after or while you complete these acts? 
 
35. Success of proactive image-related compulsions 
How successful are these strategies in the short term?  0 to 10.  In the long term?  0 to 10. 
 
 
36. Frequency of proactive image-related compulsions 








38. Success of efforts to resist 
If Y to 37, Do you generally feel able to resist performing these behaviours?  0 to 10.  What helps 










40. Interference / Impairment 
Do these behaviours (summarise above) interfere with your ability to do other things?  How 
much do these image-related behaviours interfere with what you are doing at the time?  0 to 





Thank you for all that helpful information!  I’ve asked all the questions I need to ask, and we’ve talked 
about quite a lot today, including [briefly summarise the different forms discussed]. 
 
Is there anything we haven’t asked about your OC episodes (or qualities of your OC experience) that you 




Lastly, I’m curious - What was this experience like (talking about these phenomena)?   










Termination Criteria Coding Manual 
 
Coding manual for the termination or end of the obsessive-compulsive episode 
AND the termination or end of obsessional forms (doubt, images) 
 
Code 1 = Yes if the participant reports content consistent with each category,   
    OR 0 = No if the participant does not report any content consistent with the category. 
If the obsessional form has not been endorsed, leave the cell blank. 
 
Category: Completion of compulsion 
- The individual states s/he knows the episode has ended or is over once the compulsive act has 
been completed or because the compulsion has been performed. 
Category: Intrusive experience subsided 
- The individual states s/he knows the episode has ended or is over because the obsessional or 
intrusive experience has subsided or has gone. This obsession or intrusion can appear in the 
form of an internal narrative, verbal thought, image, sense of doubt, urge, or preidentified 
sensory experience (e.g., buzzing, physiological anxiety symptoms, etc.). [Edit: This category is 
distinguished from the third category below (internal feeling or sense) in that it captures the 
removal of negative affect or sensations (e.g., less tension, anxiety, heart racing, etc.) as the 
termination criteria in the individual’s experience.] 
Category: Internal feeling or sense (e.g., relief, release, yedasentience) 
- The individual states s/he knows the episode has ended or is over because of a subjective 
internal, emotional, or physiological feeling. This can consist of a sense of relief, release, or calm. 
Alternatively, it can appear as a sense of satisfaction, completion, or yedasentience (i.e., a 
satisfying internal sense that they have completed a task). [Edit: This category can be 
differentiated from the second category above (intrusive experience subsided) in that it 
catalogues the introduction or addition of new affect or sensations, likely positive affective 
experiences, as the termination criteria in the individual’s experience.] 
Category: Not applicable  











Doubt Content Coding Manual 
 
Coding manual for the reported content of doubt 
 
Code 1 = Yes if the participant reports content consistent with each category,   
    OR 0 = No if the participant does not report any content consistent with the category. 
If the obsessional form has not been endorsed, leave the cell blank. 
 
Category: Doubt about one’s safety status or the state of things (i.e., obsessional content) 
- The individual states that his/her doubt focuses on typical obsessional content (i.e., is an 
obsession that occurs in the form of doubt). In this category, the doubt is the idea itself that 
prompts or evokes the compulsion. For example, this doubt is of the nature that asks the 
question, “am I safe, or is it clean?” [Edit: This category captures uncertainty about one’s safety 
status or the state of matters and thus whether a behavior has been performed, e.g., “did I lock 
the door or turn off the straightener?”]  
Category: Doubt about having performed compulsions properly enough or sufficiently to avert harm 
- The individual states that his/her doubt focuses on whether s/he has performed his/her 
compulsion properly or well enough such that harm has been averted. For example, this doubt 
asks the question, “did I do it properly?” Often, this is explicitly couched with a statement of 
certainty, such as “I know I did it, but did I do it well enough?” 
Category: Doubt about one’s senses, capabilities, or cognitive capacity 
- The individual states that his/her doubt focuses on whether his/her senses, memory, sanity, 
and/or other cognitive capabilities can be trusted. This doubt can arise either in the context of 
the compulsion or the individual him/herself. For example, this doubt asks questions such as: “I 
know I checked but can I trust what I saw,” “am I capable of doing it [and keeping myself clean 
or safe],” or “I remember doing it, but can I believe my memory?” Responses that are consistent 
with poor memory or cognitive confidence belong to this category. 
Category: Not applicable  
- The individual states that his/her doubt focuses on content other than the categories identified. 
 
 
 
